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ABSTRACT
Theology and SCience need dialogue since they are interdependent areas of human
experience and enquiry. Each discipline needs to be open to the discoveries and insights of
the other. Mutual agreement on fundamental issues is not a point of departure; we must
rather ask whether what one discipline is doing can have any. relevance for the pursuits of
the other?
The theologian, JUrgen Moltmann, and the philosopher of science, Sir Karl Popper, find in
"openness" a common methodology. By openness they mean that present realities are
partial; that truth lies ahead anticipated within systems that "complexify" in evolutionary
openness and transcendence.
Moltmann sees the fullness of truth unveiled in the eschaton. The Resurrection of Jesus is
the anticipation in time of the eschatol1 towards which history is moving. Within history,
creative acts open up the closed systems of the world for they transform present reality.
These closed systems are revealed by the Cross which identifies the negatives (political
oppression, economic inequality, cultural and sexual discrimination, ecological abuse,
personal apathy) within history. In the "negation ofthe negatives" such creative acts are
real antlcipations of the eschaton.
However, the roots of openness in the world lie in creation. Creation in the beginning is a
creation with open possibilities involving the evolution of complex open systems marked by
growing indeterminacy of behaviour. These systems are in communication with the
transcendent future into which they are evolving. This transcendent future is the trinitarian
God: open to creation, to history and to man in suffering but creative love. The inner-
trinitarian life is identified with worldly processes through the openness of the Cross. The
completion of the creative process lies in the kingdom of glory. Here there is participation
of transcendent creation in the unlimited freedom of God.
Evolutionary openness is the overall Popperian methodology. It pervades the entire
spectrum of Popper's thought: from physics, through epistemology and social theory to
biological and evolutionary theory.
Critical rationalism is the bedrock of Popper's thought. The search for certainty becomes
the enemy of truth, since rationalism rejects any dogmatism. Rather, rationalism means
open critical discussion and experientialleaming. For this reason Popper rejects induction
and replaces it by the logico-deductive method. Here justification is replaced by
falsification: knowledge is conjectural, constantly threatened by refutation and progressing
to problems of increasing depth and complexity and hence to greater truth-likeness. Even
animal evolution begins with a problem - the problem of survival.
Human evolution, however, develops outside the human person. It is applied knowledge.
With the development of human language, the self-conscious mind (World 2) emerges and
with it the autonomous world of the products of the human mind, World 3. (World 1 isthe
physical world of nature). In these later developments something new emerges which can
interact with the lower levels by a process of downward causation. A picture emerges of a
creative, expanding, evolving, indeterminate universe. Indeterminism, i(self,' lies ","
somewhere between perfect chance and perfect determinism. Lastly in his rejection of
holism, historicism and utopianism, Popper has eschewed the collective and replaced the
responsible individual at the social centre of his openness. The struggle for rational
openness needs the individual response, the individual initiative and mutual critical
discussion. This means that piecemeal social engineering is the practical model for the
reform of the open evolutionary society.
Moltmann and Popper both envisage an evolutionary struggle towards truth: truth is but
anticipation. The growth of truth leads to increased complexity, greater openness and
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What do the German theologian, Jiirgen Moltmann, and the contemporary maverick
Austrian-born British philosopher, Karl Popper, have in common? The former is the
generally recognized "Father" of liberation theology and the latter the debunke~ of the
hallowed "verification principle" of the scientific method. Each has travelled far from
the genesis of his work. Moltmann's Theology of Hope (1977) has led to The Trinity
and the Kingdom of God and to his pneumatological doctrine of creation, God in
Creation. After Popper's initial Logic of Scientific Discovery (1934) diversification into
the realm of Darwinian evolution led to 171e Open Universe and The Self and its Brain.
We believe that a thorough investigation of "openness" as the criterion of truth, both
theological and scientific, will assist the dialogue between theology and science which is
still in its infancy. Moltmann's God's promise, open Trinity, open Church and open
systems run parallel to some extent to Popper's open society, open universe and
evolutionary epistemology. It is proposed that all reality, including the Godhead in a
specialized sense, is process and change, that is, "experiment", "trial and error" and
"gradual modification" acting in "interrelated and interdependent open systems".
Contemporary theology, faced with the problem of massive global suffering, has been
actively aware of the theological implications of political and liberation movements. It
has consequently highlighted the liberating doctrine of redemption at the expense of the
complementary doctrine of creation. Theologians like Moltmann would insist that
human salvation cannot be divorced from the material universe. Furthermore some
features of the natural world such as cosmological, biological and social evolution have
been so well established that theology -needs to take them into account. 1
The developing dialogue with science becomes more feasible as science has over the last
generation moved away from a simple mechanistic view of the world. Quantum physics
and the discovery of the subatomic world have led some scientists to question how
accurately science can know reality.2 Consequently many contemporary scientists are
more modest in the truth-claims that they make about the physical ~orld.3
Consequently they have begun to listen with greater respect to the truth-claims of other
disciplines, even theology.
Popper has been a pioneer. He insists that no scientific theory may ever be positively
verified ("verification principle"), it may only be shown by experimentation to be false
("falsification principle"). Thus there is no absolute certainty in any scientific theory,
but only a gradual approximation to truth: in criticising competing theories a steady
approach is made towards objective truth.4
Impetus for a continuing dialogue between theology and science was provided by Pope
John Paul II in June 1988. He insisted that the
...vitality and significance of theology for humanity will in a profound
way be reflected in its -. ability to incorporate these [scientific]
findings....The matter is urgent. Contemporary developments in science
challenge theology far more deeply than did the introduction of Aristotle
into Westem Europe in the thirteenth century....Christians will
inevitably assimilate the prevailing ideas about the world and today these
are deeply shaped by science. The only question is whether they will do
this critically or unreflectively, with depth and nuance or with a
shallowness that debases the Gospel and leaves us ashamed before
history.S
Earlier in the same speech the Pope had asserted that theology and science are
interdependent, and that collaborative interaction is required, for
Science can purify religion from error and superstition; religion can
purify science from idolatry and false absolutism. Each can draw the
other into a wider world in which both can flourish [so as to establish]
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... a relational unity between science and religion ... [in which, without
identity or assimilation, each may be] radically open to the discoveries
and insights of the other. 6
While it is indeed true that the epistemology of theology differs from that of science, a
common sociology of knowledge does, nevertheless, arise from the dynamics of history
and culture. For this reason the following thesis is presented.
It is our contention that evolutionary openness is the epistemological method. All is
provisional, imperfect, yet straining through the complexity of interconnected openness
to a self-transcendence where the vestiges of an objective truth, both theological and
scientific, lie. The truth lies ahead in "complexifying openness". This then is
Moltmann's and Popper's common methodology: openness that is dogmatically
eschatological and scientifically provisional.
Chapter Two outlines Moltmann 's overall theology: eschatology, Cross, Trinity,
creation, history, man, politics, and Church and State. This treatment prepares the
ground for an investigation of his comprehensive method.
In the third chapter "openness" is proposed as Moltmann's theological method. It will
be shown. that openness pervades his eschatology, theodicy, doctrine of the trinitarian
God and creation, extending finally into his anthropology in historical, political and
church life. All lies open in the promise of God's future.
Chapter Four analyses Popper's philosophy of science. This chapter discusses critical
rationalism as Popper's basic scientific method; opposes "falsificatior!" to the ortho_dox
scientific method, "induction"; outlines Popper's distinctive logico-deductive method
and its epistemological implications; proposes that objective knowledge is nevertheless
possible within a never-ending evolutionary development; situates the products of the
human mind in a Neo-Platonic World 3; espouses body-mind interaction and finally opts
for a form of indeterminism in an intrinsically open universe.
3
Chapter Five likewise addresses Popperian issues: here his social and political theories.
This chapter, too, proposes critical rationalism as the genesis of Popper's intellectual
life; critically outlines Popper's famous attack on Plato; exposes the two other enemies
of the "open society", Hegel and Marx; attacks historicism and its laws of historical
prediction; and finally proposes the open arid democratic society as the preferred societal
model for scientific and social advancement.
In Chapter Six Popper's overall method is proposed as evolutionary openness. This
chapter first explains the meaning of "openness" in Popper's thought and then uncovers
the roots of openness in critical rationalism, the logico-deductive method, Darwinian
natural selection, indeterminism and individualism.
Chapter Seven, "Openness and the Possibility of Truth", seeks a basis of comparison for
Moltmann's and Popper's uses of "openness". The chapter begins with some discussion
of the relationship between theological and scientific truth with "complexity" a major
issue; thereafter Moltmann's and Popper"s differing approaches to transcendence are
analyzed; this is followed by an analysis of the core, "open systems"; finally the
sociological counterpart, the "open society", is appraised.
Chapter Eight will glve special attention to "openness" as used by Moltmann and
Popper as the basic methodological principle to aid theological and scientific dialogue.
This study will draw from all Moltmann's and Popper's original sources as well as from
various commentaries on their works. Th~se commentaries, together with journals, will









This thesis is concerned with the intellectual and the spiritual rather than the physical. Whereas
the constraints of the second law of thermodynamics affect the expansion of physical systems we
assume that this law does not apply to the intellectual and spiritual realms.
As examples see:
Barbour, A, Religion in an Age of Science, Barbour, I (ed), Science and Religion, Ferris, T,
Coming ofAge in the Milky Way, Gilkey, L, "Nature, Reality and the Sacred: A Meditation in
Science and Religion", Zygon, Griffin, D.R, The Reenchantment of Science, Whitehead, A.N,
Religion in the Making.
"Recognition that science has discovered a wide range of truth is compatible with the conviction
that a wide range of truths it has not discovered exists, and that its formulation of the truth it has
discovered is one-sided, presenting only abstractions from the full truth." (Griffin, D.R, The
Reenchantlllent ofScience.)
A full exposition of this will be outlined in Chapter 4. However, the main outlines of this theory
will be found in The Logic ofSCientific DiscovelY and Conjectures and Refutations.






Jiirgen Moltmann's work is situated in the context of a revival of theological interest in
eschatological and apocalyptic themes in the nineteen sixties. 1 Moltmann himself first
came into international prominence as a result of his work Theology ofHope which first
appeared in 1964. This seminal work, complemented by The Crucified God and The
Church in the Power of the Spirit, seeks to make Christian revelation intelligible within
the context of modern man's framework of thought; yet, without distorting the
uniqueness of the Christian message.
M. D. Meeks in his Origin of the Theology ofHope contends that Moltmann's Theology'
of Hope reflects the influence of both Karl Barth and Ernst Bloch.2 From Barth he
gained the concept of the "wholly otherness" of God. God's self-disclosure in the
Word is an "eternal evenf'3. This means that God is totally transcendent in that His
being has its own time and history of revelation. 4 On the other hand, Moltmann learnt
from Bloch's left-wing Hegelianism that hope could not be reduced to inwardness and
self-transcendence. Transcendence is not above us or within us. Rather, it is conceived
in the future before us. Bloch expresses the concept thus: "The forward-look has
replaced the upward-Iook"S. Human existence finds meaning in the future state of
humanity and the world. This hope arises from the confidence that there will be a new
life or novum ultimum6. Bloch, a Marxist atheist, is indebted to the apocalyptic aspects.
of the Judeo-Christian tradition7 but witho·ut the belief in a transcendent personal God.
Thus the novwn arises from the "not-yet" of the world that is open-ended towards the
future. Carl E. Braaten expresses the concept as follows:
Bloch has taught us to understand anew the overwhelming power of the
still open future and of hope which anticipates that future, for the life
and thought of Man as well as for the ontological quality of all reality. 8
In view of the above influences, Moltmann's Theology ofHope opens man's hope to the
world processes by a positive transformation of man's total reality. 9 Moltmann
expresses the concept thus:
Everything real goes beyond its processual front into the possible ...
only the real-possible (Real-Magliche) yrovides the Utopian imagination
of man without its concrete correlative. 0
The objective possibilities combined with the world-transforming aspect of Christian
eschatology makes tangible the "world-overcoming hope of Christianity" 11. Attention
will now focus specifically on Moltmann's contention that: "There is therefore only one
real problem of Christian theology, which its object forces upon us and which in turn
forces on mankind and on human thought: the problem of the future. ,,12
2.1. ESCI-IATOLOGY
Bloch distinguishes the Bible from other religious books. The Bible sees its origin not
in a primordial golden age which bears sacred repetition but, rather, in a story with a
beginning and an end. However, it is primarily a story whose end is increasingly seen
in its beginning. 13 For Moltmann, however, the basis for this hope does not arise from
the processes of the world nor from the transcendence of history14 but in the promise of
the coming of God. This God has been incarnated both in the history of Israel and in
the promissory history of Jesus of Nazareth. 15
The history of revelation of Jahweh in the Old Testament is directed" ... away from the
appearances in which [the promise] is uttered into the as yet unrealised future which it
[the promise] announces." 16 Thus, when Israel entered the promised land, she
7
recognized her new life in Canaan as a fulfilment of the promise. This promise had
been given to the Israelites in the wilderness and caused their fathers to journey to this
promised land. After Israel had settled in the promised land she continued to live, in
spite of continual temptation to do otherwise, in terms of the God of the Exodus. He
was the God of the covenant who was guiding His people into a future that He had
promised them. Even the experience of judgement upon Israel at the time of the
collapse of the two kingdoms (which meant the annihilation of all the assurances of her
previous history and the covenant with God) was not seen by the prophets as the
annihilation of God's faithfulness to His people. 17 Indeed, Yahweh's judgment served
to strengthen the prophets' conviction that out of the future would come an unheard-of
new salvation.1 8 A new covenant would arise. This covenant would bring salvation not
only to Israel but to all nations involved in the history of Yahweh's relationship with
Israel. 19
Thus, for Moltmann, hope is a power that is aroused in man in the light of his faith in
God's promises of a definite future existence for man. Hope mediates the future to the
present reality. In this way it releases man from the claim of the present. It makes it
possible for him to share even now in the light and freedom of the coming kingdom.
Yahweh is, above all, the coming God.
In the words of Moltmann,
The future is, therefore, not a dimension of his eternity, but is"his own
movement in which he comes to us. This gives the future of God a pre-
eminence over his past and his present in history. His action in history
in the past and the present are aimed at this coming and attain their
significance from his future. Who God in Himself is will be revealed
then. We know about God here only in an historically provisional
way.20
As noted earlier, the essential problem in Christian theology is the problem of the
future. God is not the "eternal present"21, but reveals Himself in the form of
promise. 22 Thus in the appearing of Yahweh and the uttering of the word of promise
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there is no religious sanctioning of the present, but a breaking from the present towards
the future. God reveals himself by proving His faithfulness. In fact the essential
predicate of God is the fulfilment of His promises. 23
Moltmann understands the resurrection of Jesus as the event in which the New
Testament witnesses saw the certainty of the future fulfilment of the promises of God.24
The resurrection cannot be verified as historical event. It is not an historically
observable event; rather, it is an eschatalogical novum.25 In Moltmann's words, the
resurrection of Jesus means " ... that He has been received into the future of the
'kingdom of heaven' and the coming glory of God ... Jesus Himself has been translated
into the future of the new,,26. Put differently, the resurrection did n9t bring the fullest
realisation of the promise; rather, it becomes the guarantee of the future God intended
for his wholecreation.27
Moltmann expresses himself thus:
... the full redeeming mode of man is present, and is only present, in
history in the helpless power of the crucified Christ who was raised. _
Christ is the anticipation of the coming God, and of the transformation
and redemption of the world that will come with him, together with the
humanity of the new man contained in that transformation. 28
The Christian faith is essentially eschatalogical and it is grounded in the occurrence of
an "historical event", the raising of Jesus.
Faith therefore lives from the promise of the fullness of that event. The Resurrection of
Jesus makes the fulfilment of God's promises certain.29 Therefore the raising of Jesus is
", _.-. .
to be understood in the way of promise. It is thus the eschatalogical authentication of
God's promise and the dawning of its fulfilment. The content of the promise of the
future of Yahweh reaches staggering proportions in the Christ event. It is seen as
directed towards the universal community of mankind and involves the annihilation of
all the contrary and negative aspects of life such as sin, death and the law.30
9
For the above reasons then, the future realized in the paroL/sia is a real future which is
a new creation (novwn). This means that it is not the return of someone who has
departed but the imminent arrival of something new)l It is not totally separate from the
.reality we now experience. Rather it works upon this reality by awakening hope and
establishing resistence to the present. In this way it breaks away from the past towards
the things that are to come. Therefore the eschaton is not merely unveiling but also
final fulfilment (adventus).
In The Future of Creation Moltmann addresses the question of whether the present
determines the future, or the future the present. He asks, "Is the future theologically the
'revelation' of the present [apocalypse] or is the present the realized anticipation of the
future [fulfilment]?"32 He dismisses Barth's eschatology, for there "nothing new" is
revealed, only the revelation of what "has already been completed")3 As a correction
he cites Paul, who would have Christians participate now in the cross of the present
sustained by the promise of what will be. Moltmann says, speaking of Paul:
... he moved statements about the universal lordship of Jesus not only
into present hidueness, but out of the perfect and present into th~ future
(1 Cor 15:28) and consequently did not bestow the title of cosmocrator
on Jesus. 34
Rather, Moltman sees that the "end of history" is not its "completion and revelation but
its key")5 The future does not emerge from the present; rather, the present becomes
" ... the anticipation, the prolepsis, the sending ahead of God's future ... ,,36. In this life,
justification and reconciliation are the beginnings of the transformation of the present
. age into the divine righteousness of the lastday.37 The justified man already lives in the
n~w creation, but he suffers the "old" as a contradiction of what will be.38
Moltmann rejects eschatological extrapolation which would see the future as already
given in Christ. Rather he insists that the eschaton is now hidden within the present.
The eschaton is a "beginning" that strives to complete itself. 39 However, not all
experiences of the present may be regarded as eschatological statements; they are only
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eschatological to the degree that they herald the eschatological promIse. Moltmann
expresses it thus: "In so far, therefore, as the eschatological future has entered into our
historical present, the present becomes the foundation of our knowledge about the
future" .40
In summary it may be said that Christian eschatology does not report future history. It
is not an extrapolation of the future from within history. Rather, it formulates an
anticipation of history's future from within the midst of history.4l The basis of
historical eschatology, then, lies in the eschatological history of Jesus Christ. Christ
risen is the beginning ~f the eschatological end.42
2.2. CROSS
The Resurrection of Christ is the pledge of the universal future. It is a nova creatio, the
herald of the future kingdom. As such it is the antithesis or contradiction of a God-less
and God-forsaken world; therefore, the as yet unrealized future of a promise is
contradicted by given reality. The spirit of the risen Christ as promised transforms the
negative, contradictory aspects of the world.
Can mankind hope without the acceptance of the reality of suffering? Can Christ be
risen without the suffering and death of the Cross? In fact there is no true theology of
hope which is not first of all a theology of the Cross. 43 Suffering and hope are held in
creative tension. Both are aspects of Christian eschatology; hope relates to the future
and suffering to the present. Each is contained within the other.
For Moltmann, Christianity is, at root, faith in the crucified Jesus Who is " ... the
foundation and measure of Christian theology as a whole"44. It is through an
understanding of the passion of Christ that God is known. Moltmann acknowledges
Karl Barth's comment that: " ... the Crucified Jesus is the 'image of the invisible
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God '" .45 He expresses these sentiments in the following words: "When the crucified
Jesus is called the 'image of the invisible God', the meaning is that this is God, and God
is like this" .46
For Moltmann, then, the crucified Jesus, far from being interpreted merely
soteoriogically, becomes a statement about God himself. This has a staggering
implication which he expresses in these words: " ...but if the death of Jesus is supposed
to be first a statement about God before it is an assurance of salvation addressed to men,
does this not mean 'a revolution in our concept of God' ... ?,,47
Consequently, Moltmann is led to reject both theism (God as an all-powerful, perfect
and infinite being) and atheism for both begin with the pre-supposition that God and
man are fundamentally one being. He comments: "Therefore what is ascribed to God
must be taken from man and what is ascribed to man must be taken from God" .48 Thus
Moltmann feels that the God conceived by theism has removed man from his humanity.
He makes man appear helpless, imperfect and finite. Conversely, atheism has raised
fallible humanity to a level of perfection and consequent dehumanization. 49
However, in Jesus' suffering, humans can have solidarity in God. Moltmann expresses
this truth in these words: " ... suffering is overcome by suffering, and wounds are healed
by wounds". 50 Expressed eschatalogically, "Taking part in Christ's visible suffering in
the world, the believer shares in Christ'sinvisible glory". 51 A God Who suffers, a
God o(pathos, is affected by human suffering in history since He is interested in His
creation. In contradistinction, a Godhead Who is perfect needs nothing for pure
causality cannot suffer. Without emotions He is apatheia (unchangeable).
Moltmann feels that the pathos of God, although only an aspect of His being, expresses
the relationship of God to His people. This notion was inspired by Rabbi Abraham
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Heshel.52 Moltmann writes of the pathos of God:
In his pathos the Almighty emerges from himself and enters into the
destiny of the chosen people. In his passion he shifts his esse into an
inter-est through his covenant with his people._ Consequently he himself
is affected by the actions and passion of his people.... He takes the
people of his love seriously to the point of suffering· under their action
and of being capable of being hurt by their disobedience...53 .
What are the implications for man of his "new" concept of God? If God is apathetic,
man becomes homo apathetikos; if God is divine pathos, man becom~s homo.
sympathetikos54. It is evident that man's view of God affects man's view of man. The
consequences of this equation for mankind and history will be explored in a later section
of this chapter.
God enters par excellence into the relationship of pathos and sympatheia in Jesus Christ.
This is principally for those unable to satisfy any conditions: sinners, the godless and
those forsaken by God.55 Moltmann expresses the pathos of God thus: .
The God~f9rsaken Son of God takes the eternal death of the forsaken and
damned upon himself in order to become God of the forsaken and
brother of the damned. Every person damned and forsaken by God can,
in the crucified one, experience community with God. The Incarnate God
is present and accessible in the humanity of every man. 56
Such is the pathos of God that it is not merely vicarious suffering for us. God not only
participates in the suffering of humanity in the world, but makes human suffering His
own by taking death into His own life. Consequently the death of Jesus was a
happening within the Godhead. It is more than "for us" .57
If God can be described ontologically as "future"; as "person." and as "Crucified One",
further thought must be given to the doctrine of the Trinity. Christopher Morse
expresses the problems as follows:
To speak of a self-differentiation and a self-forsaking within God's
"inner-life" in the historical crucifixion of Christ leads us to ask what
sense such a conception makes in view of the traditional Christian
affirmation that God is triune. 58
The "event" of the Cross makes nonsense of a simple concept of God; it invites
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trinitarian distinctions for it is a "death in God,,59. The next section focuses on
trinitarian differentiation within the unity of the Godhead and links this with the events
of salvation history, especially the cross of Jesus.
2.3. TRINITY
Moltmann's doctrine of the passion of God cannot be understood unless placed within
the context of trinitarian thought. Indeed, a biblical doctrine of the Trinity has to begin
with the axiom of God's passion. In The Crucified God Moltmann argued that the
problem of the Trinity arises when one looks at the cross:
If the cross of Jesus is understood as a divine event, i.e. as an event
between Jesus and his God, it is necessary to speak in trinitarian terms of
the Son and the Father and the Spirit. In that case the doctrine of the
Trinity is no longer an exorbitant and impractical speculation about God,
but is nothing other than a shorter version of the passion narrative of
Christ. ..60
Thus Moltmann proposes that a doctrine of God be developed " ...within earshot of the
dying cry of Jesus,,6l for the death of Jesus was a happening within the very Godhead.
Jesus died because God His Father abandoned Him. Thus the agony of the Son in His
Godforsakenness is also the agony of the Father; it isa "happening" between God and
God. 62 The Father forsakes His own Son and rejects Him. Thus Jesus is the forsaken
God. However, the Father suffers the death of the Son in the passion that is His love;
but the suffering of the Father is different from the suffering of the Son. Moltmann
affirms:
... both Father and Son act and suffer in the surrender; and the Cross
brings the Son together with the Father into a complete fellowship of that
will which is called love.... On the cross Jesus and his God and Father
are divided as deeply as possible through the accursed death; and yet
they are most deeply one through their surrender. Out of this happening
between the Father and the Son the surrender itself emerges, the Spirit·
which accepts the forsaken, justifies the godless and makes the dead
live. 63
Thus in the Cross God forsakes God. In this event he speaks of the "crucified God,,64
and that "God himself died". 65 Moltmann insists that such terminology should not be
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taken too literally and later prefers to speak of "death in God,,66. The Father delivers67
up the Son; but Jesus consciously and willingly68 gave Himself up so that it was" ... a
path of suffering that He entered upon quite deliberately, a dying that He consciously
affirmed"69.
Thus there is a basic conformity of will between Father and Son: on the one hand, the
Cross divides Jesus and the Father to the point of total separation; on the other hand, in
Their mutual surrender or "community of will,,70 They are totally united. Moltmann
expresses the thought in these words,
But this inner unity of Jesus and his God is expressed at the poin.t of their
total separation - when God abandons the Son of God on the cross.
Because the Crucifixion is both historical abandonment and
eschatalogical surrender, unity in separation and separation in unity are
one in the crucifixion.71
Moltmann has insisted on the trinitarian doctrine of the Cross.72 Thus, from what
transpires between the Father and the Son on the Cross, the Spirit proceeds. This Spirit
is called the "unifying God,,73 Who unites Father and Son and, on the other hand, .
unites the entire creation (including history) with the Son and the Father. In the words
of Moltmann,
The Spirit is the glorifying God. The Spirit is the unifying God. In this
respect the Spirit is not an energy proceeding from the Father or from
the Son; it is a subject from whose activity the Son and the Father
receive their glory and their union, as well as their glorification through
the whole creation, and their world as their eternal home. 74
A fuller exposition of Moltmann' s pneumatology will be given in the next section on
creation.
Thus, as a consequence of the "happening" within the Trinity, the being of God opens
to man, history and creation for the sake of the crucified Christ.75 Moltmann expresses
the consequences for history and the world in these words:
World history - creation's history of suffering and history of hope - is
integrated in the trinitarian processes of God and is experienced and
formed theologically in the light of this presupposition. To recognize
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the crucified God means seeir;: oneself together with the suffering
creation in this history of God.7
The Trinity is nota self-contained community in heaven, but becomes an eschatological
process open to history and to mankind. Christopher Morse expresses the concept in .
these words: "... God as a triune process of relationality extending out from the
suffering of the Cross through history to incorporate the world and thereby in this Spirit
make all things new" .77
Consequently the distinction between the immanent Trinity (God-in-himself) and the
economic Trinity (God-for-us) is not valid. The events of salvation history such as
creation, redemption and the liberation of creation through the indwelling of the Spirit
and future glorification do not happen outside God, in His acts, as it were, but within
God Himself, transforming the divine community in Their inner relationships.
Moltmann is clearly unhappy with the distinction between "immanent" Trinity and
"economic" Trinity for, "... the God Who loves the world does not correspond to the
. God Who suffices for Himself".78
Moltmann does not entirely dismiss the distinction. He wishes, rather, to locate it in
doxology.79 He will not abstract the Cross from the inner life of the immanent Trinity
for it has, as we have seen, played a major role in constituting that life. He states: "The
pain of the .Cross determiQes the~inner life of the· triune God from eternity to
eternity. ,,80 Indeed, Moltmann grounds the immanent Trinity in the economic Trinity.
He says,
Just as the cross of the Son puts its impress on the inner life of the triune
.God, so the history of the Spirit moulds the inner life of the triune God
through the joy of the liberated creation when it is united with God. 81
It would seem that Moltmann aims at a relationship of interaction betw"een the immanent
Trinity and the economic Trinity, while preserving their distinction to some degree.
Roger Olson expresses the notion in these words,
The economic Trinity not only reveals the immanent Trinity, but also has
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a 'retroactive' effect upon it ... All of this means that while God's
relationship to the world does not simply correspond with his
relationship to himself, it does affect it. The relationship between the
inner life of God and his acts in the world history is not one of original
vis-a-vis cop~, not 'Idea', vis-a-vis 'appearance', but is a 'mutual
relationship'. 2
The concept of the openness of the Trinity to creation and history will be developed in
later sections of this chapter.
Moltmann's more dynamic doctrine of the Trinity necessitates an investigation of the
ancient question: "How is the unity of God to be understood?" The unity of the three
divine persons is neither a homogeneous. essence of God (homoousios) nor a simple
absolute subject. In both cases Moltmann sees an ever present danger of abstract
monotheism dissolving the trinitarian distinctions into a modalistic unity. 83 Moltmann
argues that both Rahner and Barth are modalists84 and that their strict monotheism will
make Christology impossible. Moreover, he finds it impossible to reconcile
monotheism with the Crucified God. He says,
The strict notion of One God really makes theological Christology
impossible, for the One can neither be'parted nor imparted ... [thus]
Strict monotheism obliges us to think of God without Christ and
consequently to think of Christ without God as well. 85
For these reasons Moltmann proposes to follow the tradition of Eastern Christianity by
starting with the threeness of the Godhead and then making the unity the problem. He
states:
... the unity of the Trinity cannot be a monadic unity. The unity of the
divine tri-unity lies in the union of the Father, the Son and the Spirit, not
in their numerical unity. It lies in their fellowship, not in the identity of
a single subject. 86
As he argues in this way, Moltmann arrives at a social understanding of the doctrine of
the Trinity.' He believes that his doctrine has so linked the distinctions and unity of the
three persons that Their threeness has not been reduced to a unity, nor Their oneness
dissolved in the threeness. He explains,
The unity of the triunity lies in the eternal perichorisis of the trinitarian
persons. Interpreted perichoretically, the trinitarian persons form their
own unity by themselves in the circulation of the divine life. The unity
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of the trinitarian life lies in the circulation of the divine life which they
fulfil in their relation to one another. 87
In the above model the Trinity is not a fixed geometrical figure. Rather, the Trinity is
an historical process of reciprocal relationships between persons of a divine community.
These triune persons both take active initiatives and are acted upon according to Their
function in creation, redemption and the new creation. 88
In terms of the above analysis Moltmann arrives at a doctrine of the Trinity constituted
by the history of God's suffering love, open to creation and the world and realized in the
kingdom of glory. In the next section Moltmann' s doctrine of creation with its strong
trinitarian and pneumatological undertones is examined.
2.4. CREATION
In the Preface to God in Creation: An Ecological Doctrine of God, Moltmann sees
creation as primarily a pneumatological doctrine. He writes, "By the title God in
Creation I mean God the Holy Spirit. God is the 'Lover of Life' and His Spirit is in all
created things". 89 In .eschewing theologies associated with what he calls "monotheism
of the absolute subject,,90, he sees God in creation rather than over creation. God in
creation is strongly pneumatological, for creation
... exists in the Spirit, is modelled by the Son and is created by the:.-
Father. It is~.. from God, through God, and in God... [Such aT
trinitarian concept of creation binds together God's transcendence and his
immanence. 91
Moltmann sees God as immanent in His creation. This "means that His Spirit is the very
spirit of the universe, sustaining the initial creation out of His creative energy. Creation
is thus not simply a single event occurring in the past b'ut a continuing event right up to
the advent of the eschaton. It is both a creatio exnihilo and a creatio continua.
Attention will be focused first on the Jewish Cabbalistic metaphor of the zimsum. This
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is God's self-limitation.92 This metaphor enables Moltmann to explain creatio ex nihilo.
God "contracts" or withdraws into Himself in order to go out of Himself. This self-
movement of God allows "space" for creation. Put differently, in Moltmann's words,
"His creative activity outwards is preceded by this humble divine self-restriction" .93
God's self-limitation creates a negativity, for the space which comes into being is God-
forsaken space; initial creation is thus ex nihilo, that is, without any prior conditions.
Moltmann explains:
~-_'~... ,__ ',,,",~. .·r.,;.;<~';~</::i)',~ ~;;:;<.~.;", $~;_:"'';'4'':--;;'':,,~;~-,),~,;:- ?~..; :;-;'}'It_~'5{~:i::,';0~'\'':,-·_ .. "'-" ',." ·.'J,?~;:.,t/'.':: • ~_ ~,j.... ~-.I" ~\.~ r :>i.. ~'" ~,~1,~ ,....-. ''""'
,i' 'Thespa~'Nhi~h",coD1~~'int9J),~ing~y~ifflj'u~] ... is a literally God-
'>. ..;}+\i)!/", ""Corsateen 'space:'f!~The<~ihilin'''~hich'Godc~reates his creation is God-
forsaken, hell, absolute death; and it is against the threat of this that he
maintains his creation in life.94
Creation as creatio ex nihilo excludes anypecessity or compulsion on God's part.
Creation is God's free action. Moltmann clearly recognizes this when he writes,
The later theological interpretation of creation as creation ex nihilo is
therefore an apt paraphrase of what the Bible means by ·creation'.
Wherever and whatever God creates is without any preconditions. There
is no external necessity which occasions his creativity, and no inner
compulsion which could determine it. Nor is there any primordial matter
wh()se potentiality is pre-given to his creative activity, and which would
set him material limits.95
However, Moltmann proposes an inner-compulsion of love in God's nature. This means
that He cannot but will the good, for it is His nature to love. It is this concept of love
that enables us to understand His unity of will and nature. Put differently, Moltmann
writes,
If we lift the concept of necessity out of the context of compulsive
necessity and determination by something external, then in God necessity
and freedom coincide; they are what is for him axiomatic, self-evident.
For God it is axiomatic to love, for he cannot deny himself. For God it
is axiomatic to love freely, for he is God.96
selfless ad intra and ad extra;
therefore He is not free not to .create for in His very essence His love is creative. As
Moltmann expresses it, "... not to reveal himself and be contented with his untouched
glory would be a contradiction of himself.... ,,97 In God's creative activity He is entirely
Himself. This creative love is sacrificial love, suffering love which is revealed at the
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very heart of the Trinity.
The creation of the world as a process must be identified with God's inner-trinitarian
life; similarly, the whole world process is the divine essence (cf. Christian
panentheism98). In the inner-trinitarian relationships the Father loves the only-beggotten
Son with an engendering love; the Son responds through obe.dience and surrender. It is
a necessary love for it is love of like for like99 (cf. free love, the love for one who is
different). God's love, however, is not only an engendering love but a creative love.
This means God's love is communicated to like and to His other; in other words, He is
love in essence and love in freedom. As Moltmann says, "Creation is a part of the
eternal love affair between the Father and the Son. It springs from the Father's love for
the Son and is redeemed by the answering love of the Son for the Father" .100 Creation,
love for God's other, means withdrawal and self-limitation. It is for this rea~on that
creative love is always a suffering love. Moltmann expresses the implications as
follows:
The suffering of God with the world, the suffering of God from the
world, and the sUfferings of God for the world are the highest form of
creative love, which desires free fellowship with the world and free
response in the world.1 01 "
The suffering love is panentheistic. God suffers in, through, and with his creation. His
self-limitation or withdrawal for the sake of creation is a partial negation of the divine
being, inasmuchas He is not yet Creator. The space He creates is God-forsakenness·
therefore God-forsakenness, hell and absolute death are a part of God before creation.
Historically this sacrificial, creative withdrawal. for the sake of creation has its
counterpart and fulfilment in redemption.
Moltmann sees the process as follows:
So the resurrection and the kingdom of glory are the fulfilment of the
promise which creation itself represents ... by yielding up the Son to the
death in God-forsakenness on the cross, and by surrendering him to hell,
the eternal God enters into the nothingness out of which he created the
world. God enters the 'primordial space' which he himself conceded
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through his self-limitation .... By entering into the God-forsakeness of
sin and death (which is nothingness), God overcomes it and makes it part
of his eternal life .. , The hope of resurrection therefore brings even the
, ' h I' h f h t' 102nothingness of world history mto t e 19 tot e new crea Ion",
Creation, then, in the beginning is out of chaos and in this sense it is threatened;
moreover, initial creation is a creation in time and is thus subject to change. This means
that it is perfectible rather than perfect. I03 Creation is thus open. Moltmann expresses
the notion in this way,
Creation at the beginning establishes the conditions for the possibilities
emergent in the history of creation. It defines the experimental area for
both constructive and destructive possibilities. It is open to time and to
its own alteration within time. We can see in it not the unvarying nature
of history but, rather, the beginning of the history of nature. Creation at
the beginning is not a balanced or fulfilled reality. 104
Moltmann's understanding of the universe as an open system is essentially eschatalogical
in that it implies that the universe has a transcendent encompassing dimension with
which it is in communication and towards whose future it is evolving. 105 The Spirit is
the principle of evolution 106: He is the principle of creativity' in that He creates new
possibilities; He is the holistic principle who creates harmonious interaction and mutual
perichoresis; He is the principle of individuation in that He differentiates particulars107
and finally creation in the Spirit is open towards its intended possibilities.
Moltmann believes that God's Spirit is identical with the cosmic spirit. He writes, "If
the cosmic spirit is the Spirit of God, the universe cannot be viewed as a closed system.
It ... is open - open for God and for his future" .108 'Moreover, if theSpirit "indwells"
in creatures, then the Holy Spirit's suffering is the same as the world's suffering:
If God commits himself to his limited creation, and if he himself dwells'
in it as the 'giver of life', this presupposes a self-limitation and a self-
surrender of the Spirit. The history of suffering creation, which is
subject to transience, then brin§s with it a history of suffering by the
Spirit who dwells in creation. 10
Mo1tmann speaks of a "tripartite", concept of creation: creatio orginalis, creatio
continua and creatio nova. 110 . Creatio continua is a creating in terms of what has
already been created; on the one hand God sustains and preserves, on the other hand He
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directs creation towards the anticipation of the fullness of salvation. This means that
creatio continua is at the same time creatio nova for, as Moltmann expresses it, " ... the
unremitting creative activity of God... [is] ... an activity that both preserves and
innovates" 111.
Creatio continua is a history of the suffering of God and of His creation. Creation in
the beginning is a system open to both time and possibility; sin and slavery are
understood as "... the self-imposed isolation of open systems from their own time and .
possibilities" 112. Indeed, salvation history is God's opening up of the closed systems in
creative suffering. Moltmann sees that
The inexhaustible creative power of God in history always makes itself
known first of all in the exhaustibility of the power of his suffering.
... the more an open system is able to suffer, the more it is able to
learn.... Through his inexhaustible capacity for suffering and the
readiness for suffering, God then also creates quite specific chances for
liberation from isolation, and iuite specific chances for the evolution of
the various open life systems. I 3
Growth (or evolution) brings suffering, for closed systems resist the suffering that comes
from change. This means, therefore, that ·an acceptance of suffering is involved in the
opening up of closed systems entrapped in separation and isolation. Expressed
theologically, God's openness for the world begins with the suffering, death and
resurrection of Jesus, is made effective in creative change through th~ outpouring of the·
Spirit and is completed through the resurrection of the dead. 114 This process of creative
evolution is, moreover, indeterministic. According to Moltmann,
With the evolution of complex systems, indeterminacy of behaviour
grows, because the possibilities increase. The human person and the
human social system are the most complex systems known to us. They
display the greatest degree of in4eterminacy in their behaviour, and the
most extensive degree of openness to time and future. But every
realization of possibility by open· systems creates openness for· yet more
new possibilities. lIS
The consummation of the creative process is the kingdom of glory - a new creation
where God will be all-in-all. Man, with the whole of creation, is liberated from the
slavery to nothingness. All participate in the divine life and the glory of God pervades
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all things. This is the eternal Sabbath116 expressed by Moltmann as
... the Sabbath is the completion of creation... but [it] points beyond ...
itself to a future in which God's creation and his revelation will be
one. ... God is thus manifest in the whole creation, and the whole
creation is the manifestation and mirror of his glory: that is the redeemed
world .. . [Thus]... the messianic Sabbath is the End-time
correspondence to the original Sabbath of God's creation. I!?
Is this eternal Sabbath the final conclusion of the universe? No, according to
Moltmann, the consummation through the indwelling of God opens up unlimited
•...•••L). possibilities,
The indwelling of unlimited possibilities open to God will signify,
moreover, the openness par excellence of all life-systems and, for that
reason, their eternal imparting of life not their rigidity.... [Thus] Instead
of a timeless eternity, we should talk, rather, about 'eternal time';
instead of the 'end of history' we should talk rather about the end of pre-
history and the beginning of the 'eternal history' of God, man and
nature. 118
Creation in the beginning is the Godhead's opening of Himself for creation in self-
denial, limitation and creative love. Creation at the end is the Godhead gathering
redeemed creation into His glory. In the next section these and other theories will be
explored in the history of God and His world.
2.5. HISTORY
For Moltmann history is the concrete mode of existence created between the revelation
of the promise of God and its fulfilment. It is the movement of man and all creation
towards the realization of the eschaton. 119 It is the promise of God revealed through
Israel, guaranteed in time by Christ and ultimately fulfilled in Him.
..
History in Christ is eschatalogical and as ~uch strictly linear. This means that it is an
irreversible movement towards that which will be. This is in contrast to the so-called
epiphany religions. These religions sanction the "present" in order to overcome the
threat to human existence posed by the powers of chaos and annihilation. 120 The very
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destructiveness of time is transcended by a periodic return to the first beginnings through
religious festivals. For Moltmann history is not understood as origin, or the need to
restore the original Golden Age of remembrance. In fact the real category of history is
no longer the past but the future. The history of mankind is decided by humanity'S
future state or, as Moltmann expresses it, "Theology as eschatology tries to understand
man, together with the world, historically in view of that future which both will find in
the future of God" 121.
It is for this reason that the "promise" of Yahweh never sanctions the present nor a
return to the "Golden Age" where the lost perfection is found. Rather, it breaks away
from the present and moves towards the future. However, there are partial fulfilments
of the promise within history. Moltmann states:
The peculiar character of the Old Testament promises can be seen in the
fact that the promises were not liquidated by the history of Israel- -
neither by disappointment nor by fulfilment - but on the contrary Israel's
experience of history gave them a constantly new and wider
interpretation. 122 -
The hopes raised in history are always greater than their fulfilment. In this sense history
disappoints hope. New conditions require a fresh integration of that hope. The .~future"
of. history is qualitatively different from history and experience at the "present". Yet
this qualitative difference between the historical present and the eschatological future
should not be overstressed. Such an emphasis would negate the world and its history.
On the other hand a correspondence between history and the future can dilute the very
transcendence that is the eschaton. Every "temporary" fulfilment would in turn seek
transcendence, consequently negating the expectation of a wholly different future.
Rather, as Moltmann expresses it,' " ... the future realizes itself in history and as history
and yet always rebounds from its own realization in history and becomes again a not-
yet-realized future of the whole of being." 123 The eschatological future thus renders
any historical reality a partial anticipation Of the coming fullness. However, the future
promise has to be linked to its anticipation in history for, as Moltmann states, "There
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will only be a meaningful reconciliation when the transcendence that surpasses history is
linked with actual historical transcending ... "124.
In the Christian faith, history and the future come together in Christ in Whom that
qualitatively new future is present under the conditions of history. This means that the
end of history is present in the midst of history.125 In the Easter event the process of
the liberation of the whole of enslaved creation has not only begun; its consummation in
the eschaton is confidently anticipated. 126 For this reason the transcendence of Christ is
not to be interpreted metaphysically or existentially, but eschato10gic~ly. This means,
then, that the transcendence experienced in suffering is to be sustained by an active
hope. 127 Eschato10gical transcendence is allied to the Cross and hence to those whose
suffering is unveiled by the Cross, that is, the dispossessed and downtrodden victims of
present society. Moltmann declares: "The transcendence of the future of a 'Wholly
Other' begins for it dialectically, in the lifting up of those who are 'the others' in a
particular present and in particular societies." 128 The anticipation of the future in the
resurrection of Jesus is a sign of hope for a God-forsaken world. In the present
dispensation the glory of the "coming one" is seen in the crucified Jesus. A hope in the
Cross is a "hope against hope" .129 It is a negative theology which liberates one from all
the idols (mainly political idolatry), false hopes and self justification which militate
against the historical anticipation of the coming kingdom. 130 These theories will be
deliberated further in section 2.7.
In the previous section the question of an open or closed creation was briefly raised.
Closely allied and dependent upon this is whether history itself is a closed or open
system. For Moltmann this is a crucial question indeed, one on which hinges the
coherence of his historical eschatology. History is indeed open because the limiting and
binding features of sin, death and law have been "broken through" in the death and
resurrection of Jesus. 131 It is also "open'" because of the fact that the movement of
history is unfinished. History is a movement that is really going somewhere, towards
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something that has never been before, which exists in the present time only in the form
of hope and promise. l32
To illustrate further what he means by "open history", Moltmann contrasts this with
"closed history". In a closed system, history begins with the fall of man and ends with
the restoration of creation in redemption. Creation is thus closed and redemption is the
way back, a "paradise regained" 133. For Moltmann, the Israelite belief in creation
developed out of God's action in the history of His people, through events such as the
exodus, the covenant, and the occupation of the promised land. As he expresses it,
Israel had a "soteriological understanding of creation" 134. Moltmann insists that
... [creation] embraces the initial creative activity, creative activity in
history, and eschatalogical consummation. The reduction of the concept
of creation to creation in the beginning has led traditionally either to the
cleavage between "creation" and "redemption" and between "nature"
and "supernature", or a division between "first and second creation".
But this calls in question the continuity and unity of the divine activity
itself. 135 .
So, in Moltman's view, the initial act of creation points towards salvation history. Both
initial creation and salvation point towards the eschaton. The future determines both
creation in the beginning and creative acts in history. Thus creation in the beginning is
not perfect but, rather, perfectible for, in history, it is subject to positive and negative
forces such as disaster and salvation. Moltmann expresses this thought as follows: 136
"~reation at the beginning is the creation of conditions for th~ potentiality of creation's
history.... It is open for time and for its alteration in time. " 137
. . ...-.
Thus hope's action in history takes the form of a creative transformation of reality; a
process in which there is' a constant leaving behind of the old and a moving in the
. direction of what is new. As Moltmann sees it, God's creative acts in history are related
to the "opening up" of closed systems. These systems insulate themselves' against the
development of their potentialities.. Thus sin and slavery are related theologically to
salvation and redemption. They are a self-perpetuation of the imperfections of present
reality. Moltmann comments on "closed systems" within historical reality:
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If a human society settles down to a closed system, seeking to be self-
sufficient, then something...happens... for this society; the future ceases
to offer scope for possible change; and in this way the society also
surrenders its freedom. A society of this kind becomes societas
incurvata ill se. 138
As we saw in section 2.4, the opening up of closed systems within societies and history
cannot come about without suffering. The suffering and death of Christ is the
completion of the process of creation; it is the eschatological event in that it is God's
openness to the world. In history it brings a limited openness of God in history through
the life-giving spirit of Christ. The Spirit is operative in those involved in creative acts
that involve suffering. Moltmann describes the process in this way: " ... salvation [is a]
universal opening of closed and isolated men and women [in this] closed world for the
fullness of divine life" .139
The creative process is complete in the eschaton in the indwelling of God within the new
. creation. Here, creation will be free from enslavement to futility 140, and glorified man
will be free to enjoy the abundance of the freedom of God. The key concept of
"freedom" and "liberation" will be further investigated in sections 2.6 and, especially,
2.7. As noted in the previous section, even the eschaton is not a closed system.141
Eternity itself is an open system. The fulfilment of the promise in the eschaton begins
"eternal history". Thus the openness of creation in history is continued into eternity
itself.
It is clear that, for Moltmann, eschatological history must find its origin and its end
within the history of God's dealings with "man and creation. It has been seen (sections
2.3 and 2.4) how God as Trinity opened Himself in love to creation through the sending
of the Son and The Spirit. Thus God, while transcending history, also experiences
history.142 Therefore, rejecting older philosophical categories about the nature of God,
Moltmann can say,
God is not unchangeable, if to be unchangeable means that he could not
in the freedom of his love open himself to the changeable history with
man and creation. God is not incapable of suffering, if it means that in
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the freedom of his love he could not be receptive to suffering over the
contradiction of man and the self-destruction of his creation. God is not
perfectible, if this means that he could not in the freedom of his love
want the humanity and creation which he loves to be necessary to his
perfection. God is not invulnerable, if that means that he could not open
himself to the experience of the cross. 143
History "changes" God; He is not unaffected by His experience through and with His
creation. Moltmann says that the relationship between Father and Son after the return of
the Son to the Father is no longer exactly the same, for God has experienced the pain
involved in the redemption of the world)44 He has absorbed the experiences of the
cross into His eternal life. Having experienced history G9d is glorified through man in
His new creation by the power of the Holy Spirit. By means of His salvific activity in
history, God has experienced suffering, death and even hell itself. Moltmann's
meditation Descent Into Hell has a two-fold interpretation. First, Christ's descent into
hell was the embodiment of His utter Godforsakenness on the Cross. Secondly, it was
the beginning of His resurrection on behalf ()f all. Jhus it is both the protest against the
hell of suffering evil and the redemption from this hell for all mankind. 145 Hence God's
glory is the glorification of the new creation. 146
As Seen in section 2.3, the sufferings of God in Himself and creation can be understood
through the doctrine of the Trinity centred on the crucified Jesus. Consequently, the
salvific mission of God in history finds both its origin and its end in the Trinity.
Traditionally the doctrine of the Trinity has been understo()d.as t~e "sending" .147
Moltmann explains as follows: in history it is the Father who sends the Son, therefore
within the life of the Trinity the Father precedes the Son. The Trinity in the "sending"
is directly related to the Trinity in its essence. Therefore the Son is begotten by the
'Father before· time began. The experience of the Spiritexpresses"ihe libe;ating and .
unfolding fellowship of Jesus with the Father who has sent Him. So the action of the
Trinity within history shows the superabundant being and love of God. This love is
"open" for all eternity to the experience of history through the action of "sending" .
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Yet, as Moltmann suggests, the history of God in creation has two aspects - protological
and eschatological. The "sending" of the Son into the world points to His origin with
the Father, whereas the resurrection of Christ points to His future with the Father.
However, both these aspects are intimately linked, as Moltmann suggests:
His messianic mission in the world corresponds to his eschatological
gathering of the world. His pre-existent origin corresponds to his
eschatological future. His becoming man in time corresponds to his
being God (theosis) in eternity. His surrender to death on the cross
corresponds to his exaltation to the right hand of God. His passion
corresponds to his glorification and his descent into hell to the
Ascension.... When we relate an historical narration we always begin
with the beginning, and ultimately come to the end. But when we think·
eschatologically we begin with the end and from there arrive at the
beginning. Historically we understand an event in the light of its origin
and we ask about its beginning, its grounds and its origin.
Eschatologically, we understand an event in the light of the future, and
ask about its goal, its end and its meaning. The two ways of looking at
things do not exclude one another; they are complementary, and belong
together if we are to achieve a full understanding of history .148
In the above quotation it can be seen that a concentration on the "sending" of the Son.
stresses the event of the incarnation, .the passion, and the death on the Cross.
Eschatologically considered, however, the resurrection, exaltation and handing over
sovereignty to the Father are stressed.
Within eschatological thought, the action of the Holy Spirit is paramount in creation; all
activity within history proceeds from the Holy Spirit who, through His action, glorifies
the Son and the Father. Protologically, the Father is the active agent in the "sending",
the Son and the Holy Spirit being relegated to a more passive role. Eschatologically,
however, the Holy Spirit is the active agent in creation. Through His creative and
regenerative activity in history, He glorifies both Son and Father.149
In conclusion, it is evident that Moltmann rejects many aspects of the scientific positivist
approach in history where facts alone are evaluated. Historical facts are to be
ascertained and evaluated in relation to history. History itself is understood in terms of
the direction in which it is moving. 150 For Moltmann,
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... history cannot be understood positivistically as a closed area of events
which are dated and fixed in a calendar. Nor can history be understood
as existential. Rather, history must be seen as the sphere of action of
revelation, in which the judicial process of truth takes place. IS 1
Since the eschaton has not yet come to be, history is a process of moving towards the
realization of truth, its essential being. Truth, then, is primarily something that is
becoming realized in history and that will be realized in the future. The truth of history
lies ahead. The Christ event is not an occurrance that can be circumscribed within
history, rather it is an occurrance thaf opens up history to a definite future. Therefore
the Christ event is essentially a revelation in time and ~history of the future towards
which history itself is directed.
AIL history has its time ahead of it. 152 The "past" becomes the already anticipated
revelation of the future. The "present" becomes the present anticipation of future
r~ity. The future is the oncoming disclosure of the promise of G09 realized in the·
eschaton. The truth content of present situations is not destroyed by understanding them
as anticipations of the future. Rather, truth is made temporary and provisional.
Moltmann, sees truth as residing not at the beginning of creation but at the end. History
becomes what Moltmann. calls a "judicial process of truth". It is the process of the
struggle of history to come to its truth. Thus the whole present situation must be
.understood in the light of its historical possibilities. This means that it is grasped within
the spectrum of the future of truth. 153
, .
In the next section, Moltmann's Christian vision of man will be explained and compared
. A. . to contemporary anthropological views. Here, again, man is grasped within his
eschatological open-endedn~ss - the truth of man lies ahead.
2.6. MAN
Man is an unfinished historical being and therefore indefinable. Moltmann states "The,
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essence of man is hidden and has not yet appeared. 'Mankind' - the realized generic
concept - is becoming, is still in process, has not yet acquired a fixed 'nature'" .154
Man has the task to find out what his nature is. However, Moltmann's anthropology
sees man in a reciprocal relationship to God. Thus he says,
It is only in the coming of God himself, who endlessly puts this life in
question, that the revelation of the secret of man can be hoped for. For
this reason man cannot find himself in any of his images of man, and
achieve rest. 155
Scripture thus has no set anthropology but sees man instead only in a restless history of
his relationship to God. It could be said that man is only definable in hope. In Hope
and Planning Moltmann states the position as follows:
Man, who is encountered by God's revelation as promised, is identified
and fmds himself; at the same time, however, he is differentiated, and
goes searching for his true life which is conceded in Christ (Col. 3.3)
He finds himself only in hope, for he is not yet excluded from death, he
is not yet risen.... He comes into harmony with himself - in spe but not
in re. 156
Moltmann's vision of man is clearly Christocentric. Man is revealed to himself in the
Crossso that, "If the whole of man's reality is accepted by God on the cross, then at the
same time man's reality is revealed to him in the cross as a reality which is both directed
and forsaken by God" .157
The Cross differentiates Christian anthropology from mere ideology and mere
humanistic views of man. In the crucified One man recognizes the truth about himself '
and hence finds his tru~ humanity. He sees himself as un-man.158 This means that man
- . . ;
sees himself in his inhumanity or, as G.C. Chapman writes, "The cross alone takes
seriously un-man' s perverted interest and misuse of the knowledge of God" 159.
Moltmann expresses himself even more trenchantly. In The Crucified God, when
speaking of man's self-deification, he says'
God reveals himself in the contradiction and the protest of Christ's
passion to be against all that is exalted and beautiful and good, all that
the dehumanized Man seeks for himself and therefore perverts. 160
The cross shows the radicality of sin. All sin is linked to expressions of hopelessness.
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Hopelessness assumes two forms which Moltmann outlines in the Introduction to the
Theology of Hope: praesumptio and desperatio.1 61 As Moltmann defines it,
praesumptio is " ... a premature, self-willed, anticipation of the fulfilment of what we
hope for from God" .162 Moltmann sees the self-deification of man as the glaring
example of praesumptio. In especially strong language he states,
The wretchedness of a modem anthropology built on the basis of an
inherited theology lies precisely. in its theological and religious
inheritances. As total man, as ideal man, as the man of possibilities or
the man of decision, man must accomplish things which he cannot
accomplish. The divinisation of man makes him not more human, but
rather more inhuman. An anthropology which, in the modem post-
Christian sense, intends to be the heir of theology, loses sight not only of
.the real life but also of real man. 163
Anthropotheism de-humanizes man by requiring achievements which he cannot meet.
In section 2.7 an especially pernicious sense of praesumptio will be found in political
theology. This Moltmann refers to as idolatry. Another form of praesumptio is
"works-righteousness" where "having" is more important than "being" .164
The second form of hopelessness IS desperatio which Moltmann defines as
"apathy" .165 It is, at bottom, the fear of exposing oneself to risk, to God's creativity,
to love. Man flees from authentic human existence. He becomes incurvatus in se, the
apathetic man. Human life, for Moltmann, needs to be
" ... accepted, loved, and experienced ... (so that) where life cannot be
accepted, loved and experienced, we are no longer dealing with human
life ... being human (homo esse) is being interested (inter-esse)
Indifference and apathy can therefore be called "dead life" .166
In essence all sin is hopelessness. Man is estranged both from his true understanding
and his destiny: he cannot "be" and he cannot "become". He is "un-man".
In contradistinction to un-man, Jesus IS the truly human person In the midst of
inhumanity for, as Moltmann says,
The Crucified One personifies the new humanity which is in accordance
with God, under the circumstances of inhumanity that contradict God.
He personifies homeland under the circumstances of the foreien land
~ ,
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and freedom in the midst of slavery's bonds. But it is precisely by this
that men are vested with the power to alter these conditions, to arrange
the world to be more homelike, and to abolish inner and outward
slavery.167
In the image of the Son of Man, Moltmann finds the biblical symbol which represents
for him Christ as the vanguard for the coming kingdom, the One who identifies himself
with un-man in order to bring him to the fullness of humanity. The Son of Man does
not emerge from the morass of human power exemplified by worldly empire; He comes
from heaven to effect the eschatological change, to humanize man and bring him into
God's justice. 168 In Moltmann's words,
The Son of Man is he who identifies himself with the "un-man", in
order to call them "men"... Man is manifested as the being who is
accepted and beloved by God, in the manner of Jesus, and also through
him God is manifest as this humane God. 169
How then does Moltmann see this new humanity? Perhaps the best summary is
provided in Religion, Revolution and the Future, viz. the abundant man (material
abundance), the upright man (one who honours human dignity), the sovereign man (self-
determined, and not by works-righteousness in its various forms) and the purposeful
man (who accepts the experiment that is hope).170 This new humanity is destined to be
in Moltmann's words,
... a world which no longer stands over against God in endless disparity
but now has God dwelling in it. It thus participates in the boundless
creating power of God himself. It is a new humanity which will no
longer be only the creation of God or no longer only a child of God but
will be "like God" and participate in God's infinite creativity.171
In the present dispensation, man is called· to be both God's creature and the image of
God. Firstly, this means that as a creature with fellow creatures man is to have oneness
and empathy with all God's creation. As Moltmann expresses it,
Neither man nor nature is divine.... Nature is neither numinous nor
demonic.... Man is also a creature of God. He is neither a demon, an
aberration of nature; nor a derni-God. Man is God's creature; that also
means that he stands in solidarity with God's other creatures.172
G. C. Chapman sees that man's at-oneness with his fellow creatures has certain
ecological consequences. One of these is to overcome the problem of alienation from
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the physical body. Categories of "possessing" lead us to speak of "having" a body
rather than being a body)73
Secondly, as an image of God man is called to represent God in and on behalf of His
creatures. As Moltmann sees it, Imago Dei means:
... not the essence of creative man, but his vocation or definition: to
represent God in his creation.... [Thus] As an individual man and as a
whole, man has the vocation to be God's counterpart. At one and the
same time, 'man' is a creature like all the rest of creation and the image
of God like none other of God's creatures. He is a creature; at the same
time,he has the whole creation as the realm in which he represents
God.174
In this vocation man's eschatological identity is linked with his "not-yet" present. On
the one hand, he identifies with creatures; on the other hand, he transcends them. Thus
man is not reducible to his present condition for, even now, he enjoys a foretaste of the
endless freedom of.his eschatological identity. Man thus has a dual identity and IS
consequently at strife within himself as he reaches towards maturity. 175
In the next section the focus shifts from man as a generic term to man in his social and
political context, that is, man for and with others.
2.7. POLITICS
Moltmann's political theology cannot be understood unless section 2.2 (Cross) has been
grasped. In its core it is the application of the theology of the Cross to the world. It is
the rule of the Crucified Christ in a world enslaved by "vicious circles of d~th"176 on
the one hand, yet open to the liberating experience of the promise to be revealed and
actualized in the eschaton. As seen previously, the theology of the Cross leads beyond
the apathetic God of theism to the God of pathos; the God Whose being is suffering in
love. The consequences of a "Crucified God" for society, history and especially politics
are enormous. Moltmann deduces:
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If this crucified man has been raised from the dead and exalted to be the
Christ of God, then what public opinion holds to be lowliest ... is
changed into what is supreme. In that case, the glory of Christ does not
shine on the crowns of the mighty, but on the face of the crucified
Christ. 177
By "mighty" Moltmann means those whom the world regards as powerful and
influential. It is in the Cross, therefore, that the Christian faith distinguishes itself from
other religions and theologies and from various forms of idolatry,178 If the Christian
faith is to remain consistent with this identity, it cannot accommodate itself to the
vicious political religions of society. .The Christian faith in the Crucified One is the
';-\,i_"'-,,;."'" -;;"',,'1,- ).""
power of liberation from these ideologies and idolatries. This liberation happens in two
ways: firstly, in forbidding all images of God, the second commandment initiates both a
world free from autocracy and a political life freed from political and state idolatry;
secondly, by demythologizing theology, the theology of the Cross further radicalized the
prohibition of images, desacralizing all claims to divinity in man, nature or natural
theology and democratizing government. 179
Moltmann does not wish to make political questions a central issue of theology.
However, Christianity has been politicized since the time of Constantine as it has taken
over the political and social mores of society. In addition it has Christianized the state
religions. The churches which wish to remain socially neutral are never non-political.
Moltmann contends that" ... they fulfil needs in the fashion of a political religion; that
is, they provide forlhe symbolic integration of society and its homogenization and self-
confirmation" .180
Political theology is hermeneutical in the sense that it moves beyond mere existential and
personalist interpretation of scripture text. Moltmann would express the relationship as
follows: "Participation in history is participation in the history of mankind, in political,
social, and scientific-technical history ... [it] reaches far beyond the search for the
meaning of one's own being" .1 81 Theology is not pure theory, nor is it blind action.
Theory, political and ethical aspects, complement each other. Political theology would
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like to interpret the message of Christ within the conditions of contemporary society.
The purpose is to be able to free man from the restrictions, creations and limitations of
society and so prepare the way for the eschatological freedom of the new man. 182 It is
indeed true that no scriptural text can be understood apart from the definite social
background and institutions that brought it into existence. In addition, it must be
understood in terms of conditions which lie behind efforts to overcome the real misery
of the time. Form criticism, for Moltmann, tried to understand the texts within their -
social and political- situations. However, the texts need a !urther understanding in terms
of the criticism of religion and the criticism of society. 183
In The Experiment Hope, Moltmann expresses his concern that theology should not lose
its Christian identity in striving to "adapt" itself to society. In association with political
and social movements it risks becoming a religion of society. Thus he says,
A modem theology which desires merely to be a "contextual theology"
is often similar to a chameleon that always assumeS the colour of its
environment. Christian theology should not adapt itself in order to hide;
it is required to reveal what is specifically its own in changing times.
Christian theology should rather be an "anti-chameleon theology" and
that means displaying colours which contrast with its environment. 184 .
The prophetic element within the Christian faith should enable Christians to stand back
from partial historical realities and movements that have been idolized and uncritically
assimilated from the surrounding culture.
Moltmann feels that the inner essence of Christian identity (in its identification with the
crucified Christ) has the power to resist the idolatries of historical society. As noted
earlier, God has, in the Crucified One, identified himself with the godless and the
forsaken. The doctrine of the Trinity, 185 the eschatological concept of peace arid the
prohibition of idolatry in the Second Commandment provide a basis for a critical
appraisal of historical society by Christianity. Strict monotheism has canonized a
hierarchical-monarchical structure of society. Thus the unity of God had its political
counterpart in one emperor, one empire and one Church.186 However, three-in-oneness
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exists only in the Godhead and consequently has no political counterpart. Thus, in time,
the developing doctrine of the Trinity caused the collapse of what Moltmann calls
"political metaphysics" .187 The eschatological peace proclaimed by Christianity had no
counterpart in the Pax Romana or the peace of Christian Europe. Its hope lay in
universal peace, secured, not by naked power, but by the powerlessness of the Crucified
One. The prohibition of images in the Old Testament forbade not only religious idolatry
but also political idolatry. The Christian faith in the Crucified One is, for Moltmann, a
radical realization of the Old Testament prohibition of images. He affirms:
... the freedom that is opened up to it [the Christian faith] ... will enter
into a permanent iconoclasm against political personality cults and
natural religions and against money and community fetishism. It seems
to be that Christianity should lead the way in the desacralization and
democratization of political rule. 188
The above quotation indicates that political, national and cultural idols are seen as
attempts at self-justification. All "works-righteousness" makes men slaves of their own
works. They force the creator to bow down before the creature.1 89 God, on the other
hand, has justified the sinner through the death and resurrection of Jesus. Jesus was
judged by the law and cursed by God. This judgement passed on Him on the Cross is
turned into grace by His resurrection. Thus the justification of the "sinless one" Who
was made "sin" must be understood as a new creation.190 A nova creatio is revealed in
the raising of the Crucified One. Through the "negation of the negati~e" 191 (effected
in the resurrection of the Crucified One) God has created new possibilities for history by
justifying the unjustified and reconciling the godless. God's resurrection of Christ is a
creatio ex nihili. Moltmann contends: "The event of justification in man is part of the
universal transformation of the passing world, and to be understood as its
beginning" .192
The act of God in Christ's crucifixion and resurrection must lead ultimately, through the
justification of the sinner, to God's own glory in the new creation. In the justification
of the godless the transformation of creation is seen. 193 Justification is thus ultimately
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directed to the eschatological transformation of an unjust world. In this sense, then, the
oppressed are the hope for the liberation of humanity. 194
In the identification of God with the Crucified One there is a partisanship (an
identification of God with the "others" of society) with those who are social outcasts,
politically insignificant and economically impoverished. Meeks, commenting upon
Moltmann's concept of God's partisanship, says
For Moltmann, the public shape of Jesus' ministry demonstrates the
partisan, creative love of God. His incarnating love is manifested not in
ideal humanity, but in the real inhumanity of man.... Thus lowliness
becomes the locus of the Son of Man's parousia and the kingdom and
the justice of God fmd their way into the world among the poor and the
unjust. 195
Thus it can be seen, that, for Moltmann, God is present and active especially within the
"negatives" of history. God suffers with and through His enslaved creation. The
suffering, the failures and the "negatives" within unglorifiedcreation are linked to the
suffering of the God of pathos. 196 In The Power of the Powerless Moltmann expresses
the creative suffering of God in these words
To put it simply, God suffers for 'us because he loves us. Love and
suffering go together... Christ reveals to us God's love, with its infinite
capacity for endurance, for suffering. His love is passion - passion for
men and women and their dignity, passion for creation and its
197peace....
However, God created mankind for liberty and freedom. For this reason the Christian
faith is a liberation born from the resurrection of Christ. In this liberation men are
raised into the creative liberty of God where they act in terms of its potentialities. 198
Through acts of liberation the eschaton in all its creative freedom is already
anticipated. 199 This freedom is a messianic freedom which differs considerably from
secular freedom of choice. Moltmann calls it a "passion for the possible" .200 He
defines it further,
It [freedom] happens where the fu~re of God is anticipated in the open
space. Liberation happens when the new creation of all things which
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will be fulfilled in Christ is anticipatorily experienced.". Freedom as the
fulfilled process of liberation is for Christian hope the eschatological
goal of the new creation of God.... The reality of freedom is the
eschatologically new and free world, but the effects of this freedom are
present in the experiences and actions of liberation.201
However, for Moltmann, man is not a one-dimensional being. Man suffers in many
different dimensions of life and therefore liberation is a struggle against five "vicious
circles of death" .202 Liberation takes place in the following areas: in the struggle for
economic justice and against the exploitation of man, in the confrontation for political
rights and the recognition of human dignity, in the fight for human solidarity against
racial, cultural and sexist domination and exploitation, in the battle for peace and
communion with nations threatened by the consequences of industrial pollution. and the
exploitation of the environment, and in the struggle for hope, meaning and fulfilment in
a personal life often beset by apathy.203
There is such an interdependence between the vanous forms of oppression that co-
operation between the different types of liberation is essential. Oppression and
liberation operate simultaneously at many levels of the human situation. Moltmann
contends:
- "-
These five dimensions belong so closely together that there can be no
economic justice without overcoming cultural alienation and without
personal conversion from apathy to hope. Whoever does not understand
salvation in the most c()mprehensive liberal sense and does not strive for
a network of saving anticipations over the various fields of devastation,
does not understand salvation holistically,204 .
Through these messianic actions of liberation God's pTomise in history is both ,celebrated
and anticipated. They are furthermore sacramental, for each of them is a real presence
of God; a presence incarnated in time, yet straining beyond itself to a greater presence
where God's indwelling will be all-in-al1. 205
In concluding this section it has become evident that the principal insight of Moltman's
political theology has been the theoretical and practical combining of hope (resurrection)
with the "negative" (cross) in contemporary existence. This means that in politics
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Christians will, in Moltmann's words, " ... realistically realize and accept the real and
objective possibility that there is some correspondence with the future set before
them. ,,206 In the final section of this chapter attention will be focused on the specific
Christian confrontation with the State. What is the mission of the church in relation to
society and its problems? -
2.8. CHURCH AND STATE
The vexed question of the Church's relationship to the political community is of seminal
importance for Moltmann. From tradition he cites the models of "unburdening" and
"correspondence" that have been used to relate the Christian faith to the political
situation.207 According to the first model the Church and political society must be
separate in order that each may be free to follow its demarcated path. The second m?del
uses the correspondence between faith free from social conformity and unfree social
situations enslaved by vicious circles of death. However, both models distinguish God
and the world and, only secondarily, ask about a correspondence of faith to God in the
world. 208
Moltmann outlines various roles that the church has accepted in its relation to the
political society. In a comparison of the approaches of Lutheranism and Calvinism
(represented chiefly by Barth) he attempts to come to an acceptable synthesis in order to
find a positive role for the Church within the historical society.209 The -Church, for
Moltmann, personifies eschatological hope for it is essentially, " ... a Church under the
Cross, an exodus community and a charismatic community, demonstrating the power of
the n~\V creation and the liberating sign of the coming free world". 210 The Church
attempts through historical actions to be a force within history that leads it to its goal.
The Church becomes a community that personifies eschatological hope.
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Moltmann investigates the vanous social roles of the Church in history. After the
collapse of the Roman Empire, the Church emerged as a reconciling centre of society.
Christianity became the religion of the Empire and the cult of the State. After the
Industrial Revolution, men associated for the purposes of industrial production,
commerce and consumption. In this modern society, men were reduced into a new
category of subjectivity where a personal search for meaning and existence could replace
the former corporate life. Thus in this situation religion lost most of its social relevance
and became a cultus privatus.211 Moltmann concludes,
The public vitality of Christianity declines in proportion to the
emancipation of the 'society of needs' from the religious needs 'of society
on the one hand and the growth in the church of the liberal, pietistic or
existential inwardness on the other hand.212
The result was that the Church did not disturb the social realm. It became socially
irrelevant, merely an institution where the individual could unburden himself in his
search for a personal, meaningful faith)13 Therefore, the Church is seen as a
community within the larger body of society. Here its purpose is to provide warmth,
understanding and neighbourliness. It thus becomes for Moltmann " ... a Noah's Ark
for social!y alienated man ... ,,214 with no effect on the public activity of society.
Eventually, the Church conformed to the model of "institution" whereby it became yet
another institution within society. It provided that security against the alienating and
depersomilizing greater mass of society. 215
In his book On Human Dignity Moltmann rejects the inadequate attempts of both Luther
and Calvin (represented chiefly by Barth) to create an understanding of the relationship
between the Church and the State)16
Luther's "two kingdoms" doctrine had clearly sought to define the two realms, one
where the righteous keep God's laws, and the other where the mass of humanity lives in
lawlessness. The first is ruled by the Gospel and the second by the sword; neither
gospel nor sword must intrude into the realm of the other. However, as Moltmann
41
argues, the Gospel cannot originate in the ongoing battle between the kingdom of God
and the kingdom of the devil. Rather, it should begin from God's victory over Satan on
the Cross and the resurrection of Christ.217 Moreover the injustice pertaining in the
political kingdom ruled by the sword is unaffected by the justice-creating nature of the
gospel. In addition, there is no specific Christian ethic, just an acceptance of the ethic
of the worldly order. Consequently there is no world-transforming hope.218
In contradistinction, Calvin pla~~ th~,~~~le of public life under the command of God.
Christian critical scrutiny thus extends beyond the morality of individuals into culture
and society. The discipleship of Jesus covers all areas of life. This involves personal
life, economic ethics and political ethics. In speaking of Barth's position, Moltmann
writes,
Thus, the earthly, unfinished state and human, imperfect society are
oriented towards the coming lordship of God. The Christian community
makes this rolitical eschatology apparent by living a consciously political
existence.2 9
For the Christian personal life involves the double aspect of calling and sanctification.
Although sanctification means election to a different kind of life and to a particular
service, it also means the transformation of life and society.220 Moltmann feels that
political theology can learn much from the Reformed injunction to be different from
others so as "to be for others";· otherwise,· it is the case of "like" attracting "like" ,221
The political ethics of Reformed theology involved a State contract in which God made
a double covenant with his people (firstly with the whole people and then with the king).
This waseventually to lead to the growth of modern democracy, for the king derived his
sovereignty from the people as the People of God. In the event of his .breaking the
covenant, sovereignty would then revert to the people. Thus Moltmann feels that Calvin
translated Luther's concept of the "universal priesthood of all believers" into "the
universal kingship of all believers", thereby preparing the ground for responsible
Christian political action. 222
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In Barth' s political theory Moltmann discovers further consequences of the Calvinist
doctrine of the lordship of Jesus Christ. Firstly, the whole world is objectively under
Christ and his lordship. Secondly, the State, although independent of the Christian
society,223 performs the work of Jesus Christ and is therefore oriented towards the
coming lordship of Jesus.224 Moltmann shows how Barth conceives of the relationship
between the Christian community and the civil community in terms of concentric circles.
The Church, the inner circle, proclaims the liberating lordship of Jesus. The civil
community, the outer circle, in preserving the world from chaos and promoting
freedom, keeps the political kingdom open to the kingdom of God. Thus, expressed in
Moltmann's words, Barth's position is as follows:
Politics on earth remains an imperfectible process of freedom and justice.
Whoever tries to perfect this process politically becomes a tyrant;
whoever resigns to this process delivers the world to the tyrants. Barth
seems to see the indirect effect of Christ's proclamation and the Christian
community on the civil community in the fact that political situations
remain changeable and political changes are kept historically
imperfectible. The Church does not divinize politics and it does not
. demonize politics either. It brings politics humanly into the suspension
of permanent improvability and historical imperfectibility.225
In formulating Moltmann's distinctive approach which has undoubtedly been affected by
the above historical sketch, two pertinent criticisms of Barth must be noted. Firstly,
Barth's doctrine of the lordship of Jesus means that the Church already rules over heaven
and earth. 226 This lordship of Christ, for Moltmann, is not that of a powerful king,
rather it is the lordship of the Crucified One who conquers not through the power of the
resurrection but through weakness. The kingdom of glory lies ahead. Secondly, the
lordship of Jesus applies to the discipleship of believers. This makes it invalid to
advocate an apolitical philosophy relevant to Christian and non-Christian alike.227
Seminal to Moltmann' s concept of the role of the individual Christian and of the
Christian community is the idea of mission. The promise realized in the resurrection of
Jesus points towards the future universal realization of that promise. So, as Moltmann
contends, "The link between the coming history and the past history is provided in the
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light of this forward-moving, historic mission" .228
Thus the Christian involved in his apostolate is called upon to concern himself.not only
with what is but with what ought to be. .Through the creative transforming action of
faith and love he must decrease the discrepancy between present reality and God's new
promised reality. Crisis-causing conditions need to be transformed to correspond to the
promised "new". Mission becomes the opening up to a genuine possibility of what can
be. Indeed, even history has a missionary structure. The "latency" of life is opened up
. '"." " " -, - . -.' .
by the eternal life created by the resurrection of the Crucified One. There is a
corresponding "tendency" that drives the "latency,,229 towards an eschatological goal of
reconciliation230. The Spirit directs the process in which the power of life out of death
is mediated to all creation. Hence Moltmann can say: "The indwelling of the Spirit ... is
the anticipation of the eschatological indwelling of God's glory" .231
Thus man in his missionary dimension must be seen as one who hopes. Von Rad saw
mankind as an eschatologically determined being, determined, not by capricious events,
but by the continuity of God's sameness in historical events in history.232 Moltmann, in
similar vein, would see man as determined by the promised eschaton of the future. Man
thus bears his nature not from himself, or from nature, but from the future to which
mission leads him. Thus Moltmann observes:
Man attains to knowledge of himself by discovering the discrepancy
between the divine mission and his own being, by learning what he is,
and what he is to be, yet of himself cannot be... . In his call man is
given the prospect of a new ability to be.233
Mission, therefore, opens man up to new possibilities. The. whole present situation is
understood in all its historic possibilities in respect of the future truth. Man, in seeking
the "new Jerusalem", has been summoned by the divine promise. Therefore he must
adjust himself to the universal, salvific, rec'onciling future of God. Moltmann writes:
His [the believer's] thinking adjusts all things to the coming messianic
reconciliation.... He adjusts being to the universal, rectifying future of
God ... His understanding consists in the fact that in sympathy with the
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misery of living he anticipates the redeeming future of being and so lays
the foundation of its reconciliation, justification and stability. 234
Turning from the individual call to the Church's call, Moltmann regards the Church as
the "community of eschatological salvation" .135 He maintains,
The church lays claim to the whole of humanity in mission. This
mission is not carried out within the horizon of expectation provided by
the social roles which society concedes to the church, but it takes place
within its own peculiar horizon of the eschatological expectation of the
coming kingdom of God, of the coming righteousness and the coming
peace, of the coming freedom and dignity of man. The Christian church
has not to serve mankind in order that the world may remain what it is,
or may be preserved in the state in which it is, but in order that it may
transform itself and become what it is promised to be.236
Thus the Church is a veiled anticipation of the kingdom insofar as it creates in the world
genuine anticipation of the end-time community)37
In -these terms, then, Moltmann equates the world and the Church with the "old" and the
"new". The world represents the spirit of sin, law and death. The Church, in her
witness, represents freedom from these. Moltmann emphasises the active role of the
Church in the creation and transformation of history. As the Church is a force that leads
history to its goal, it is exodus church. Thus the salvation that is promised by faith far
transcends the private salvation of ·Luther's "two kingdoms" theory. It is a public
salvation and hence a political salvation. Consequently, the Church, as it. is the
.community of hope, does not have to centre on itselfbut on the future.~38
The two models of "unburdening" and "correspondence" mentioned earlier (PAO) are
inadequate for Moltmann. He asks:
... must we not ... start [to] understand God in the world, the beyond in
the this-worldly, the universal in the concrete and eschatology in the
historical, in order toairive at a political hermeneutics of the crucified
Christ and a theology of realliberation?239
Liberation depends on the active presence of Christ in history. However, as was made
evident in earlier sections of this chapter, this "opening up" of the Church to the world
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in hope is linked with an acceptance of suffering. In an expectation of this future the
suffering Church is to take upon itself the cross of the present. As Moltmann explains,
the creative suffering of the Church is:
... the "yes" of faith to the cross of true love, [it] bears the fate of the
present and yet lives in the life-giving spirit of the resurrection. It does
not soothe and calm the tensions of brokenness and the devastations of
our society, but rather it brings these to a head and confronts them with
the divine transformation. 240
Moltmann summarizes the Church's activity in the modem world and its specific role in..
the creation of hope in The Church in the Power of the $pirit.241 He believes its four
marks to be "one, holy, catholic and apostolic". However, his interpretation of these
marks is not traditional. Hence the unity of the Church lies in the jngathering and
unifying action of the Church rather than in the unity of its own members. It is further
evidenced in the Church's concern for the suffering and the testimony of other
"deprived" communities that it sees as its own. The catholicityof the Church is seen in
its mission, for there is no sphere of life which Christ has not claimed as His own. The
Church's catholicity is shown, too, in the Church's partisanship on behalf of both the
oppressed and the oppressor. Both need reconciliation. It is for the sake of the kingdom
that catholicity must be partisan. The holiness of the Church is exhibited in its poverty
and its fellowship with the outcasts of society. This fellowship is an expression of love
and solidarity with the poor. Finally, the Church is apostolic in its suffering.
Participation in the apostolic mission of Christ leads the Church inescapably into
suffering, contradiction and confrontation with the vicious circles of death.
In concluding this chapter it can be said that Moltmann has presented a VIew of
Christianity as a critical force in the world. It is a power that addresses the society both
from within and from beyond.
Moltmann himself, says "Only a future which transcends the experiment of history itself
can become the paradigm of transcendence and give meaning to the experiment
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'history'" )42 While not accommodating itself to the spirit of the times, Moltmann's
theological position is nevertheless relevant in that it confronts contemporary problems,
especially political ones. However, its relevance comes from the Crucified Christ. This
is observed in its "testing" of the modern spirit and its espousal of provisionality. Ben
Wiebe, speaking of Moltmann's view of the State, remarks that "Every form of the state
is provisional in the sense that none will be ideal, for then the kingdom would have
arrived. So no state will be so transformed as not to be in need of criticism. ,,243 Thus,
while Moltmann is not "enslaved" by the contemporary situation, he directs attention to
the problems of society in general (including the covenant). His purpose is to make
Christianity relevant to the world. However, there are only provisional solutions. There
are no final solutions.
Inthe next chapter openness as an overall "i?ethod" in Moltmann's theology will be
investigated. The eschatological basis of his theology makes him critical of aa>"JY finality.
All is open, pending the unveiling of truth on the last day. Thereafter the full unveiling
of God in this event will begin eternal time where " ... there will be time and history,
future and possibility in the kingdom of glory as well, in that they will be present in
unimpeded measure... " .244 Openness, therefore, is without end.
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FOOTNOTES
1 Apart from Moltmann, the most influential contributors to this development have been Wolfhart
Pannenberg, Gerhard Sauter and Johannes Metz.
Pannenberg, Sauter and Moltmann are discussed by James M. Robinson in Theology as History
Vol. 3, New Frontiers in Theology, pp. 1-100. and by Klaus Koch in The Rediscovery of
Apocalyptic, voI. 22, SBT 2 ser., pp. 9.8-111. For a discussion of Metz and Moltmann see
WaIter H. Capps, Time Invades the Cathedral: Tensions in the School of Hope, pp. 41-90. On
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"If in the justification of the sinner God attains to his right, then this justification is the
beginning and foreshadowing of his sole lordship. The divine righteousness which is latent in
the event of Christ has an inner trend towards a totality of new being. The man who is justified
follows this trend in bodily obedience. His struggle for obedience and his suffering under the
godlessness of the world have their goal in the future of the righteousness of the whole" (J.
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emergence of his Spirit, he is present in the world and imrnanant in each individual system. The
recognizable trend to communication towards every side, and the thrust towards permanent self-
transcendence in all open systems, are signs of the presence of God's spirit in the world, and
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community has no existence based upon and developing according to its own destiny. It is
rather - outside the church but not beyond the domain of the lordship of Jesus Christ - 'an
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3.1. OPENNESS IN ESCHATOLOGY
Moltmann's eschatology, the genesis of openness, arises from the philosophical impact
of Bloch's left-wing Hegelianism. 1 Moltmann makes his d~bt to Bloch clear: he finds it
hard to imagine a more useful philosophy than that outlined in the Principle ofHope for
enabling Christians to elaborate their own philosophy of hope.2 As has been stated
earlier (pp:6-7) the category novum, which is so important in Bloch' s philosophy, IS
paralleled in Moltmann' s theology by the novum of God's presence.
For Bloch the novum is a knowledge of the "not-yet-being"3 (noch nicht zein); a
reminder to us that our present existence is not ultimate; a vision of a kind of reality that
has n~ver been, a vision ora possibility that. might be realized. Thus the novum or
perfection is an endless, infin~te journey; "an open space, a vacuum... , the open area of
what lies before us, the novum into which the various series of human ends go on".4 It
is defined by Moltmann as the" still open and unattained depth of man and the world,
into which all hope's images reach the realm that keeps moving ahead, ever and again
uncomprehended and eluding our grasp; it is an open realm that beckons and excites".5
Bloch's eschaton isa transcendence beyond the existent development of history. In this
se~se the worldly reality displays openness and possibility and the novum is anticipated. . . .
by creative forces that lie within the present. Thus Bloch can state: "The real genesis is
not at the beginning but at the end" .6
For Moltmann, however, the Resurrection of Jesus is the eschatological novum, "... [it
is] the dawning, the anticipation, the hidden representation of a future never possessed
before".7 It is transhistorical in that it is historically unverifiable, for it is without
historical analogy. Thus, "In this event there lies a real anticipation of the future of
history in the midst of history". 8 However, the resurrection of Jesus is a true novum
for, according to Moltmann,
... [it] does not mean a possibility within the world and its history, but a
new possibility altogether for the world, for existence and for history....
By the raising of Jesus we do not mean a possible process in world
history, but an eschatological process to which world history is
subjected.9
In The Future of Creation Moltmann elaborates on the above: "Only a future that
transcends the experiment of history itself can become the paradigm of transcendence
and give the experiment 'history' meaning".lO For Moltmann the future does not
emerge from the processes of history (as it does for Bloch11); rather, the present springs
from the future, " ... the starting-point is the anticipation, the prolepsis, the sending
ahead of God's future, .. .in the passion and resurrection of Christ" 12.
Thus the novum is found in transcendence. Bloch conceives it as a future before us
rather than as an eternity above or within us. Moltmann contends that the future is the
paradigm of divine transcendence. He states: "The future of history is something
qualitatively different and new compared with what we 'have experienced in history". 13
In The Theology ofHope the concept is clearly stated:
The parousia of Christ is a different thing from a reality that is
experienced now and given now. As compared with what can now be
experienced, it brings something new.. Yet it is not for that reason
totally separate from the reality which we can now experience and have
now to live in, but, as the future that is really outstanding, it works upon
the present by awakening hopes and establishing resistance. 14
The world is then an open process. This means, according to Moltmann, that
... [it] becomes not a system with eternally repeatable structures, but an
open history in which something new happens and can be realized... .
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Thus it is not a completed creation but an open creative process... the
world is itself a great experiment. IS
Meeks sees an epistemological problem in the open experimental process: "How can
something which does not already exist and which was only intimated in the past be an
object of knowledge?" 16. He relates how BIoch's view of knowledge as "anticipation
of the not-yet-realized" provides Moltmann with the categories to define faith
principally in terms of hope17. Faith anticipates the promised future of God. However,
the promised future is not a result of open evolutionary processes. It is not an
extrapolation from present history; rather, it is the desirable or hoped-for future, an
adventus18. Christ is the anticipation of the coming God and the renewed transformed
creation encompassing its new humanity. 19 The vision of a new creation is thus rooted
not in the present situation but in Jesus' resurrection.
However ,_ Moltmann' s use of dialectic20 allows him to see the present as a contradiction
to the promised future. When applied to God the dialectical principle means that God is
revealed as God in his opposite. Thus the Cross becomes the present form of the
resurrection. The believer seeks the coming God in· the concrete agony of the Cross.
Therefore the theology of the .Cross is simply the reverse side of the theology of hope.
As Moltmann states: " ... there is no true theology of hope which is not first of all a
theology of the cross" .21 Expressed differently, it is in the raising of the Crucified One
that the future transformation of the world is anticipated thropgh the presence of God on
the Cross.
Moltmann insists: "Truth must be practicable".22 He means by this that through the
theologia crucis the believer is unable to reconcile himself to the constraints of a world
that accommodates itself to death. He writes: "Unless it [faith] contains initiatives for
the transformation of the world, it becomes a myth of the existing world" .23 However,
the theologia crucis decries any identification of the coming kingdom with human
Utopian dreams. Thus he argues:
What is the abundance of life? The death of death. What is complete
freedom? The elimination of every rule, every authority and power.
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What is God? The elimination of nothingness itself, which threatens and
cajoles everything that exists and insults everything that wants to live but
must die. 24
In Moltmann's dialectic eschatological openness must have its counterpart in the
openness of creative suffering. The dialectic of cross and resurrection, then, points to
the dialectic of suffering and hope. The meaning of openness in the suffering of the
world will now be considered.
3.2. OPENNESS IN SUFFERING
Moltmann sees that· suffering takes "multifarious forms"25. He certainly sees the
connection between sin and suffering when he declares: "Misery is the lot of anyone
who sins against God. Thus misery is already inherent in the sin itself"26. However,
Moltmann understands that sin has its roots in the limitation of creation itself. He
argues:
If creation in-the-beginning is open for the history of good and evil, then
that initial creation is also capable of suffering and capable of producing
suffering. 27
Creation in the beginning IS, as Moltmann sees it, " ...a system open for time and
potentiality ... "28. Consequently sin is the" ... self-closing of open systems against their
own time and their own potentialities",29 Closed systems eschew the suffering involved
in self-transformation; in this way they become rigid and deathlike. The opening-up of
closed systems involves the acceptance of the suffering accompanyi.ng the process of
transforming growth,30 Consequently, Moltmann defines salvation as " ... the universal
opening up of closed and isolated men and women and this closed world for the fullness
of divine life",31
The closed, invulnerable man of success· and action, the apathetic man, is the most
poignant symbol of a creation closed against itself and its potentialities. As the homo
incurvatus in se, he is self-isolated, fixed in the present reality32 and invulnerable to
suffering, as well as to the weaker and more sensitive side of life. Moltmann's dialectic
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contrasts the apathetic (closed) man with the homo sympathetikos, the open, vulnerable,
receptive, sensitive and caring man.
The relationship between man and suffering cannot be understood apart from the
relationship between God and suffering. The apathetic God of the philosophers IS
contrasted by Moltmann with the pathos of the Christian God. Thus,
In pathos, the all-powerful God goes outside of himself and enters into a
relationship with a people of his choosing.... God takes man seriously
to the point that he suffers from the actions of man and can be injured by
them. 33 -
In the situation of the pathos of God, the sympathy of man is found:
In the sphere of the apathetic God, man becomes homo apathetikos. In
the situation of God's pathos, however, he becomes homo
sympathetikos... . The divine pathos finds its resonance in the sympathy
of man, in his openness and sensitivity to the divine, the human and the
natural. 34
The homo sympathetikos feels sympathetic openness to God and to his creation. It is not
the unio mystica; rather, it is the unio sympathetica open and vulnerable to God's
history in creation.35 Moltmann recognizes here the dialectic of God's self-limitation
and consequent self-subjection to suffering, on the one hand, and his eschatological self-
deliverance from suffering, on the other hand. He writes: "Between these two
movements lies the history of the .profound fellowship between God and man in
compassionate suffering - with one another, and in passionate love for one another" .36
A love that is creative is a love that suffers. Creativity and suffering belong In a
dialectical tension. 37 Moltmann expresses the notion thus:
Creative love is ultimately suffering love because it is only through
suffering that it acts creatively and redemptively for the freedom of the
beloved. Freedom can only be made possible by suffering love. The
sufferings of God with the world, the sufferings of God from the world,
and the sufferings of God for the world are the highest fonn of his
creative love, which desires free fellowship with the world and free
response with the world. 38
The goal of creative suffering, both human and divine, is eschatologicalliberation. God
identifies in His history with the unfree, the exploited and the suffering. The association
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between suffering and freedom is clarified even further when Moltmann states:
The cry of freedom is therefore universal. It is the hunger of men and
women. It is the desire of nature. It is the passion of God as it was
revealed in the crucified Christ.. .. [It] sees all individual sufferings and
failures in the world against the background of God's patient suffering.
It therefore sees all partial movements towards liberation against the
horizon of God's own perfect and final history of liberation. In this way
it introduces the testimony of God's suffering and God's freedom into
each individual liberation movement. 39
The history of freedom-in-suffering is destined to become the kingdom of glory; for the
crucified one who reveals it is also the resurrected Lord. The specific Christian freedom
in the beginning is, then, the foretaste of the freedom for which all creation, all men and
all things, long. It is, in Moltmann's words, "the passion for the possible,,40, "the
place where the new creation of all things .. .is already anticipated,,41, and "the
eschatologlcal goal of God's new creation,,42.
The analysis in sections 3.1 and 3.2 led to what Moltmann would call" ... revolution in
the concept of God ,,43. In the next section openness is related to t.he trinitarian
processes in God. God, too, is becoming. As Moltmann states: "Just as God goes out
of himself through what he does, giving his world his own impress, so his world puts its
impress on God too, through its reactions, its aberrations and its own initiatives. ,,44
3.3. OPENNESS IN GOD
Moltmann argues that the trinitarian God is not a closed circle of perfect being in
heaven, but rather, " ... open to man, open to the world and open to time,,45. The
trinitarian God takes up the historical processes of human suffering, through the cross,
into the iimer life of God. He writes:
All human history, however much it may be determined by guilt, and
death, is taken up into this 'history of God', i.e. into the Trinity and
integrated into the future of the 'history of God.' There is no suffering
which in this history of God is not God's suffering; no death which has
not been God's death in the history of Golgotha. 46
Thus the history of human suffering through the Cross is seen to be constitutive of the
68
reality of the Godhead. Moltmann so identifies the history of human suffering with
God's inner trinitarian life that, on the Cross of Christ, God has freely made history's
suffering death His own. Expressed evenmore strongly, God comes to His perfection
only in and through the history of the suffering of creation. Thus Olson, commenting
on this, states:
The event of the cross, as central and determinative as it is, is not
exclusively determinative of the inner trinitarian life of God, but is
dependent upon the kingdom of the Father in creation and the kingdom
of the Spirit in the liberation and union of creation in God. All these
together constitute the inner life of God in history and are mutually
interdependent, just as the persons of the Trinity are mutually
independent for their personhood.47
This means that the trinitarian life of God changes in accordance with human historical
change. God's inner trinitarian life is thus identified with the worldly processes
involved in the establishment of the kingdom.
In order to establish this revolutionary theological concept Moltmann discredits the
traditional distinction between God-in-Himself (the immanent Trinity) and God-for-us
(the economic Trinity). In this way he is more easily able to identify God's essential
being with human history. The distinction between the economic Trinity and the
immanent Trinity had upheld God's transcendence over history. Moltmann disagrees,
for such a distinction introduces a "contradiction"48 into the very being of God. This
means, according to Moltmann, that "... the God who loves the world does not
correspond to the God who suffices for himself".49 God is then separated from His
creation.
Instead Moltmann proposes that we see the economic Trinity as the ground of the
immanent Trinity. This God" .. .is in himself as he appears in salvation history" .50
However, as Olson suggests,
...not wishing entirely to identify God's being with human events,
Moltmann posits a 'more' - an immanent Trinitarian life which, though
affected by and stamped with these events, is transcendent to them as
their future fulfilment and glorification.51
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The immanent Trinity is here conceived as future; action flows from the economic
Trinity to the immanent Trinity so that the immanent Trinity becomes an almost passive
product of historical processes.
It is in the Cross that Moltmann establishes the identity between God's essential being
and the history of human suffering. In fact, Moltmann insists that the Cross of Jesus
should be the starting point for a Christian understanding of God. In this way an
understanding of the passion of Christ will lead to a greater understanding of God. He
states: "Christ's surrender of himself to a God-forsaken death reveals the secret of the
cross and with it the secret of God himself" .52 God is present in the suffering and death
of Jesus, for it reveals the suffering in God. "My God, My God, why hast thou
forsaken me?" The cry of Jesus belongs to the inner life of God. Moltmann reveals the
implications in The Experiment Hope:
In the cross of Christ, a rupture tears, as it were through God
.himself.. .. God rejects himself.. ..God cries out to God... [Thus] ... the
event of the cross is an event within God.53
The death of Jesus is eternally in the very being of God. Thus the only adequate way of
speaking of the event of the Cross is in trinitarian terms. Moltmann believes that the
historical event of the Cross reveals a God who is subject to suffering love in trinitarian
distinctions. God is rather an "event. .. the event of the love of the Son and the grief of
the, Father from which the Spirit who opens up the future and creates life in fact
derives" .54
The trinitarian God is constituted in the event of the .Cross. He becomes Himself
through the openness of the Cross: the experience of sacrifice and abaIldonment. As
Moltmann expresses it, "He constitutes his existence in the event of his love. He exists
in love in the event of the cross" .55
Moltmann's dynamic, "becoming" trinitarian doctrine of God begins with the givenness
of the three persons. Their unity then beco'mes the problem.56 He writes:
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... it seems to make more sense theologically to start from the biblical
history, and therefore to make the unity of the three divine persons the
problem, rather than to take the reverse method - to start from the
philosophical postulate of absolute unity in order then to fmd the
problem in the biblical testimony. The unity of the Father, the Son and
the Spirit, is then the eschatolojical question about the consummation of
the trinitarian history of God.5 .
Moltmann speaks of the three divine persons of the Trinity as three divine subjects:
Father, Son and creative Spirit58 Who work together in the trinitarian history of the
Kingdom. Moreover Their unity is not a monadic unity.59 Rather, the" ... unity of the
divine tri-unity lies in the union of the Father, the Son and the Spirit, not in their
numerical unity. It lies in their fellowship, not in the unity of a single subject".60
Moltmann uses the term perichoresis to find trinitarian unity In relationship. The
persons of the Trinity are in a " ... process of most perfect and intense empathy".61
Through their eternal love they live in one another to such a degree that they are one.
Moltmann expresses the idea in this way:
The unity of the trinitarian person lies in the circulation of the divine life
which they fulfil in their relations to one another.... It is bound to
consist of the living fellowhsip of the three Persons who are related to
one another and exist in one another.62
God is then a community whose openness and freedom is found in self-giving and self-
communicating love. Thus, one should not think of the Trinity as a fixed geometrical
figure. Rather, the Trinity is a history of reciprocal relationships between the persons of
the divine community. These persons take the initiative in action or are acted upon
according to their function in c.reation, redemption, and the new creation.
The next section moves from openness within the Trinity to the Trinity as open to
creation and its consummation. For Moltmann the Trinity is a dialectical event which is
open to the future realization of the kingdom. He expresses this thought in self-
confessedly inadequate imagery when he sees "The Father as the creating origin of the
creation, the Son as its shaping origin and the Spirit as its life-giving origin,,63
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3.4. OPENNESS IN CREATION
Moltmann's doctrine of creation must be understood as the indwelling of God, " ... the
transfiguring indwelling of the triune God in His creation". 64 He implies, then, that
... the Creator through his Spirit, dwells in his creation as a whole, arid
in every individual created being, by virtue of his Spirit holding them
together and keeping them in life.65
The doctrine of creation takes as its starting point "... the indwelling of the Spirit in all
created beings. ,,66 For this reason creation is primarily a pneumatological doctrine.
Through the Spirit, God the Creator takes up His dwelling in His creation. The Spirit
who proceeds from the Father and shines forth in the Son is the very spirit of the
universe - its continuing creator, its cohesive structure and its unity.
Moltmann's doctrine of creation. corresponds very closely to the social doctrine of the
Trinity as presented in The Trinity and the Kingdom of God. In this work, as has been
noted, the concern is with the Trinity seen panentheistically in terms of "relationships
and communication": 67
By taking up panentheistic ideas from Jewish Christian traditions, we
should try to think ecologically about God, man and the world in their
relationships and indwellings. In this way it is not merely the Christian
doctrine of the Trinity that we are trying to work out anew; our aim is to
develop and practise trinitarian thinking as well. 68
Moltmann's trinitarian doctrine of creation binds together God's transcendence and His
immanence. Thus creation has its initial origin in the Father and is shaped by the Son
while the Spirit is its life-giving organ. 69 In Moltmann's words, "Creation exists in the
Spirit, is moulded by t~e Son and is created by the Father".70 This doctrine proceeds
from and is inherent in the realisation that the God who is transcendent in relation to the·
world, and the God who is immanent and dwells in His creation is one arid the same.
The Spirit is God's immanent presence in the world. For this reason a distinction must
be made between the incarnation of the Logos who became flesh and the Spirit who
"indwells",71 God in the Spirit commits Himself to His limited creation in self-
limitation, self-humiliation and self-surrender. The Cabbalistic doctrine of the Shekinah
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had prepared for a trinitarian solution in seeing this descent of God to human beings and
His indwelling among them as a division which takes place in God Himself. 72 This
means that in the suffering inequalities of the world of nature and of human beings the
sighs of the indwelling suffering presence of God is heard. Moltmann expresses this
doctrine in these words: "The God who in the Spirit dwells in his creation is present to
every one of his creatures and remains bound to each of them, in joy and sorrow",73
As noted in section 3.2. the social doctrine of the Trinity finds its community in the
circulation of the divine life fulfilled in the divine persons among themselves " .. .in their
relational, perichoretically consummated life process... ".74 Likewise, the indwelling
creative Spirit is the foundation for the community of creation. For this reason
It is not the elementary particles that are basic, as the mechanistic world-
view maintains, but the overriding harmony of the relations and of the
self-transcending movements in which the longing of the Spirit for a still
unattained consummation finds expression.75
The interpenetration and mutual interdependence of all created things finds its source
and end in the reciprocal indwelling and mutual interpenetration (perichoresis) of the
persons of the Trinity. God is "in" creation, thus "creation" is bound up with the
trinitarian life of God.
What is the nature of God's works in the world? How do the divine actions of the Spirit
in the world promote His indwelling and worktowards the Sabbath consummation?
Moltmann borrows the metaphor of the "open system" and uses it as a parable of the
world in its relationship to God and in particular to the work of the Spirit. For this
reason " ...we give the name of Spirit to the forms of organization and modes of
communication in open systems",76
Moltmann provides four criteria whereby an open system may be distinguished:. the
future condition differs from the present starting-point; open systems pass through
multiple processes of change; behavioural indeterminancy points towards an open range
of anticipation; open systems display a qualitative difference between the future and the
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past and the openness of a system is matched by its relative closedness, for only a
relatively stable system meets the preconditions for open communication and
anticipation.77
Moltmann discusses four ways in which the cosmic spirit operates within these "open
systems". First, the Spirit is the principle of creativity on all levels of matter and life.
In this sense, then, the Spirit creates new possibilities as He is the principle of
evolution.78 Secondly, the Spirit is a holistic principle, the integrating uniting centre of ...
purposeful consciousness. This means, according to Moltmann, that " ... at every
evolutionary stage he creates interaction, harmony· in these interactions, mutual
perichoresis, and therefore a life of co-operation and community".79 Thirdly, the Spirit
is the principle of individuation. This means that He differentiates what is particular in
life and matter at various levels. However, individuation must be linked with
integration, for they are complementary sides of the process of evolution. As Moltmann
states: "Self-assertion and integration, self-preservation and self-transcendence are the
two sides of the process in which life evolves". 80 Lastly, creations in the Spirit are
"open" in that they are aligned towards their possibilities by the principle of
intentionality. 81
Openness poses the question of the relationship between necessity and freedom or
determinacy and indeterminacy in both GoOd and creation. Moltmarin tries to avoid the
question when he writes:
The later theological interpretation of creation as creatio ex nihilo is
therefore unquestionably an apt paraphrase of what the Bible means by
"creation". Wherever and whatever God creates is without any
precondition. There is no external necessity which occasions his
creativity, and inner compulsion which can detennine it. Nor is there
an~ ~rimordial .matter whose potentiality is pre-given to his creative
activity, and which would set him material limits.82
However, Moltmann does ascribe an inner compulsion to God's nature which the strict
creatio ex nihilo would exclude. He comments:
If we .lift the concept of necessity out of the context of compUlsive
necessity and determination by something external, then in God necessity
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and freedom coincide; they are what is for him axiomatic, self-evident.
For God it is axiomatic to love, for he cannot deny himself. For God it
is axiomatic to love freely, for he is God. 83
This means that God cannot but will the good and therefore He is without choice in
communicating Himself to His creation. It can be concluded, then, that God's own self-
determination is "... an essential emanation of his goodness". 84 Moltmann sees
selflessness as the essence of love; consequently, God is at once free to create or not,
but must in essence be described as creative love. 85 There is, moreover, no distinction
between God's eternal self-sufficient love as Father, Son and Spirit and His free love in
creating a world distinct from Himself. 86 (See the blurring of distinctions between the
immanent Trinity and the economic Trinity, pp. 16-17).
Moltmann sees initial creation as creation with open possibilities. He says:
It is not perfect, but perfectible, in that it is open both to the history of
damnation and salvation as well as to destruction and consummation ...
as an ·open system ... the conditions for both its histor~ and its
consummation are established simultaneous with its beginning. 7
.However, there are "open" conditions in the sense that the future does not inhere
completely in the present. In the sense that it can bring something new it includes
elements of randomness. 88
Moltmann thus theologically understands the universe, according to J. McPherson, as
_. " ... an open system ... [which] has a transcendent encompassing milieu with which if is
in communication and a transcendent future into which it is evolving" 89. In this sense it
" ... hovers between necessity and randomness, and unfolds its ch<l!acter _in its selection
of choices" .90 The evolution of complex open systems involves an interaction between
a fixed past and a partially open, undetermined future. The realization of every
possibility gives birth to more complex situations which in turn open up a newer and
further range of possibilities. 91 For Moltmann this means that" ... [a] richer wealth of
forms is bound up with a growing indeterminacy of behaviour, and this again involves
increasing future possibilities" .92
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Such an open universe will be both participatory and anticipatory. As a participatory
system the universe is evolving towards richer, more diverse communication between
the open part-systems existing at various levels. 93 In this perichoresis, there is, in
Moltmann's words, " ... the trend towards the universal symbiosis of all systems of life
and matter, by virtue of 'the sympathy of all things' for one another" .94 As an
anticipatory system in which communication grows and possibilities increase, the thrust
towards self-transcendence accelerates. This permanent self-transcendence, " ... points
towards the forecourt of an inviting and guiding transcendence, and it is only in this
forecourt that the self-transcendence is possible".95 The universe is an open self-
transcending system and the individual part-systems of matter and life within these
complexes of communication (perichoresis) reach up into a transcendence, on the one
hand, and subsist out of that transcendence, on the other hand.
God's creative activity in history is the subject of section 3.5. God is engaged 10
creating the world in the present moment and will continue His ~ork right up until the
cosmic sabbath - in other words, right up to the eschatological consummation of all
creation.96 Moltmann sees the completion of the creative process in the kingdom of
glory as a new creation; as the indwelling of God. 97 Here the openness of transcendent
creation is a participation in the unlimited freedom of God. Thus openness is, for
Moltmann,
The indwelling of unlimited possibilities open to God ... the openness
par excellence of all life-systems and, for that reason, their eternal
capacity for life, not their rigidity.98
Moltmann notes that within the evolution of complex systems, indeterminate behaviour
(especially personal and social behaviour in humans) increases. The realization of the
possibilities in open systems creates yet more open possibilities.. Thus the kingdom of
glory which completes the process becomes " ... the openness of all finite life systems
for the fullness of life" ,99 Theologically this is the final indwelling of God in creation
or "." the beginning of the 'eternal history' of God, human beings and nature" .100
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The theology of creation relates to the understanding of salvation m history. As
Moltmann expresses the connection,
Creation at the beginning establishes the conditions for the possibilities
emergent in the history of creation. It defines the experimental area for
both constructive and destructive possibilities. It is open to time and to
its alteration within time. 101
In the next section salvation in history as well as in political and church life will be
understood as the opening up of closed systems.
3.:~5. OPENNESS IN HISTORY, POLITICAL AND CHURCH
LIFE.
The openness of the historical process is related to God's presence in history. God's life
is not held aloof from history, but is closely identified with the world processes of
liberating salvation.
Moltmann understands history as a sacramental "matter" in which God is present
through the word of compassion and power. 102 There are materializations of the
presence of God, real presences, in liberation from the vicious circles. Moltmann
expresses the notion in this way:
They are incarnations which point beyond themselves. They stand in
parallel to the trCiditional real presence of God in the sacraments.... In
the vicious circles of alienation his presence is perceived in the
experience of human identity and recognition.... Thus the real
presences of God require the character of a praesentia exp[osiva.103
However, a qualification of the above assertion is necessary, for two reasons. First,
God is identified with what is opposite to His inherent glory and· power in present
history; this means He is identified with what is inglorious, weak and in bondage.104
The paradigm for seeking God in His opposite is Christ's suffering death on the Cross
and God's identification with this event. Secondly, God's presence in history is
sacramental in that it points forward or beyond to a fuller, more complete presence.
This fuller presence is God's eschatological presence when God will be all in all. This
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analysis is captured by Moltmann when he states: "The peculiarity of Christian theology
can be defined as follows: Christian theology speaks of God historically and of history
eschatologically ".105 This means, on the one hand, that the life of God is inextricably
interwoven with the historical movements of God and, that on the other hand, only in
the future kingdom will historical processes be dealt with in retroactive validity in
relation to the novum of the Resurrection. Expressed differently, when God is spoken of
historically, He is related to concrete history witnessed in salvation history. When
history is spoken of eschatologically, the universal future of all men and all things is
anticipated.
The openness of the history of the kingdom of God cannot be understood, however,
unless it is situated within the doctrine of the Trinity. It is through the Trinity that
historical events become determinative of God's eternal life. Moltmann is loath to cling
to any distinction between the immanent Trinity and the economic Trinity. However, he
does not wish to dispense with the distinction entirely, locating it instead in
doxology. 106
Moltmann is insisting that the immanent Trinity is no "other" beyond or above the open
unity of the Father, Son and Holy Spirit in salvation history.' It is, rather, God's
transcendence, God's future, the outcome of the historical trinitarian processes and the
power which activated, fulfilled and united the various provisional forces. The
immanent Trinity belongs, then, to eschatology; the economic Trinity to the worldly
processes of the establishment of the kingdom. For Moltmann, the flow of action is
fro~ the economic Trinity to the immanent Trinity in order to preserve'the "openness"
of the trinitarian life for man and history.
God is open in the sense that He is the future of history, "the coming God", "God in
front of us, ahead of us", the "God of hope" and the "God of the Exodus" .107 In
"sending" the Trinity is open towards the world because of its "threefold" sendin (1 love'
o ,
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dialectically, the Trinity in the glorification is open for the ingathering and unification of
humanity and of all creation in God because of the three-in-oneness of His "gathering
love" .108
"Sending" and "gathering" are the protological and eschatological symbols of divine
openness.
History is an open eschatological process in God which does not, however, rob mankind
of freedom and historical initiative. Rather, it makes creative discipleship in an
unfinished world possible. The task ahead IS one of radical openness to new·
possibilities, a breaking free from present incompleteness and the building up of a new
reality corresponding better to the promised future.
Historical openness understands itself as being the crying for a freedom only as yet
anticipated in time. It is "a passion for the possible" 109. This cry for liberty runs
through man, creation and even the Godhead. l1O Thus it is a truly universal cry.
Moltmann declares:
It [the cry for freedom] is the hunger of men and women. It is the desire
of nature. It is the passion of God, and it is revealed in the Crucified
Christ... . A theology of liberation sees all individual suffering and
failure in the world against the background of God's own patient
suffering. It therefore sees all partial movements towards liberation
against the horizon of God's own perfect and final history of
liberation. I 11
.;
Thus all reality is open to the future, is "going somewhere" and its final transformation
is provisionally embodied within the present.
Moltmann identifies the unfree world with negatives. These negatives, for Moltmann,
are the "others": 112 the socially and culturally outcast, those who suffer economic
destitution, the exploited environment and those who live in the apathy of personal
despair and hopelessness. These "vicious circles of death" (p.39), as Moltmann calls
them, are exposed by the suffering-identity of God with the Crucified Jesus. Having
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identified the "negatives" within contemporary existence, God's creative acts are the
"negation of the negative" (p.37). These creative acts in history open up closed,
moribund systems through the transformation of what Moltmann calls "non-human life
systems" .113 The opening-up of these systems is impossible without the acceptance of
creative suffering. For this reason, God's openness to the world is displayed in the
suffering and death of Jesus. Thus, the negation of the negative in history quickens life
through the process of death and recreation. 114 Thus the opening-up of the closed
systems which militate against life and future eschatological fulfilment is the obverse
side of the negation of the negative. They are, positively expressed, "creative acts" .115
They transform present reality, allowing it. to reach the potentialities revealed in history
in the raising of the Crucified One. This process is what Moltmann means by the
"experiment hope" .116 However, to the extent that the "experiment hope" is open to
the coming kingdom, those associated with it in faith and trust experience the groaning
of unredeemed creation. 117
Creation and history are unfree at the beginning. In Moltmann's discussion terms such
as "enslavement", "primal fear", "alienation" and "closed systems" relate to sin
(p.25-27). This means that the origin of sin is implicit in the very creation of
"possibilities", "potentialities" and "freedom" in God's initial creative act (p.26).
Moltmann explains:
Creation in the beginning is also the creation of time. It must therefore
be understood as creatio mutabilis. It is perfectible, not perfect, for it is
open for the history of both disaster and salvation, both destruction and
consummatio.I1. If we understand creation indivisibly and as a whole as
an open system, then its beginning is at the same time the condition for
its history and its completion. Creation in the begilming is the creation
of conditions for the possibilities of creation's history.... It is open for
time and for alteration in time. We canot see in initial creation the
_invariant nature of history, but we can see the beginnings of nature's
history. 118
The unfree world is nowhere more evident than in the political domain. Moltmann's
political theology is not one of undue optimism nor one containing a strong social or
political theory. Mankind lives in a world where nothing as yet corresponds to God's
promise and where there is a continual tension between the now (the unfree) in which
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the promise is proclaimed and the new in which the promise is fulfilled.
Moltmann centres his political theology on the death and resurrection of Jesus. It is an
event circumscribed within history, but it opens up history to a definite future.
Consequently the death of the Crucified One reveals the truth of the human, social and
political predicament of unredeemed man. 1l9 Open political theology makes man
aware of the contradiction between the hoped-for future and the conditions of the
present. Expressed dialectically, it can be said that the Crucified One demonstrates what
is wrong with the world, while the risen Christ is the messianic anticipation of the end-
time. Thus Moltmann contends:
But if Jesus is the anticipator of God, then he must simultaneously and
unavoidably become the sign of resistance to the powers of a world
which contradicts God and to the laws of a world which is closed to the
future... . Thus eschatological anticipation inevitably brings forth
historical resistance. Salvation can enter the situation of misery in no
other way; liberation can enter into a world of oppression in no other
way. 120
Therefore the resurrection of Jesus is the eschatological anticipation and the beginning of
the resurrection processes in the world's new creation. God becomes the power of the
open future in the midst of history. This means that in the event of the Resurrection the
.expectations of man can be partially, though certainly, realized in history. The
liberating future of God arouses hope of man's transcending every present historical and
political limitation. The social and political realms are under the sentence of death,
enslaved by the forces of law, sin and death. 121
This unfree world is created for freedom and openness; the cry of liberty runs through
the entire creation and the Godhead.122 However, freedom entails many risks, for it is
the participation in the creative act of God and is open to all the human abuses of self-
interest in power. Moltmann notes:
The risk of freedom in an unfree world is a big one... and it is true that
everyone who is prepared for freedom must be prepared for the cross....
Freedom is the cross: that is the Gospe1. 123
The "unfree world" is identified with the negatives which are the unspeakable sufferings
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of society, the vicious circles of death 124 and various forms of slavery. These negatives
are sin, and Moltmann identifies God's presence in the Crucified One with the
community of sin and godforsakenness. Thus Moltmann sees the presence and power of
the lordship of the Crucified One even in the sphere of sin's reign.125 The Christian
faith turns to these negatives in order to proclaim and promote the negation of the
negative. However, the opening-up of these systems is impossible without the
acceptance of creative suffering. In the same way as God's openness to the world is
made manifest in the suffering and death of Jesus, so the negation of the negative
manifests the opening-up of the closed systems in order to transform present reality. It
can be said that Moltmann brings to political activity a sensitivity for transcendence, for
the actualizing of the possibilities inherent in the negation of the negative are God's
creative acts within history.
Moltmann sees Christianity as the very negation of ideology for it does not tether man to
a particular ideology or final political vision. However, Christianity does draw the
believer into participation in political life and into membership of his society. Thus
Moltmann's political ~pinions are reflected in his dialectical detachment from political
religion on the one hand, balanced by effective involvement in the secular realm, on the
other hand. Without this appraisal it is not possible to address the political realm
effectively from within Christian ethics.
Firstly, then, Christianity must become the power of liberation from political idols.
Moltmann states:
Political religion would like to try to interpret the dangerous meaning of
the messianic message of Christ within the conditions of contemporary
society in order to free man practically" from the coercions of this society
and to prepare the way for the eschatological freedom of the new
man. 126
It may be observed that Moltmann does not want to make political questions the main
concern of theology, or to politicize the Church. He wishes, rather, to Christianize the
political realm while maintaining the distinctiveness of Christian identity. Political
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religion, for Moltmann, makes idols of the soul of the nation by replacing history with
mythology. While it is often true that these state religions have been Christianized,
nevertheless, in the process Christianity itself has been politicized, so provoking what
Moltmann calls the" ... current raison of the state" 127.
As Moltmann has shown in The Experiment Hope, monotheism has bolstered the
monarchical structures of society and so provided a basis for political religion. Yet
Christianity has the inner consistency and power (through the doctrine of the Trinity, the
_. ' .J • ~ • .' .~"_~_ .. > 01;.,.':'·', .. , ••_ c., ~._ ~. ,.
prohibition of the worship of idols, and the eschatological concept of universal peace) to
break loose from political religion. The symbol of the Cross distinguishes the Christian
faith from any other religion or ideology for it deprives the state or society of any
religious justification. All the natural order holds sacred - the power of authority - the
Cross demolishes in exalting its antithesis, which is freedom. Consequently the
Christian faith becomes the power of liberation from political idols. 128 Christian hope
in the raising of the Crucified One is a perennial symbol of resistance to the status quo.
Secondly, detachment from political idols is matched by the involvement of the
Christian faith in the secular processes leading to the liberating freedom of God) s
transforming future. In Moltmann's distinctive approach:
For Christian hope, the world is not an insignificant waiting-room for
the souls's journey to, h~ven, but !he ..arena" of the new creation of all
things and the battleground of freedom.... It must ... draw the hoped-
for future already into the misery of the present and use it in practical
initiatives for overcoming this misery. 129 -
Mankind lives in a world where nothing as yet seems to correspond to the promise of
God, and where there is a continual tension between the "old" in which the promise is
proclaimed and the "new" in which the promise is fulfilled. The "old" is symptomatic
of the vicious circles of death that enslave and frustrate creation's universal cry of
freedom. Moltmann elaborates:
The road to peace leads right through these vicious circles.... Today
these vicious circles have devilish power; they interlock like links in a
chain; and they lead to death. Peace workers, therefore, must look for
political, economic, cultural and religious ways that lead to life. Hope
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in action must produce images and adaptations of peace that will make
the hope of faith credible. 13b
This Gospel of peace is put into action in the vicious circles of death where human
potential is stunted and the threat of universal death most real. The new in God's
creative acts means redistribution of economic power; realization of human rights;
mutual respect for racial, cultural and sexual identity; partnership with, reverence for,
and communion with nature and, finally, an appreciation of the quality of personal
life)3! In these creative acts, society is opened up to the liberating freedom of Jesus
Christ. 132
For these reasons Moltmann would contend that the Christian, both as an individual and
as Church, is directed in openness towards the possibilities of what will be. Thus,in
Moltmann's words,
The theory of world-transforming, future-seeking missionary practice
does not search for eternal values in the existing reality of the world, but
for possibilities that exist in the world in the direction of the promised
future. 133
Through his faith in the resurrected One and the promise of His future, the believer
must then transform existing reality in the power of the Spirit and the crucified One.
His salvation is not only personal and social but one in solidarity with the whole
creation. Thus the believer stands in a relationship of obedience to the world-
transforming mission. Moltmann maintains that the believer
.... does not link things, as in technical positivism, with his own
subjectivity. Rather, he adjusts being to the universal, rectifying future
of God. Thus his mediation serves the reconciliation of the world with
God.... His understanding consists in the fact that in sympathy with the
misery of being he anticipates the redeeming future of being and so lays
the foundation of its reconciliation, justification and stability. 134
Thus the practice and realization of a Christian in the world is a political question. The
believer and the environment are open to the salvific acts initiated by the resurrection of
Christ. Salvific reconciliation is a process of liberation. It is the opening-up of closed
systems to their future potential in the eschaton. This liberation is multi-dimensional: .
freeing of theology from religious idolatry, politics from political idolatry and the
Church from political and civil religion. The liberating service of the Church is
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reflected in its concrete involvement in the transformation of the world.
The Church is to be an "exodus church" (PAD) and no longer the religion of society, the
cultus publicus, representing the highest good of society. Rather, it is the Church for
the world. The Church serves mankind by assisting the world to transform itself. It is
the expectation of the coming kingdom and the vanguard of the coming righteousness.
The Church serves what is to be. This, for Moltmann,
... does not merely mean salvation of the soul, individual rescue from
the evil world, comfort for a troubled conscience, but rather the
realization of the eschatological hope ofjustice; the humanizing of man,
the socializing of humanity, peace for all creation. 135
Creative discipleship136 suffers under the cross of the present in unfree creation. It is
never an adaptation to the existing social patterns. It opens the present to the creative
possibilities in reconciling the world to God and to his future. In so doing discipleship
restricts social institutions in order that mankind may live in-a world of possibilities that
can serve the future promise.
Christian discipleship does have political consequences, but these can only aim to give
the Church political liberty. This liberty will enable the Church to play a critical
liberating role against the vicious circles of death that enslave the world. The Church's
involvement in liberation means that it must take sides. It is partisan on behalf of those
sufferings revealed by the Cross. There is no danger of the Church or the Christian
conforming to the,world if each seeks the identity of the Cross. In the Church's activity
with the lowly it will have the freedom to stand back from partial historical realities,
from political, cultural and religious idols, and any uncritical assimilation of culture.
The Cross is a symbol of openness in that it will always have the power to contradict the
present, the yet unfulfilled reality (p.ll). It will contradict the is and through its link
with the resurrection, open reality to the ought, that is, the promise of the future
fulfilled in the eschaton,l37 Moltmann contends:
To act ethically in a Christian sense means to participate in God's history
in the midst of our own history, to integrate ourselves into the
comprehensive process of God's liberation of the world, and to discover
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our own role in this according to our own calling and abilities. A
messianically oriented ethics makes people into co-operators for the
kingdom of God. It assumes that the kingdom of God is already here in
concrete, if hidden, form. Christian ethics integrates suffering and ailing
people into God's history for this world; it is fulfilled by the hope of the
completion of God's history in the world by God himself. l38
Thus Christian creative discipleship anticipates the coming open kingdom of glory.
The next chapter will turn to the philosopher, Karl Popper. Openness is his overall
thesis, too; the truth lies ahead. Popper is primarily a philosopher of science. His
overall scientific method is falsification (a scientific via negativa) as opposed to
verification. Chapter Four will investigate his approach and its bearing on the
limitations of knowledge, especially scientific knowledge.
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FOOTNOTES
1 Moltmann is obviously much indebted to Hegel. An important feature of Hegel's thinking is
his understanding of the historicity of God. This means that God is known to man through
history and is actively involved in history. He is not a supreme being above and beyond man
and the world. Rather, He is a self-developing God in the process of coming to Himself. He
absolves all the negatives of history by absorbing them into the good. In this way He arrives at
the unity of finite and infinite. See W. Gorduun, "Hegelian Themes in Contemporary
Theology", Journal ofthe Evangelical Theology Society (22).
God is Absolute Spirit and, in His final expression, essentially atemporal, the dynamic
development leading up to the stage of a God in the process of temporal and historical
becoming. Moltmann, who wishes to combat classical theism, uses the insights of Hegel and
integrates them into his own thinking. This is why he works with Hegelian ontology in order
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Two symbols of openness in the kingdom of liberation are "play" and "open fellowship". Play
is a symbol, not of doing and becoming, but of being, and as such is a sign of man's end. Play
is what men do when they are free. However, Moltmann insists on the dialectical nature of
play. "If on earth everything turns into play, nothing will be play" (Theology of Play, p.Il2).
The world itself still grows in pain and cannot be all gain "until the dead rise and all begin to
dance because everything has become new" (Ibid.). Christian fellowship is inclusive; it breaks
through the exclusive circles of modem friendship to be !l sign of the messianic age. (See J.
Moltmann, The Open Church, pp.60-62).





4.1. CRITICAL RATIONALISM AS THE SCIENTIFIC
METHOD
Central to Popper's thought is that "truth is not manifest" 1 for it has a quality of
elusiveness and uncertainty about it. Thus he rejects any idea of ultimate or final
explanation;2 every explanation is in need of further explanation) Throughout his
work he thus rejects the notion of "essentialism,,4 which asks "What is?" questions5
such as "'What is matter?' or 'What is force?' or 'What is justice?'" .6 These questions
aim to reveal the real or essential meaning of these terms and thus the true and essential
nature behind them.
Popper's faIIibilism7 sees truth, rather, as tentative, uncertain and provisional. He
states that "though there are no general criteria by which we can recognise truth -
except perhaps tautological truth - there are something like criteria of progress towards
the truth ... ".8 Ih fact Popper relies on the notion of truth as a "regulative principle".9
Though it is not something which has a fixed form or limits, or can ever be known in
its totality, truth has the qualities of realism and objectivity. Thus Popper states:
... science, does embody objective knowledge (of a hypothetical
character) although of course it does not embody knowledge that is
certain (which means that we cannot claim to know in the sense of
certain rational belief). Nevertheless we can claim that in deciding to
refer one thing to another... we proceed in a perfectly rational way - in
the way of the searcher for truth, though not in the way of the possessor
of truth. 10
According to Popper the truth of a statement is related to the correspondence theory
rehabilitated by Taski. 11 Truth is correspondence to the facts and requires that a
correspondence theory be formulated in a metalanguage. 12 Logically this can be
expressed thus: "p" corresponds to the facts if and only if "p" .13 Popper could
logically use such a theory to define reality in its relationship to true statements. Thus
Popper proposes:
For example, we may distinguish real facts, that is (alleged) facts that
are real, from (alleged) facts that are not real (that is, from non-facts).
Or to put it more explicitly, we can say that an alleged fact, such as the
moon's consisting of green cheese, is a real fact if and only if the
statement which describes it - in this case the statement 'The moon is
made of green cheese' - is true; otherwise the alleged fact is not a real
fact (or, if you prefer to say so, it is not a fact at all). 14
With the above theory Popper retains the idea of absolute and objective truth as a
regulative idea or a standard by which we fall short. Truth thus becomes a standard of
criticism but, as Popper reminds us, "truth is often hard to cOme by, and once found it
may easily be lost again." 15 Science, however, remains a search for objective
information and truth.
Popper thus regards the idea of episteme or absolute knowledge as an obstacle to the
acquisition of human knowledge, for the ideal of absolute knowledge leads to scepticism
or dogmatism,16 both enemies of truth. The search for truth requir~s an attitude of
rationality and, for Popper, "There is n,o better synonym for 'rational' than
'critical'" 17. Rationality, for Popper, is "an attitude of readiness to listen to critical
arguments and to learn from experience" .18 Thus to be rational entails being' open to the
viewpoint of others; being open to what is other. As will become more evident later,
Popper stresses the fact that "the link between rationalism and humanitarianism is very
close".1 9 In summary it may be said that to know rationally presupposes a capacity to
choose, in the face of criticism, either to maintain or to abandon belief.
Thus critical rationalism rejects any epistemological authority equated with a divine
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authority which then becomes the source of all knowledge.20 Both classical rationalism
and classical empiricism, Popper maintains, thought in terms of authority, much though
they wished to reject it. They appealed respectively to the authority of the intellect or the
authority of the senses.21 Both wished to be possessors of absolute, certain authority.
Popper's critical rationalism abandons all attempts at justification, seeing criticism as an
alternative to justification. The central problem in epistemology had been the
justification of theories and beliefs. Popper asserts that we cannot give any positive
justification or positive- reasons for our theories and beliefs.22 However, we are able to
prefer one theory to another on the grounds that it has withstood criticism better than the
other.
In Realism and the Aim ofScience Popper states:
Critical reasons do not justify a theory, for the fact that one theory has so
far withstood criticism better than another is no reason whatever for
supposing that it is actually true... . Such critical reasons do not of
course, prove that our preference is more than conjecturaL. .. For my
proposed solution to the new problem is compatible with the view that
our knowledge - our conjectural knowledge - may ~ow; and that it may
do so by the use of reason: of critical ~rgurnent. ... 3
It is evident that Popper argues strongly against a commonsense theory of knowledge
which takes knowledge to be a special kind of belief, namely justified belief. Popper's
contention is that all knowledge is "conjectural".24 This means that growth in scientific
knowledge is a system of "conjectures and refutations", of critical "trial and error", of
progressing from problem to problem: "problems of ever-increasing depth and an ever
Increasing fertility in suggesting new problems".25 Thus, by the method of critical
rationalism, knowledge grows by evolution and adaptation in terms of the method of
conjectures (bold untested theories) and refutations (selective retention).· In summary it
may be said that at its core Popper's methodology is a model of successful rational
problem-solving, that is, conjectures interacting with criticism in the form of severe
testing.
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In the next section Popper's critical method is further elaborated in his rejection of
induction - verification as a scientific method and its replacement by deduction -
falsification.
4.2. FALSIFICATION VERSUS INDUCTION
For Popper the mark of a scientific (empirical) statement is that it is capable of being
tested by experience.26 This means that scientific theories are tested by_ exposing them
to the struggle for survival in order to select the fittest. "Falsification" is the criterion of
demarcation between scientific and non-scientific or metaphysical theories. 27
Accordingly it must be possible for an empirical statement to be tested by experience
and refuted if it fails. Popper expresses this notion succinctly:
I propose the following definition. A theory is called 'empirical' or
'falsifiable' if it divides the class of all possible basic statements
unambiguously into the following two non-empty sub-classes. First, the
class of all basic statements with which it is inconsistent (or which it
rules out, or prohibits). We call this the class of potelltialfalsifiers of the
theory; secondly, the class of those basic statements which it does not
contradict (or which it 'permits'). We shall put this more simply by
saying that a theory is falsifiable if the class of its pQtential falsifiers is
28 .not empty ...
In a further elaboration Popper states that any empirical system should first be
consistent. This means, as stated above, that all possible statements may be divided
into two classes: those which contradict the system and those which support the
system. Secondly, the system must be falsifiable. Both conditions enable a
differentiation within the totality of all possible statements. This makes the system
"scientific"29 in that any theory is testable and potentially "real". In addition,
Popper states that the uncertainty of the theory, arising from its hypothetical or
conjectural character, does not diminish its potential to describe some aspect of
reality. Indeed, potential falsifiers may clash with reality.30 Therefore Popper can
state:
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But some of these theories of ours can clash with reality; and, when they
do, we know that there is a reality; that there is something to remind us
of the fact that our ideas may be mistaken. And this is why the realist is
right. 31
According to the above view a system may only be considered scientific if its assertion
may clash with reality.
Popper regards the problem of demarcation between science and non-science (including
logic, metaphysics, and pseudo-science) as fundamental to intellectual development. 32
He proposes the following criterion of demarcation:
This, then, is roughly the methodological form ... of demarcation.
Propose theories which can be criticized. Think about possible decisive
falsifying experiments - crucial experiments. But do not give up your
theories too easily - not at any rate, before you have critically examined
your criticism.33 .
For Popper, unlike the Positivists,34 non-scientific or metaphysical statements are not
without meaning. He admits that some metaphysical ideas have obstructed the growth'
of science, but others (e.g. speculative atoms) have aided science.35 In his essay Back to
the Presocratics ,he comments as -follows on their "metaphysical ideas":
Here we find bold and fascinating ideas, some of which are strange and
even staggering anticipations of modem results, while many others are
wide of the mark, from our modem point of view, but most of them, and
the best of them, have nothing to do with observation. 36
Attention will now be turned to the problem of induction and verification which reaches
. .
to the heart of Popper's scientific method. In the Logic of Scientific Discovery37 Popper
.. "" . '. ~ .'.
argues that universal laws cannot be logically deduced from the observance of
particulars.38 He relies heavily on Hume's "Two Problems of Induction" (a logical
problem and a psychological problem).
Hume had pointed out that no number of singular observation statements could logically
justify a general statement. 39 T.E. Burke expresses the problem in this way:
... a systematic or organiZed body of knowledge about the world can be
developed only by the use of such observation of particulars. But such
observations, however assiduously collected and recorded, cannot by
themselves furnish logically adequate grounds for predictions about
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future states of the world, or for unrestricted generalizations.... Hence
in so far as it puts forward such predictions and generalisations, despite
its reputation as a paradigm example of logical thinking - cannot
characteristically claim more than it is logically entitled to claim ....40
Hume's psychological problem41 proposes that reasonable people expect and believe
that the future will be like the past so that instances of which they have no experience
will conform to those which they have already experienced. Hume believes that this is
so because of conditioning and repetition. Expressed differently, he believes that
induction justifies itself in practice.
Popper believes that Hume's psychoJogical theory is wrong because observers are not
passive but active, and impose order on observation.42 Moreover, Popper transfers the
logical solution to the psychological level: the truth of logic is the truth of psychology.
Hume's "n~gati~e" P&2plem of induction leads Popper t~ develop his own
epistemological theory. 43 Scientific or theoretical knowledge can never be justified; it
remains forever conjectural. There is n~ certain knowledge. However, preference for
competing theories can be rational: firstly, some can be more informative and bolder;
secondly, some can stand up better to severe tests. 44
At the root of the problem of induction is how we gain theoretical knowledge from
experience. Popper answers negatively - experience can never validate or justify -our
. - - - .. ,'-
hypotheses;45 it can merely facilitate choice between competing theories. Therefore
Popper concludes: "Induction, Le. inference based on observation, is a myth. It is
neither a psychological fact; nor a fact of ordinary life, nor one of scientific
procedure".46
With what do we replace induction? Simply, with the deductive testing of theories. In
his Logic of Scientific Discovery Popper outlines four procedures for testing a theory:
logical testing of internal consistency; logical determination of the type of theory, for
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example, empirical, scientific or tautological; comparison with other theories (survival
test) and finally a test of the empirical application of the theory.47 It should be noted
again that theories are never verifiable by experience. It is only possible for an empirical
scientific statement to be falsified or refuted by experience.
Scientific theories have a logical form of universal laws applicable to particular
phenomena. With· the aid of initial conditions we deduce from our universal theories
predictions concerning the future behaviour of the phenomenon under investigation.48
..
Further we need "basic statements" to decide whether a statement may be "falsifiable".
Popper defines basic statements as follows: "basic statements are therefore - in the
natural mode of speech - statements asserting that an observable event is occuring in a
certain individual region of space and time. ,,49 These basic statements might be called
"conventions"SO because they are accepted as a result of agreement and we can desist
from subjecting them to further tests. This convention, however, concerns only singular
empirical statements and not universal theories. According to Popper, the question of
basic statements establishes:
...a fundamental logical asymmetry between empirical falsification and
verification...a set of singular observation statements ('basic statements',
as I called them) may at times fasify or refute a universal law; but it
cannot posssibly verify a law, in the sense of establishing it. Precisely
the same fact may be expressed by saying that it can verify an existential
statement.. .but it cannot falsify it. 51
No scientific statement can ever be. presented as the final unchanging truth. Nor is it
possible to verify a theory even if it happens to be true. In the next section a further
analysis of Popper's epistemology will follow, embracing concepts such as theory-
impregnated knowledge, corroboration and verisimilitude.
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4.3. LOGICO-DEDUCTIVE METHOD
The previous section debunked the idea of final, demonstrative knowledge. Knowledge
grows by a process of trial and error, of conjecture and refutation leading to a better
approximation to the truth, rather than the attainment by verification of certain truth.
Conjectural knowledge does not include the ingredient of certainty at all. Indeed,
Popper's view is that we learn from experience, from our mistakes, from refuting
instances and, most of all, by criticism. Truth is not fixed and finished, but rather an
unending search.
Induction gets the stages of knowledge acquisition in the wrong order. It proposes that
observation comes first and that the mind is a tabula rasa. Such pure observation, for
Popper, is both psychologically and logically impossible and at variance with the very
nature of observation.52 Popper criticizes the tabula rasa theory of the mind naming it
the "bucket theory of the mind":
Our mind is a bucket which is originally empty, or more or less so, and
into this bucket material enters through our senses all experience
consists of information received through our senses . Among the
many things which are wrong with the bucket theory of the mind are the
following:
(1) Knowledge is conceived of as consisting of things, of thing-like
entities in our bucket (such as ideas, impressions, sense-data ... )
(2) Knowledge is, first of all, in us: it consists of information which has
reached us, and which we have managed to absorb..
(3) There is immediate or direct knowledge ...
(3a) All error, all mistaken knowl~ge ... comes from bad intellectual
digestion which adulterates these ultimate or "given" elements of
information by misinterpreting them ...53 .
. .
The above common sense theory of knowledge is for Popper radically mistaken for it
fails to see the distinction between knowledge in the subjective sense (dispositions and
expectations) and knowledge in the objective sense (linguistically formulated information
available for criticism). It is not therefore knowledge in the objective sense.54
According to Popper the belief that we start with pure observation unaided by a theory is
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nonsensical. "Observation is always selective. It needs a chosen object, a definite task,
an interest, a point of view, a problem".55 Popper further insists that we start our
conscious lives with certain primitive interests and expectations, and enlarge or develop
these in response to whether they are realized or thwarted.56 Popper in fact sees our
whole intellectual development as a constant process of the modification of our theories
and expectations under the pressure of experience.57 Popper's epistemology owes much
to Kant. Kant asserts that there are synthetic, a priori judgments which perform a dual
function: they both give knowledge about the world and are universally valid. He thus
assumes the existence in human consciousness of innate ideas to which natural
phenomena must conform.58 He accepts (like Hume) that experience cannot reveal to us
any necessary laws, but such laws as are set within experience.59
Jeremy Naydler correctly expresses Popper's Kantian position as follows:
The conception that Popper is led to advocate is thus one which is a kind
of hybrid between the Humean and Kantian approaches. To overcome the
Humean problem of induction Popper insists, with Kant, that the world
of experience is our creation; but to avoid the metaphysical problem of
Kantianism, he maintains, that our scientific theories can never have the
necessity of a prior validity - they are, at best, conjectures.60
The Kantian influence confirms Popper's belief that human beings are not paSSIve
recipients of knowledge, allowing nature to impress order and regularity upon us.
Rather, we impress the laws of our intellect upon nature. 61 Thus we have the "activist"
or "searchlight" theory of knowledge. 62 We cannot do without a pre-existing
framework of theories. These; even if only implicit, create expectations and often result
, in disappointment. All knowledge is thus theory-impregnated and conjectural in nature,
for even our organs are theory-impregnated and open to error. As a consequence,
knowledge must be criticized and corrected (hence "searchlight theory").63 Closely
related and allied to "theory" or "conjecture" as a starting point for rational knowledge
~. .'.
is the concept of tradition. Popper expresses the idea thus:
This means that we pick up, and try to continue, a line of enquiry which
has the whole background of the earlier development of science behind
it; you fall in with the tradition of science. It is a very simple and
decisive point, but nevertheless one that is not sufficiently realized by
rationalists - that we cannot start afresh; that we make use of what people
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before us have done in science.64
The function of observation, as seen earlier, is not to produce theories. Rather
observation challenges us to make new and better theories which can stand up to
rigorous testing in the light of the problem situation of the day. We cannot ever free
ourselves from the so-called restriction of a tradition. We cannot start from scratch.
Tradition is a starting point which we critically accept.
We can speak of the growth of objective knowledge. This involves the repeated
overthrow of scientific theories and their replacement· by better ones. As Popper
expresses it: "Scien.ce should be visualized as progressing from problems to problems -
to problems of ever increasing depth".65 In order to facilitate this aim Popper says that
science should concentrate on theories which have a high degree of falsifiability. Those
which are incorrect are most likely to be eliminated and those which may be true will
survive their tests. 66 The question arises whether some theories are better than oth'ers
and may thus be tentatively accepted. A "better" theory will have to succeed both
where its refuted predecessor succeeded and where its predecessor failed. Success on
.these two levels will qualify the new theory as "more successful" or better.67 Expressed
differently, the new theory would have a better degree of "corroboration" than its
predecessor. Corroboration is a non-inductive measure to assess how well the theory has
stood up to tests. It does not add to the probability of the universal theory; it means
simply that the theory has not yet been falsified. A "high" degree of corroboration
means that a high content of the theory or hypothesis has survived severe tests. These
tests must involve a conscientious series Of counter instances.68 Popper expresses the
notion in, the following manner: "The degree of corroboration of a theory is an
evaluation of the results of empirical tests it has undergone". 69 Indeed, the degree of
corroboration of an hypothesis or theory will increase the more severe tests it passes.70
Popper introduces an allied notion, that of the verisimilitude of theories, which allows
us to speak of some theories as being nearer to the truth than others.71 This means that
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one theory - even though false - might be preferable to its competitors in being nearer to
truth. Popper combines two logical notions introduced by Taski (p.9S): the notion of
truth and the notion of the (logical) content of a statement72 (Le. the class of all
statements logically entailed by it). He defines verisimilitude as follows: "... the
verisimilitude of a statement will be explained as increasing with its truth content and
decreasing with its falsity content".73 Popper would prefer to see verisimilitude, rather
than truth, as the aim of science, for it is a more realistic aim. It suggests that we make
progress towards the truth.74 Popper sees three requirements for the growth of
knowledge:
The new theory should proceed from some simple, new and powerful,
unifying idea about some connection or relation ... between hitherto
unconnected things or facts ... or new "theoretical entities" (such as
field and particles) Secondly, we require that the theory will be
independemly testable it must lead to the prediction of phenomena
which have not so far been observed .... We require that they shall pass-
some new, and severe tests ... . The third requirement, on the other
hand, can be found to be fulfilled, or not fulfilled, only by testing the
new theory empirically.75
It is clear that, according to Popper, the primary aim of science is to discover objective
truth. Indeed, as noted by O'Hear, "Popper remains an objectivist, an implacable
opponent of relativism and irrationalism",76 However, O'Hear questions Popper's
"objectivity" for it remains impossible on any level to get out of a theoretical structure
to true reality. 77 Nevertheless, as Popper notes, "I do not know... I can only guess. But
I can ex_amine my guess critically and, if it withstands criticism, then this fact may be
taken as a good reason in favour of it",78 Thus Popper's position is totally objective. A
statement is true whether anyone believes it or not. Moreover, a theory may be closer
to the facts than any of its competitors whether anyone believes it or not.79 Objectivity
is there - outside man - but it cannot be known with certainty.
In the next section the objective and evolutionary nature of knowledge will be
investigated in depth. Knowledge grows, but it starts with animal knowledge.
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4.4. OBJECTIVE EVOLUTIONARY KNOWLEDGE
Popper's position is clear: insistence upon absolute or objective standards and equal
insistence upon our fallibility in trying to achieve these standards. He calls this position
"fallibilistic absolutism" .80 Musgrave notes:
The central point of Popper's fallibilistic absolutism is to reject the
affirmative answer to these questions which are presupposed by both
dogmatists and sceptics. Popper agrees with the sceptic against the
dogmatist, that we cannot infallibly know objective or absolute truth -
but he agrees with the dogmatist against the sceptic that the notion of
objective or absolute truth plays. an important role as a regulative
standard... 81
Popper sees that scientific knowledge is so real, so far reaching that it is impossible to
"know" in the traditional sense. As noted earlier (p.1O!), knowledge has objective and
subjective dimensions, but the latter has far greater importance. Popper notes that
traditional epistemology neglects the distinction between the knowing subject and his
objective knowledge thus making it irrelevant for a proper study of scientific
knowledge. 82 In the next section we shall see that in order to avoid subjectivism the
objective dimension of knowledge must be autonomous. 83
Popper's objectivist epistemology is coterminous with a theory of evolution. He is a
convinced Darwinian. In his Poverty of Historicism, in what he calls the "logic of
situations", he postulates the evolutionary idea that a theory or action is a response to a
. .'
problem being confronted. 84 Problem-solving is thus to be seen in Darwinian terms: in
response to a problem an hypothesis is thrown up which is subject to environmental
pressure. This pressure leads either to its rejection, its modification or its acceptance85
(only if not confronted by a problem it cannot solve). Popper notes:
... the growth of our knowledge is the result of a process closely
resembling what Darwin called 'natural selection'; that is, the natural
selection of hypotheses... . From the amoeba to Einstein, the growth of
knowledge is always the same: we try to solve our problems, and to
obtain, by a process of elimination, something approaching adequacy in
our tentative solutions. 86
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The main difference betweeen the problem of organisms and humans is that the former
are almost all directly and immediately concerned with the question of survival. 87
Because of their linguistic formulations human solutions are open to criticism and
consequent modification. As Popper so aptly expresses it, the critical method enables
our theories to die instead of ourselves. 88 Consequently he shows how our human
problems obey the same laws as those involved in evolutionary change. Human change,
however, is discontinuous with nature. Thus Popper comments:
What is so notable about human knowledge is that it has gone so far
beyond all animal knowledge, and that it is still growing. The main
task of the theory of human knowledge is to understand it as continuous
with animal knowledge; and to understand also its discontinuity... from
animal knowledge. 89
There are new developments within living organisms. Animal evolution involves
largely the modification of, or emergence of, new organs which affect behaviour.
Human evolution, on the other hand, proceeds largely by development outside the
person or behaviour, that is, in the making of tools, weapons etc.90 However, the
most important development, for Popper, was the emergence of language: "the
evolution of languages from animal languages to human languages" .91
Popper sees four functions of language which he divides into the lower functions
which we share with animals and the higher functions peculiar to humans, which
evolve from the lower functions. 92 The lower functions of language are the
symptomatic or expressive function (expression of the state of the organism) and the
releasing or signalling function (a response to the sender's expression). Human
language has developed the two higher functions: the descriptive and the
argumentative (the lower functions are always present with the higher). The
descriptive function may be either true or false. The argumentative function
involves critical discussion and played a major role in the evolution of reasoning
and rationality.93 In his influential essay "Of Clouds and Clocks" Popper writes:
Like the other functions, the art of critical argument has developed by
the method of trial and error-elimination, and it has had the most
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decisive influence on the human ability to think rationally.... Like the
descriptive use of language, the argumentative use has led to the
evolution of ideal standards of control, or of 'regulative ideas' .,. and
that of the argumentative use of language in critical discussion, is
validity (as distinct from invalidity).94
The argumentative function of language is an essential prerequisite for the emergence of
"pure knowledge" (fundamental research as Popper calls it95) which displays a tendency
towards integrated unified theories as distinct from the growth of "applied knowledge"
(the evolution of human organisms, human artifacts) where different and specialized
applications result.96
The earlier Popper had compared tentative solutions to problems with anatomical and
genetic changes in animal species in response to environmental problems: "My view
may be expressed by saying that every discovery contains 'an irrational element' or
'creative intuition' in Bergson's sense" .97 Later he qualifies his analogy by suggesting
that the theorist's imagination is blind rather than random. He searches actively and
even creatively, although in the dark, for something he believes is there.98 For Popper,
Jiving things are problem-solving organisms. Their expectations and, indeed, their
structures are the result of solutions to previous problems. This means that new
problems are bound up with old solutions. Popper expresses the idea thus: "Organic
structure and problems arise together. Or in other words organic structures are theory-
. incorporating as well as problem-solving structures" .99
In view of the above analysis, perception is a decoding process and humans do not have
access to untheoretical data. As mentioned in the previous section, perception is always
complex since our sense organs are theory-laden. 100 Problems of knowledge never start
from scratch. The growth of knowledge is a progress from problem to problem and to
problems of ever-increasing depth. Popper suggests the following schema as a
description of the growth of theories:
Pl-7TT-7EE-7P2
"P" represents a problem; "TT" is tentative theory and "EE" stands for (attempted)
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error-elimination involving critical discussion. P2 is a problem of greater depth. lOl
Popper comments on the schema: "I like to sum up this schema by saying that science
begins with problems, and ends with problems" .102
In summary, Popper sees all living processes as epistemological or problem-solving.
Both animal (organic) and human problem-solving seem to proceed by a trial and error
method which develops independently of the environment, yet is available to the
demands of the environment. Popper's evolutionary epistemology suggests a universe
that is inventive and creative. Indeed, it is a universe in which new things emerge.
The next section will move from evolutionary epistomology to a yet deeper concept, that
of Popper's "three worlds" theory. The physical world begets the conscious world
which in turn begets the third world of the products of the human mind.
·4.5. POPPER'S THREE WORLDS
As seen in the previous section Popper's evolutionary epistemology is in reality an
epistemology of natural selection. It entails, in effect, an abandonment of any approach
which starts from sense-data or the given. All knowledge is fallible or conjectural;
nothing is given to us by our senses; everything is intepreted and decoded. Scientific
growth occurs when such tentative theories are severely tested and either retained or
overthrown. Do objective phenomena such as theories, standards and values have a real
existence outside of our minds? Are they thus irreducible to physical objects?
Popper's "World 3" theory may be seen as a complement to his stress on the objective,
impersonal and evolutionary character of human knowledge. Any object of the human
intellect can be said to inhabit World 3.. Popper draws an analogy between World 3
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products and the exosomatic products of animals such as spiders' webs and beavers'
dens. These have an objective existence apart from spiders and beavers; likewise,
human products of our activity exist autonomously, awaiting discovery by us. 103 These
World 3 products, as Popper names them, have what he terms an "ontological
status" 104. This means that although they originate in linguistic formulation, these
World 3 products contain problems no one has yet solved or may ever solve. Popper
expresses the concept thus:
We can thus say that there is a kind of Platonic ... third world of books
in themselves, theories in themselves, products in themselves, problem
situations in themselves, arguments in themselves and so on. And I assert
that even though this third world is a human product, there are many
theories in themselves and arguments in themselves and problem
situations in themselves which have never been produced or understood
and may never be produced or understood by men. 105
In this sense we could say that the third world transcends us. Popper has
distinguished three different worlds. World 1 is the world of physical objects and
states, World 2 is that of states of consciousness or mental states while World 3,106
as seen above, is the World of objective (mostly linguistically formulated) content
of thought. 107
Each world is irreducible to the other, but there are causal relationships between the
three worlds. World 3 is separate from World 2 (the world of mental thought), and
can not only have an effect on World 2 but through World 2 on World 1.. At the
same time World 3 objects have their own logic of development which is irreducible
to either World 1 or World 2. Popper expresses the relationship thus:
Thus the mind may be linked with objects of both the first and the third
world. By these links the ~nd establishes an indirect link between the
first and the third world. This is of the utmost importance. It cannot be
seriously denied that the third world of mathematics and scientific
theories exerts an enormous influence upon the first world. It does so,
for instance, through the intervention by technologists who effect
changes in the first world by applying certain consequences of these
theories .. )08
Thus the transcendent third world challenges us, stimulates us and, through its influence
109
on us, affects World I as well. The point is that, although we ourselves create World 3
objects they are not under our control. They have unexpected and unavoidable
consequences. If the third-World transcends us, where then does it exist? Popper states
in The Self and its Brain:
... the World 3 object is a real ideal object which exists, but exists
nowhere, and whose existence is somehow the potentiality of its being
re-interpreted by human minds.... In a sense World 3 is a kind of
Platonic World of ideas, a World which exists nowhere, but which does
have an existence and which does interact,' especially with human
minds ... 109
Popper suggests that Plato was the discoverer of the third world.1lO He makes three
remarks concerning Plato's world and his own, two of these being critical. Firstly, Plato
not only discovered World 3 but also discovered the feedback of World 3 upon
ourselves. Secondly, Plato's world was divine, eternal and true; Popper's is man-made
and evolves autonomously. Its theories may equally well be false as true. Thirdly,
Plato's World of forms provi&~d ultimate explanations; Popper's world is a world of
theories that are conjectural, hypothetical and tentative, sometimes moving towards truth
likeness. I I I
In Popper's most recent publication The Self and its Brain (1977) he turns his attention
to how we "grasp" or "see" World 3 objects. He suggests that it is easier to understand
how we manufacture World 3 objects than to understand how we "see" them. 112 The
grasping of "a World 3 object is an active process l13 not a direct vision or
,
contemplation. It involves, as Popper expresses it,
... "sensing of open problems, even of problems not yet formulated... to
think, to examine the existing theories; to discover a vaguely suspected
problem, and to produce theories which we hope will solve it.... But the
not yet explored logical relationship between existing theories may also
play a role ... 114 .
The interaction between World 3 and World 2 has formed an important part of this
section. In the next section attention will focus on the mind-body problem (of the
interaction between World 1 and World 2).
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The emergence and growth of
consciousness, as well as the interaction of body and mind will be important concepts in
the treatment of the topic.
4.6. THE BODY-MIND PROBLEM: INTERACTION
The emergence of World 3 can be partly explained as a result of Darwin's natural
selection. Popper's position is that mental processes and consciousness are the products
of evolution by natural selection. 115 He believes that the growth of human language
from animal language stimulated the growth of human self-consciousness,116
Moreover, as seen earlier, (pp.105-107) World 3 itself had its beginning in the
development of language, for language led to criticism. 117 In Dialogue III with Sir John
Eccles (The Self and its Brain Part Ill) Popper links linguistic development more
directly to the evolution of mental processes: .. "So I conjecture that the very beginnings
of language were probably connected with the not yet enlarged brain; but that language
led very soon to an increase in the size of the brain ... " ,118 Eccles in the same Dialogue
replies:
[1 believe that] ... this growth did not arise spontaneously in some kind of
unusual manner, but that it arose in response to the needs, the demanding
needs, of the linguistic developments and all of the associated creative
aspects required in discursive thought, ... 119
a reply with which Popper concurs.
As his theories deepen and develop, Popper distinguishes two kinds of behavioural
programmes which Mayr120 had termed "closed behavioural programmes" and "open
behavioural programmes" .121 Closed behavioural programmes prescribe animal
behaviour to a marked degree, whereas open behavioural programmes allow for
alternatives and. choices even though the organism may determine the choice in some
way. Open progress evolves by natural selection due to competing environmental
pressures. Popper sees the emergence of consciousness in the choices allowed us in
open behavioural progress (primitive consciousness is found in animals' self-,
111
-A _._
consciousness is a human- development).1 22 He allows four stages in the emergence of
consciousness: some organisms adopt alternative behaviour patterns in the face of danger
or pain and so survive; some more developed organisms plan a movement in some way
before its execution; at a third stage conscious or purposeful animal aims such as
hunting evolve and rudimentary trial-and-error behaviour begins. Finally, with the
evolution of language as the product of World 3 we have reached hum~ consciousness:
our hypotheses may be viewed objectively and critically.123 Popper expresses the final
step thus: " ... consciousness will assume evolutionary significance - and increasing
-'
significance - when it begins to anticipate possible ways of reacting, possible trial-and-
error novelties ~dth~ir possible outcomes" .124
Mental states are closely related to the state of the body especially to physiological
states, but through consciousness they begin to transcend them. Although Popper opts
for a Cartesian "self", 125 a body-:mind dualism, he distances himself from the
overconcern with the relationship between states of consciousness and the body: 126 "I
propose instead that we regard the human mind first of all as an organ that produces
objects of the human third world and interacts with them." .127 Popper postulates that a
self-conscious mind emerges as a product of the human brain, transcends it and then
actively directs the brain processes. He thus sees the self-conscious mind as something
totally different from the physical system with which it interacts. 128 He explains this
interaction as follows:
I intend to suggest that the brain is owned by the self, rather than the
other way round. The self is almost always active ... . The active,
psycho-physical self is the active programmer to the brain ... ; it is the
executant whose instrument is the brain. The mind is, as Plato said, the
pilot ... the self ... is incredibly richer. 129
Popper explains that the self-conscious mind or the self has a moral personality of its
own, partly arising from past actions. BO Thus the brain is partially formed by the self
and is in some sense a product of the mind. Although the self-conscious mind has some
relationship with the brain, it is not passive but active in that it searches and modifies
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the neuronal operations. 131
Interaction between body and mind is not to be understood in terms of a theory of
causation (cf. the Cartesian theory of causation) dependent on various forms of
parallelism (see note 127). Popper notes: "Thus both the theory of causality in the
physical World 1 and the theory of causality in the psychological World 2 on which
parallelisms are based are completely unacceptable today." 132 Taking his cue from.
Physics he mentions a plurality of different types of causes (such as forces of which
there are least four different types»)33 Popper rejects the Cartesian interacting
substances. He prefers to distinguish two interacting states, that is, the physio-chemical
and the mental states. He suggests, however, that this may be too narrow a view for
there is the additional interaction between World 3 and our minds. His intention is that
we should be pluralists rather"than dualists. 134
Popper's interactionism rejects "reduction", 135 but accepts "upward causation" 136 to a
point. While accepting the evolution from lower to higher forms implicit in upward
causation, he rejects any suggestion that higher levels cannot act on lower levels, that is,
downward causation. Downward causation proposes that higher evolutionary
developments can and do control the lower levels from which they have evolved. He
shows how tools and machines are designed for this purpose. From a biological
perspective, animals may survive the death of many cells, the removal of organs and
limbs and yet the death of the animal must involve the death of the constituent parts. 137
., ..; ..,- ·""""~",-,c",.',".'",.,,,,.
In relating downward causation to the brain he says: "... I think that the self in a sense
plays on the brain, as a pianist plays on a piano or as a driver plays on the controls of a
car" .138 Popper thus rejects reductionism, preferring instead to use the words
"creative" or "emergent" to explain the evolutionary process. This process can never be
understood reductively for in the course of evolution new things emerge with unexpected
and indeed unforeseen properties such as the self-conscious mind. Popper explains:
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It is something utterly different from anything which, to our knowledge,
has previously existed in the world.... From an evolutionary point of
view, I regard the self-conscious mind as an emergent property of the
brain; emergent in a way similar to that in which World 3 is an
emergent property of the mind. World 3 emerges together with the
mind, but nevertheless it emerges as a product of the mind, by...
interaction with it. .. 139
Popper proposes further that the brain has the unique quality of openness. He
conjectures that during man's evolutionary development: "We have to propose that the
World 1 of certain special areas and related regions of the brain, what I have been
calling open modules, is open to influences from World 2" .140 It may be concluded,
then, that World 1 is'incomplete, that it is influenced by World 2, that it interacts with
World 2 and that it is d.usally open towards World 2 and even further to World 3. Thlis
Worlds 1, 2 and 3 are not self-contained but "open" to one another and to the creative
evolving universe.
In the next section attention moves to the problem of indeterminism and determinism or,
as Popper expresses it, "Of Clouds and Clocks." The issue is: do we live in a causally
closed universe or in one which is incomplete and open?
4.7. OF CLOUDS AND CLOCKS: THE PROBLEM OF
INDETERMINISM AND DETERMINISM
"Clouds" and "Clocks" are metaphors which P~pper uses to express, on the one hand,
,"~"'<"'"'''''' ,open (and partly closed) indeterminate physical systems and on the other, closed
deterministic physical systems. Popper "defines" a physically closed system as:
... a set or system of physical entities, such as atoms or elementary
particles or physical forces or fields of forces, which interact with each
other - and only with each other - in accordance with defmite laws of
interaction that·do not leave any room for interaction with, or
interference by, anything outside the closed set or system of physical
entities. 141
He defines physical indeterminism as: " ... the doctrine that not all events in the physical
universe are predetermined with absolute precision, in all their infinitesimal details" .142
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Popper's metaphors are chosen in order to suggest the need for "something
indeterminate in character between perfect chance and perfect determinism - something
intermediate between perfect clouds and perfect clocks" .143 He argues that even the
most reliable clocks are not fully accurate nor are clouds perfectly indeterminate. 144
Popper thus wishes to avoid the pitfalls of determinism, which would make the world a
perfectly running clock, and those of metaphysical indeterminism, which would allow
sheer chance to play a major role in the world. 145 Sheer chance cannot be the answer
to determinism.
It is for this reason that any argument for the mere probabilistic theories of metaphysical
indeterminism is rejected. Popper thus introduces his "propensity theory" to show that
statistical theories are objective and real. He states: "Propensities are thus introduced in
order to help us explain and predict the statistical properties of certain sequences... " .146
Popper likens propensities to dispositional properties with some similarity to Aristotelian
potentialities. Unlike these potentialities, however, they do not inhere in the individual
thing, although they are real,147 He "defines" them as follows:
... they are relational properties of the total objective situation; hidden
properties of the situation whose precise dependence on the situation we
can only conjecture ... propensities again resemble forces or fields of
forces; a Newtonian force is not a property of a thing but a relational
property of at least two things.... Force, like, propensity, is a relational
concept. 148
Thus a propensity is a tendency inherent in certain physical situations which will realize
an event. Propensities are really existing forces that underlie undetermined events. It is
this propensity theory which enables Popper to discard determinism without espousing
metaphysical indeterminism.
Turning from science to rationalism, it is a truism that rational human behaviour
demands that "freedom is not just chance but, rather, the result of a subtle interplay
between something almost random or haphazard, and something like a restrictive or
selective control... ".149 A rational Popperian approach would wish to understand how
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World 3 objects like theories, intentions and values could play a part. in effecting
physical change in the environment. 150 This is done by a system of "plastic
control" .151 Popper's four uses of language provide an adequate example. The higher
functions of language do not replace the lower, but they establish a plastic control over
them. This control involves feedback. Popper expresses the hypothesis as follows:
For the control of ourselves and of our actionsby our theories we
.propose a plastic control. We are notfarced to submit ourSelves to the
control of our theories for we can discuss them critically, and we can
reject them freely if we think that they fall short of our regulative
standards. So the control is far from one-sided. Not only do our theories
control us, but we can control our theories (and even our 'standards):
there is a kind ofjeedback here. 152
In the Addendum to The Open Universe: An Argument for Indeterminism Popper has an
essay entitled "Indeterminism is not Enough: An Afterword" .153 Although his overall
purpose is to defend indeterminism, he states that indeterminism alone is not enough to
make human freedom understandable. More is needed - the causal openness of World 1
towards World 2 and of World 2 towards World 3, and vice versa. He means here that
freedom and nature interact. Put differently this means an interaction between the realm
of aims, intentions and hypotheses, the mental realm and the physical. The point is that
freedom is not chance, but involves what Donald H. Clark calls "deliberate, purposive
activity, which can be explained only in terms of conscious intentions and aims (that is,
social freedom calls for teleological explanation) and not at all in terms of random
physical causes" .154 The ability to make conscious decisions is of the essence of
freedom (or openness). The mental is the realm of freedom "outside" the physical. This
means "that one sort of being, the physical, has given 'birth' to another sort, the
mental." 155 The mind is seen as an evolutionary extension of the physical (or nature)
which it nevertheless controls and with which it interacts. 156
The mind produces World 3, the realm of objective human knowledge. It is World 3
that, for Popper, proves not only the indeterministic nature of the universe but its
further qualities of openness and incompleteness. 157 As has been seen, in the previous
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section there is an interaction between Worlds 1, 2, and 3 (pp.109-110). World 3 can
and does act upon World 2 and through World 2 upon World 1. This openness is of
fundamental importance, for it shows that nature and the universe are intrinsically
creative. 158 Popper expresses the idea succinctly: "Our universe is partly causal, partly
probabalistic, and partly open: it is emergent" .159
Popper's evolutionism involves a belief in newness, radical novelty and emergence. 160
Thus, as seen earlier (p.113), he rejects any reduction of higher level developments to a
physical or chemical level. At each higher level there are developments which could not
have been foreseen at lower levels. 161 Popper expresses his objection to reductionism·
thus:
Can we reduce or hope to reduce biology to physics; or to physics and
chemistry? Can we reduce to biology or hope to reduce to biology,
those subjective conscious experiences which we ascribe to animals... .
Can we reduce, or hope to reduce, the consciousness of self and the
creativeness of the human mind to animal experiences and thus ... to
physics and chemistry? 162 .
He rejects utterly materialistic monism which seeks to explain all life - including the
universe - in terms of the properties of matter.163 Matter is not a "substance" but rather
"highly packed energy, transferable into other forms of energy, and therefore something
of the nature of a process ... ".164 Matter operates with forces, radiating energy and
other non-material entities. It is for this. reason that Popper postulates that classical
materialism has transcended itself. 165 He states:
All physical systemS, including clocks, are in reality clouds... . This
suggests that the emergence of hierarchical levels or layers, and of
interaction between them, depends upon a fundamental indeterminism or"
the physical universe. Each level is open to causal influences coming
from lower and from higher levels. 166
Popper's position is thus clearly indeterminate. It has been presented in broad outline in
this thesis. Attention will now be focused on his attack on classical determinism.
He states that predictions about the future will never be possible. No prediction will
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ever contain all the World's future theories and states~ Universal theories are superseded
with the help of still higher universal theories which explain the former as
approximations. There is thus an infinite sequence of approximationsl67 which no
predictions can ever successfully predict. In his Replies to my Critics Popper gives a
logical reason why a prediction cannot predict all future states:
We can start from the activity of the draughtsman who draws a large plan
of a room he is sitting in, including in this plan a plan of the plan he is
drawing. It is clear that he can never fmish his plan: it will never
contain in full the plan which he is drawing, that is, up to the last
touches he has made.168
.'
In a similar vein science will never be complete because attempts to describe the present
knowledge contained in books and articles can never be total. We can never foresee all
future scientific developments. The key assumption is that prediction theorists are part
of the world. As Popper expresses it: "No calculation or prediction can deductively
predict. the results of its own calculations or predictions... " .169 Moreover predictions
from within cannot be carried out with any precision. I70 The so-called asymmetry
between the past and the future provides another argument against determinism. This
argument means that the past is closed and the future is open. An event in the past can
reach through to the future, but no future event can exert any influence on the past. 171
Still another argument against determinism states that we cannot subjectively predict
results which will obtain in the future growth of knowledge. The person who does not
-
know what he will know tomorrow cannot know how he will act on the morrow. 172
Moreover, no scientist will be able to collect enough material to provide a solution to his
prediction for he is unable to know what . data will be needed for the -prediction even
though the material may exist. I73 Prediction itself can have an effect on future
developments through what Popper calls the "Oedipus Complex" .174 Each prediction
from within a system may have an influence on the system. Thus information about
one's future interferes strongly in a psychological way with the knower and may help
either to frustrate or to bring about the future event. Other arguments against
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In Chapter Five attention is focused on Popper as a social and political thinker. These
are not seen as- separate areas, but are closely connected with his philosophy of the
natural sciences. Thus he links indeterminism in physics with indeterminism in history,
the criticism of theories with a rational reform of social institutions, and democracy with
indeterminism and openness.. Popper's thought is unified and perhaps best summed up
in the sentence: "Truth is not manifest" (p.94). The implication is that what is
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POPPER AND THE SOCIAL
SCIENCES
5.1. RATIONALISM AND THE SOCIAL SCIENCES
There is a systematic unity in Popper's thought. Popper's argument for democracy, for
example, is at one with his epistemological arguments. The attainment of an ideal
society is as futile an aim as efforts to obtain an infallible foundation for our scientific
theories. All knowledge is conjectural, consisting of hypotheses which have been
subjected to critical discussion and testing. Thus the greatest amount of freedom is
necessary both to formulate hypotheses which are attacks on present problems and to
subject them to. tests. An open and democratic society provides more of such freedom
than an authoritarian or closed society constrained by an ideology which claims to justify
it.
Popper's overall approach in both the physical and social SCIences is rationalism or
criticism. He defines rationalism as "an attitude of readiness to listen to critical
arguments and to learn from experience".1 Rationalism is an implacable opponent of
authoritarianism, for reason grows by mutual criticism.2 Socrates is the Father of
critical thought; for Popper he represents the quintessence of true rationalism:
What I shall call the 'true rationalism' is the rationalism of Socrates. It
is an awareness of one's limitations, the intellectual modesty of those
who know how often they err, and how much they depend on others
even for this knowledge. It is the realisation that we must not expect too
much from reason; the argument rarely settles the question, although it is
the only means for learning... .3
For Socrates, then, the search for truth by critical discussion is a way of life.
What rational scientific method does Popper use in the social sciences? Firstly, as with
the natural sciences, it is the method of "trial and error". It consists in formulating
hypotheses which are in principle falsifiable and then subjecting them to rigid tests.4
Popper's principle of demarcation distinguished between science and non-science,5 but
perhaps Popper's deeper concern was to distinguish between criticizable and non-
criticizable theories. Although in The Open Society and its Enemies Part II he states:
"... when I speak here of 'rationalism', I use the word always in a sense which includes
'empiricism' as well as 'intellectualism'; just as science makes use of experiment as well
as thought",6 on the next page Popper widens the scope of empiricism when he
continues: " ... rationalism is an attitude of readiness to listen to critical argument and to
learn from experience".7 Thus non-scientific or metaphysical statements which are not.
empirically falsifiable can be submitted to critical examination. In a talk entitled "On
the Status of Science and Metaphysics" Popper argues that metaphysical theories are
susceptible to criticism and argumentation because they are attempts to solve problems. 8
Secondly, gIven the importance of falsification in the development of objective
knowledge, Popper develops his social philosophy in a polemical way: by negative
criticism of doctrines to which he is violently opposed; historicism, holism,
essentialism, totalitarianism etc. We shall return to these "isms" and Popper's
criticisms thereof in section 5.3.
Thirdly, no hypothesis is unrelated to a context or tradition. A new hypothesis springs
from provisionally established theories in which context it is intelligible. We do not start
afresh each time. No hypotheses are formulated in terms of what we have learnt not to
be the case. Popper explains the concept of tradition as follows:
This means that you pick up, and try to continue, a line of enquiry which
has the whole background of the earlier development ... behind it; you
fall in with the tradition ... we cannot start afresh; we must make use of
what people before us have done ....9
The main thrust of Popper's attack on "utopianism" or "holistic" social engineering
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relates to the flaunting of tradition in the sense understood above. Both philosophies
take the view that the only real social change is a complete change; any attempt at
partial improvement will fail because any partial aspect of s,ociallife depends organically
on the whole.!0 This view, for Popper, is unscientific. The proper "scientific" attitude
on the question of social policy is "piecemeal social engineering" .11 This is a
concentration on one social problem at a ti.me, modifying subsequent social positions in
the light of the outcome of previous interventions.
Fourthly, Popper's scientific empiricism is transferred to social institutions when he
states that a concern for practical problems is needed if our theoretical understanding of
social institutions is to advance: "Practice is not the enemy of theoretical knowledge but
the most valuable incentive to it" .12 Put simply, this means that we shall improve our
understanding of institutions by trying to improve them.
Fifthly, Popper's concern with improvement leads to the problem of values and their
relationship to facts. Statements are the medium in which to express facts whereas
norms express values - what Popper calls "a dualism of facts and decisions". 13 Thus it
is impossible to reduce norms to facts:
... it is impossible to derive a sentence stating a norm or decision or say,
a proposal for a policy from a sentence stating a fact; this is only another
way of saying that it is impossible to derive norms or decisions or
proposals from facts. 14
Facts are independent of man and his thoughts whereas norms are dependent upon
decisions to make, to observe or to alter them. Therefore man has a moral responsiblity
for them. 15 Values can be said to transcend the world of facts. Popper does not quite
see values as World 3 objects,16 but rather sees World 3 as dominated by the values of
objective truth and its growth.!? Popper's insistence on the dualism of facts and
decisions refutes any suggestion that values may be derived from actual historical trends
or that history can judge questions of moral worth (see Section 5.4).
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Sixthly, Popper espouses a form of "methodological individualism" 18 in reaction to
holism whereby a collection of people (such as a race, a state or a class) is somehow
greater than the total number of individuals who comprise it. 19 Popper proposes instead
a view according to which society is no more than the sum of the individuals comprising
it. What happens in history and society is thus the result of the action of individuals:
Very often we are unaware of the fact that we are operating with
hypotheses or theories, and we therefore mistake our theoretical models
for concrete things .. . the task of social theory is to construct and
analyze our sociological models carefully in descriptive or nominalistic
terms, that is to say, in terms of individuals, of their attitudes,
. I . 20expectations, re atlons, etc...
Popper's "individualism" can best be' understood in terms of "methodological
nominalism" .21 He suggests that the methods of the natural sciences are in reality
nominalistic.22 Popper's attitude against essentialism23 arises from his strongly held
belief that, in the words of Clifton Perry,
... the proper explanation in social as well as natural sciences is one
which explains the phenomenon under investigation in terms of
contingent laws. The main purpose of social science is not to investigate
the nature of a social phenomenon but rather how such a phenomenon
came to be, how it behaves and how it affects other phenomena.24
Lastly, as a "methodological nominalist", Popper is not interested in "What is...1"
questions but rather in "How do...1" questions. For example, instead of the
fundamental problem of politics being: "Who should rule the state?" it should rather
be: "How can we so organize political institutions that bad or incompetent rulers can be
prevented from doing too much damage?,,25. Therefore the important humanistic
question is: How are societies to be improved? This question is connected with
Popper's policy of a rational and piecemeal method of social improvement.26 Popper
explains the idea thus:
'" the piecemeal method ... can be used, more particularly, in order to
search for, and fight against, the greatest and most urgent ills of society,
rather than to seek, and to fight for, some ultimate good.27
For Popper, it is also more rational to have aims which are widely shared. This is more
likely to be the case with policies which attack social evils than with policies which aim
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towards the greatest ultimate good.28 Moreover, the complications of life make a
blueprint for social change on a grand scale almost impracticable, whereas a blueprint
for piecemeal social engineering will be comparatively simple.29
Popper's method avoids what he calls "irrationalism" in social policy. He "defines"
such irrationalism as:
... a doctrine or creed that does not propound connected and debatable
arguments, but rather propounds aphorisms and dogmatic statements
which must be 'understood' or else left alone, ... (and) will ~enerally
tend to become the property of an esoteric circle of the initiated. 0
Popper considers irrational and .unscientific all belief in intellectual infallibility, such as
the "intellectualistic intuitionism" of Plato,3l historicism which tries in Popper's words
" ... to compensate ... for the loss of the unchanging world by clinging to the faith that
change can to be foreseen because it is ruled by an unchanging law" ,32 and "re-inforced
dogmatisms,,33 like Marxism (and various psychological theories such as those of Freud
and Adler) which are immune to criticism and correction and are sufficient in
themselves. Popper explains as follows: "Marxists... are accustomed to explain the
disagreement of an opponent by his class bias, and sociologists of knowledge by his total
ideology. Such methods ... lead ... to ... anti-rationalism and mysticism ... ".34 For
Popper, as we have seen, scientific results have the character of hypotheses which are
open to reason at any time. The method is that of trial and error, the conjecture of
hypotheses and the submission of these hypotheses to practical tests. For the social
sciences, the testing is by piecemeal social engineering.35
In this section, Popper's methodology as applied specifically to the social sciences but
closely allied to the natural sciences, has been outlined. In the next section analysis of
Plato's political ideas as interpreted by Popper will be undertaken. Plato's society is a
"closed" society; a via negativa method will lead to an appreciation of what Popper
means by an "open society".
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5.2. PLATO'S "CLOSED SOCIETY"
The Open Society and its Enemies Vol. 1, published in 1945, is devoted to a defence of
Popper's interpretation of Plato as the enemy of the open and democratic society.
Popper's interpretation has been subjected to much criticism by various scholars over the
years.36 It is not within the ambit of this study to evaluate Popper's interpretation of
Plato. For the purposes of this thesis this interpretation is a vehicle for Popper's own
criticism of various "historicist" or closely allied sociological and political doctrines
such as Hegelianism and Marxism. It is with this limitation in mind that this critical
study begins.
In The Open Society and its Enemies Popper is attacking various forms of totalitarianism
which attempt in the name of holism or collectivism to undermine Western liberal
democracy and impose large-scale social planning. The aim of holistic (sometimes
called Utopian) social engineering is, in Popper's words, the "remodelling (of) the
whole of society in accordance with a definite plan or blueprint".37 Historicism
postulates that there are social laws of ch"ange and development.38 This implies that
effective social action must have as its basis historical interpretation and especially
historical prophecy.39 Historicists aim to discern the "trends" of history which they
consider to be unalterable laws. Thus the unifying theme of The Open Society is
Popper's critical examination of the origin and development of historicism: the view
that we can discover the laws of history which will enable us to "prophesy the course of
historical events" .40
Popper proposes that Plato's "historicist" doctrine was essentially pessimistic and that is
aimed at arresting all change and keeping the "ideal" society static.41 According to
Popper, Plato had held that since the good state lies in the past, a change is nearly
always for the worse. Our fundamental aim must therefore be to: "arrest all political
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change! Change is evil and rest is divine! ... Back to nature! ,,42. Popper charges that
Plato attempts to arrest all change and return to the closed and static society of
tribalism43 (cf. Hegel and Marx). Popper also shows that, according to Plato, the fust
example of an "ideal form" in history is necessarily closer to the original and
consequently more perfect than what follows. 44 The first human society was then the
Golden Age which was followed by a process of degradation.45 Thus the criterion of
distinction between a good and a bad state is whether or not it is inherently static.
Innovation is decay. Thus, how do we arrest change? To answer the question Popper
turns to Plato's idea of justice:
What did Plato mean by 'Justice?' I maintain that in the Republic he
used the term 'just' as a synonym for 'that which is in the interest of the
best state'. And what is in the interest of the best state? To arrest all
change, by the maintenance of a rigid class division and class rule.46
Thus Popper maintains that Plato's concept of justice is far from egalitarian and that it is
identical with that adopted in totalitarian societies:
... we can say that Plato's theory of justice; as presented in the Republic
and later works, is a conscious attempt to get the better of the
equalitarian, individualistic and protectionist tendencies of his time, and
to re-establish the claim of tribalism by developing a totalitarian moral
theory ...47.
Popper attributes to Plato an "organic" theory of the state. The state becomes a super
individual thing with a life of its own and independent of its individual members.48
Thus Plato's justice is not based on the rel~tionship between individuals, but is related to
the -good ordering of the state and a correct relationship between the classes.49 Popper
says of the Platonic view: "The criterion of morality is the interest of the state,,50.
In opposition to this view Popper proposes a view that would make society no more than
the sum of the individuals who comprise it. He admits,51 however, that human society
will be greater than the sum of its individual parts because of relations obtaining
between the individual constituents; but only just a little.52 Plato had felt,
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according to Popper, that justice implied inequality and that the collective had a higher
status than the individual.53 Popper postulates the counter-theory that the individual has
supreme importance in life.54 His methodological individualism decries any holistic
view that suprahuman forces are operative in history. He asserts: " ... the functioning of
all social institutions, should always be understood as resulting from the decisions,
actions, attributes etc. of human individuals .... ,,55. However, in his later philosophy,
Popper abandons his methodological individualism arguing instead that groups do affect
the action of individuals and even that institutions develop an autonomy of their own.56
A. O'Hear says of Popper's social science:
... [It] is an attempt to avoid extremes. It is individualistic without being
psychologistic. It admits the autonomy of sociology, in saying that men
are formed by traditions and institutions, but attempts to avoid holism by
explaining events as the consequences of individual actions.57
Popper's individualistic or humanitarian· theory of justice demands egalitarianism,
individualism, and state protection of the rights of the individual.58 Platonism presents
instead natural privilege; holism and collectivism; and individual subservience to state
needs.59
The root" of the problem, according to Popper, is methodological essentialism.60 Popper
says that Plato saw the question "Who should rule the state?" as the fundamental
political problem.61 Popper wishes to replace Plato's question with a new one:62 "How
can we so organize political institutions that bad or incompetent rulers can be prevented
from doing too much damage?"63. Popper feels that the really important question is
how rulers are to be controlled. Political institutions avoiding the possibility of tyranny
need to be created. Thus Popper's "democracy" is a careful system of checks and
balances:
. .. the theory of democracy is not based upon the principle that the
majority should rule; rather, the various equalitarian methods of
democratic control, such as general elections and representative
government, are to be considered as no more than tried ends and, in the
presence of a widespread traditional distrust of tyranny...64.
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Plato's first answer to the question "Who should rule?" is guardians; Popper maintains
these guardians impose an irrational tyranny under the guise of reason. According to
Popper they are "a master race" 65 ,a "ruling class,,66 and the herders of "human
cattle"67. Secondly, Plato's authority is exercised through "philosopher-kings";
according to Popper, these have as their main function "the copying of the divine
original of the city, ... and ... the divine original of man"68. Here, Popper feels, is
Plato's undisguised holism and essentialism. He recommends that we search, not for
essences, but rather for processes. The perfect city and the perfect man are not
legitimate quests. Rather, we should ask, how do we provide the mechanisms whereby
the imperfect may become better and may improve?
Firstly, as was seen in the last chapter, we learn from our mistakes by criticism and this
even involves the right to criticize one's ruler. Popper expresses the lesson thus:
... perhaps the greatest of all, Socrates, ... taught the lesson that we
must have faith in human reason, but at the same time beware of
dogmatism; that we must keep away both from misology, the distrust of
theory and reason, and from the magical attitude of those who make an
idol of wisdom; who taught, in other words, that the spirit of science is
criticism ...69.
As Popper sees it, rulers are bound to make mistakes and therefore rational government
must be subject to the spirit of criticism. In this way mistakes are pointed out and
lessons learned. In the last chapter it was seen that Popper rejected induction as a
scientific method. The truth emerges as a result of attempts to refute theories, and
here non-experts are necessary to the process. No one person"can be expected to
criticize his own ideas rigorously. Thus there is a connection between science and
democracy and this is why Plato's guardians and philosopher-kings are valueless. Ruler
and ruled need each other and the new knowledge that emerges depends for its validity
on a spirit of openness and criticism.
Secondly, the only rational approach, for Popper, is what he calls "piecemeal social
engineering,,70. The holist (like Plato, according to Popper) begins with a preconceived
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"blue print" of how things should be, while the piecemeal planner begins by formulating
what the problem is. He will "adopt the method of searching for, and fighting against
the greatest and most urgent evils of society, rather than searching for, and fighting for,
its greatest ultimate good" .71 Put simply: "We must learn to do things as well as we
can, and to look out for our mistakes".72
The Platonic approach, according to Popper, has been the belief in an absolute and
unchanging ideal, restructuring and recasting the whole of society. The piecemeal
method, in contradistinction, allowed repeated experiment and consequent re-
adjustment:
It is the conviction that one has to go to the very roots of the social evil,
that nothing short of a complete eradication of the offending social
system will do if you wish to 'bring decency into the world'.73
Closely linked to the fallacies of Utopianism and to piecemeal social engineering is
Popper's ethical theory which he calls "critical dualism" .74 "Critical dualism thus
emphasises the impossibility of reducing decisions or norms to facts; it can therefore be
described as a dualism offacts and decisions". 75 Popper feels that Plato, in recognising
natural laws, has violated the principle.76 Wilds explains:
They have confused natural regularities, which are factually true and
cannot be violated, with normative prescriptions which ought to be true
(according to some persons or groups), and can always be violated.
Since Plato recognised not only biological needs common to all men but
non-biological needs as well, Popper calls him a "spiritual naturalist"77.
Popper sees norms as "man-made": "Norms are man-made in the sense that we must,
blame nobody but ourselves for them; neither nature nor God. It is our business to
improve them as much as we can, if we find that they are objectionable" .78 Popper thus
makes the individual responsible for ethical decisions. In this way he strikes a further .
blow against authoritarianism. Our principles and decisions need to be constantly
assessed in the light of new facts and experiences (including the experience of other
people). What Popper is in effect saying is that there are no certain right answers to
either our practical or our theoretical (e.g. ethical) problems. Only the rational
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programme will do, that is, progress through self-criticism and self-correction. .The
historicist cannot tell us what we ought to do. Our actions are up to us. We are always
free to criticise. However, Popper's arguments are not ethically indifferent.79 As we
strive for scientific, objective truth, so by the same method we strive for objective, valid
ethical standards:
... we may take the idea of absolute truth - of correspondence to the facts
- as a kind of model for the realm of studies, in order to make it clear to
ourselves that, just as we seek for absolutely true propositions in the
realms of facts ... , we may seek for absolutely right or valid propositions
in the realm of standards - or at least for better or more valid,
proposals. 80
., ".. ,;
in conclusion, Popper sees Plato as a subtle propogator of the closed tribal society. The
Greeks began the revolutionary but painful transition from a closed to an open society81
in which what Popper calls the "strain of c~vilization"82was so keenly felt. This strain
.. .is the strain created by effort which life in an open or partially abstract
society continually demands from us - by the endeavour to be rational, to
forgo at least some of our emotional social needs, to look after ourselves,
and to accept responsibilities ... 83.
In the next section the focus will be on' the more immediate enemies of the Open
Society, viz. Hegel and Marx. They were both protagonists of h-refutable political and
social dogmatism and therefore of necessity enemies of the Open Society.
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5.3. HEGEL AND MARX: ENEMIES OF THE OPEN
SOCIETY
The Open Society and its Enemies consists mainly of critiques of the politics and
sociology of Plato and Mane Part I was concerned exclusively with Plato. Part II is
devoted almost exclusively to Hegel and Marx with an introductory chapter on Aristotle.
Popper has a deep hatred of Hegel and Hegelianism.86 Gilbert Ryle passes a valid
comment:
His comments (on Hegel), in consequence, have a shrillness which
detracts from their force. It is right that he should feel passionately.
The survival of liberal ideas and liberal practices has been and still are in
jeopardy. But it is bad tactics in a champion of the freedom of thought
to use blackguarding idioms characteristic of its enemies. His verdicts
are, I think, just, but they would exert a greater influence if they
sounded judicial. 87
Popper finds the roots of Hegelianism in Aristotle. 88 Aristotelian thought is dominated
by Plato, but here the formal essence of 3:"Y sensible thing, which exists in it and not
outside it, is synonymous with its purpose, end or final state. All sensible things thus
carry within themselves a potentiality which is realized in their final state as their
essence.89 Thus in order to be realized essence manifests itself in change.
Popper sees Aristotle as the father of what he calls "essentialism": "Eventually he
simply postulates that we possess an intellectual intuition, a mental or intellectual faculty
,
which enables us unerringly to grasp the essence of things and to know them,,90. Thus
essentialism is closely allied to definitions such as "What is X?" and "What does X
mean?,,91. Whereas essentialists read definitions from left to right, Popper insists that
modem science reads definitions from right to left in order to give what he calls "short
labels", for science needs only undefined terms.92 (This is a nominalist approach.93)
In the Poverty of Historicism he characterizes the method of the natural sciences as
nominalist whereas in the social sciences essentialism tends to be the methodology.94
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The Aristotelian legacy, according to Popper, is a preoccupation with meaning,
definition and demonstrative proof leading ultimately to a weariness with argument and
reason.95
Like Aristotle and unlike Plato, Hegel is an optimistic historicist. He teaches that the
general trend is towards the essences or ideas which are self-developing and self-
creating and propel themselves in the direction of the Aristotelian final cause. It is this
final cause which Hegel calls "The Absolute Idea" or "The Idea". Popper criticizes the
attempt to treat Thought as a self-generating process as the worst element in Hegel's
theory. This process has a logical or semi-logical triadic relationship between the
stages.96 This "dialectic triad" involves an original element which is the thesis, bringing
forth its opposite or antithesis. The resulting tension requires a synthesis which
reconciles thesis and antithesis and begins the necessary process again.
Popper notes only a superficial resemblence between the dialectic triad and his idea of
progress through trial-and-error, conjecture and refutation. The antithesis is inherently
self-contradictory whereas rational argument aims to eliminate contradiction.97
However, if contradiction is unavoidable, we are faced with what Popper calls a "re-
inforced dogmatism,,98;
•All things are contradictory in themselves' he (Hegel) insists ... and the
reason why he wishes to admit contradictions is that he wants to stop
rational argument, and with it scientific and intellectual progress. By
making argument ;md criticism impossible, he intends to make his own
philosophy proof ~gainst all criticism, SO that it may establish itself as a
re-in/arced dogmarism, secure from attack.99
Popper correctly sees the function of dialectic as providing the momentum for change.
However, it can only do this if contradiction is ruled unacceptable as it must be
overcome. WO Further, Popper feels that the dialectic opens the way to excess in
dogmatism and irrationality, for the movement in history has an innate momentum
independent of the choices and efforts of human individuals.101 Another rationally
unacceptable aspect of Hegalianism, according to Popper, is Hegel's so-called
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"philosophy of identity" 102, which he explains as follows:
... everything that is reasonable must be real, and everything that is real
must be reasonable, and that the development of reality is the same as
that of reason. And since there can be no higher standard in existence
than the latest development of Reason and the Idea, everything that is
real or actually exists by necessity, ... must be reasonable as well as
good. 103
The problem for Popper is that the philosophy of identity justifies the present order and
is thus "moral positivism": " ... that what is, is good, since there can be no standard but
the existing standard; it is the doctrine that might is right" 104. Another closely allied
moral stance is "moral futurism" by which Popper means "that coming might is
right" 105 so that: "... the most reasonable attitude to adopt is so to adjust one's system
of values as to make it conform with the impending changes" 106. The essential problem
is that both positions adopt prevailing or future standards without criticism.
Popper sees Hegelianism as the inspiration behind modem authoritarian and totalitarian
movements and their irrational offspring such as nationalism, glorification of the state,
the ethical idea of war, the world historical personality and the concepts of the "heroic
life" and the "heroic man" 107. Of the Hegelian state he says:
The State is the Law, the moral law as well as the fundamental law.
Thus it cannot be subject to any other standard, and especially not to the
yardstick of civil morality.... Its only judge is the History of the
World.... To be successful, that is, to emerge as the strongest from the
dialectical struggle of the different National spirits for power, for world
domination, is thus the only and ultimate aim and the only basis for
. d 108JU gement... .
Hegel emerges from Popper's analysis as a hopelessly confused thinker, an enemy of
intellectual and political freedom and a forerunner of all that is distasteful in the modem
world, such as racialism, nationalist and totalitarianism.
There is much opposition to Popper's interpretation of Marx's "historicism" 109, but
again, as was the case with Plato, Popper's interpretation embodies his social and
poHtical thought - the subject of this thesis.
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According to Popper, Marx takes Hegel's concept of the dialectic and makes it the basis
for attempts to formulate laws of historical development. Marx inverts Hegelianism and
traces dialectical processes in the world of material things rather than in the world of
ideas. 11O Popper maintains that Marx is therefore a "practical dualist" who draws a
fundamental distinction between the natural and the mental or spiritual world:
... although he recognized that the natural world and its necessities are
fundamental, he did not feel any love for the 'kingdom of necessity', as
he calls a society which is in bondage to its natural needs. He cherished
the spiritual world, the 'kingdom of freedom', and the spiritual side of
'human nature' as much as any Christian dualist.... With Hegel he
thinks that freedom is the aim of historical development. lll
Freedom is, for Marx, the ultimate aim of historical development, but human beings
inherit "the kingdom of freedom" only in so far as they escape from the necessities of
material life. This is to be done by minimizing the tools of production and equalizing
labour so that everyone has at least some measure of freedom. 112
However such developments are "unfree" in the sense that they are outside the control
of individuals caught up in the process. The process determines itself and is carried
along by its own momentum. Popper expresses this deterministic process thus: " ...my
fundamental thesis is not (as you suspected) the sentimental desire to help the oppressed,
but the scientific and rational decision not to offer vain resistence to the developmental
laws of society... I can actively assist in shortening and lessening its birth pangs" 113.
There is an advance here from Utopian ideas about how we would like society to be, to
the laws according to which society must change. Marx gives economics the central role
in his (according to Popper) "deterministic" historical development. According to his
economic version of historicism significant historical changes only occur when a
particular social system destroys itself thro~gh conflicting class interests and is replaced
by another. As Popper expresses it, in the Marxist analysis: "... history is propelled
and the fate of man determined by the war of classes and not the war of nations (as
opposed to the view of Hegel and the majority of historians)" 114. Popper argues that
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the class struggle cannot be treated as a dogma because there were many struggles in
history which were not waged between classes or for the pursuit of their economic
interest. IIS
Marxism insists that class interest significantly influences human persons: "It is not the
consciousness of man that determines his existence - rather, it is his social existence that
determines his consciousness. " 116. Thus man's actions are what they are because they
are determined by antecedent and simultaneous events. Thus social systems change with
the forces governing production; a particular period of economic development produces
a particular social system. II? As Popper suggests, Marx considers not only the actions
of individuals to be determined by social events but makes the social system determine
thought as well. 118 Popper sees this development as an indication of Marx's
"metaphysical essentialism". The world of ideas and norms are then "accidents" of the
"reality" which is economic and material. 119 Popper calls this "moral sociologism" 120
and counters it as follows:
That man, and his aims, are in a certain sense a product of society is true
enough. But it is also true that society is a product of man and of his
aims and that it may become increasingly so ... the decisive point is that
our mind, our opinions though largely dependent on our upbringing are
not totally so.... But it simply cannot be denied that ~e can examine
thoughts, that we can criticise them, improve them, and further that we
can change and improve our rhysical environment according to our
changed, improved thoughts. 12
This is confirmation of the fact that despite the importance of economic factors they are
not the only influence in human history. Popper says that the scientific relationship with
the material means of production is one of interdependence rather than one· of
dependence, that is, scientific discovery has determined the direction of industrial ouput
(cf. the effect of World 3 on World I).
Popper feels that Marxism is basically irrational and unscientific for, being a "re-
inforced dogmatism", opposition is dismissed as, for example, class bias.l22 Indeed all
science, although moving towards objectivity, is in a sense relative, that is, it will be
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superseded in the course of scientific progress. The authoritarian nature of Marxism
makes it impossible for it to be reconciled with reason since it cannot challenge its basic
presuppositions, e.g. that our thoughts and opinions have a class or national bias. 123
Rather, as Popper expresses it, "in history we have no such unifying theories" 124.
Every generation must face its own historical interpretation,125 which can be compared
to a searchlight:
We let it play upon our past, and we hope to illuminate the present by its
reflection. As opposed to this, the historicist may be compared to a
searchlight which we direct upon ourselves [thus]... we... select (as
historicists) and order the facts of history, [believing] that 'history
itself' or 'the history of mankind', determines, by its inherent laws,
ourselves, our problems, our future, and even our point of view... 126.
Popper's "critical rationalist" view leads him to remark that we do not need "certainty"
for we move towards truth and progress by defending our basic democratic
institutions,127 We do not need a single, fixed and once-and-for-all social ideal; rather,
our programme should be one of piecemeal social reform. Using existing structures we
tackle immediate and specific problems by the method of trial and error. We learn from
our mistakes, achieving improvement but not perfection. Insight is always only partial.
According to Popper, Hegel and Marx, like Plato, proposed a fixed absolute social ideal
towards which all societies are to aspire and against which existing structures should be
measured. 128 Ultimately this ideal is something to which the progress of history
inexorably moves without outside individual human effort. Popper's alternative is an
"open society", where the individual me~bers recognize their responsibility for self-
determination. There are consequently no ideals other than those of our own making.
The growth of objective knowledge is a major factor in determining historical
development. The growth of knowledge itself makes long-term prediction impossible.
Popper expresses this ideal aptly when he says: "Instead of posing as prophets we must
become makers of our fate" 129.
In the next section a detailed analysis of "historicism", which is Popper's chief objection
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to Plato, Hegel and Marx, will be undertaken. This analysis will focus to a limited
degree on Popper's Open Society as an alternative to historicism.
5.4. POPPER'S ATTACK ON HISTORICISM
As was mentioned (p.128) earlier Popper's philosophy of the physical and natural
sciences determines what he says about the social sciences. No generalisation about
human society, either in its structure or development, is open to verification. Thus the
conjecture and refutation account of theories holds not only for the physical sciences but
also for the social sciences. Man is forever faced by problems both theoretical and
practical with no solution being guaranteed the appellation "truth". His very survival as
an organism depends on his being able to alter and adapt his provisional solutions in the
light of experience. As seen in the previous section, Popper agrees that we can make
short-term predictions, but long-term historical prophecy is always misguided and
indeed irrational. In his Poverty of Historicism Popper provides a brief explanation of
what he means by "historicism" 130
It will be enough if I say here that I mean by "historicism" an approach
to the social sciences which assumes that historical prediction is their
principle aim, and which assumes that this aim is attainable by
discovering the "rhythms" or the "patterns", the "laws" or the "trends"
that underlie the evolution of history.131
Shaw distinguishes between Popper's objection to "radical historicism" and what he
calls "limited historicism" 132. Radical historicism proposes the view that unchanging
laws of history may be discovered, thus facilitating precise predictions. Limited
. historicism, on the other hand, limits the degree of the accuracy of the predictions. 133
As early as the Preface to the Poverty of Historicism Popper raises what are arguably
perhaps his chief objections to historicism: firstly, it is impossible to predict the growth
of knowledge; and secondly, knowledge influences the course of human history.134
Thus any historical prediction is likely to be adversely affected by the growth of
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knowledge or a creative invention or discovery. While short-term or vague predictions
related to piecemeal social engineering135 are possible, according to Popper, he is
extremely cautious, for in another place he states: "Some historicists, it is true, are
content to predict only the next stage of the human pilgrimage, and even these in very
cautious terms" 136.
Popper's mam attack is however, on the· belief that there are laws of historical
prediction. He divides historicist laws into two main groups, antinaturalistic and
pronaturalistic historical doctrines. Naturalistic theories propose applying the methods
of physics to the social sciences. 137 However, as Donogan notes: " ... both when they
professed to reject the methods of physics and when they professed to accept them, the
historicists misunderstood what the methods of physics are ... "138.
A brief analysis of some of the more important aspects of both doctrines follows. Anti-
naturalist doctrines are dealt with first.
Firstly, historicists reject the notion that the laws of nature which transcend particular
time and space can apply to the social sciences. They hold that social laws that apply in
one period may not hold in another: "... in similar circumstances similar things will
happen ... [but]... this principle is necessarily useless in sociology. Similar
circumstances may arise within a single historical period. They never persist from one
period to another" 139.
Social situations, too, unlike situations in nature may be "radically novel". This means
that the social regularities which may obtain in certain places and certain times do not
exist in other situations at different periods. 140 Popper counters this argument by
suggesting that novelties are to be explained not by laws being operative only within
certain places and periods but, rather, by finding the novelty in the initial conditions. 141
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Secondly, there is a widespread belief that social sciences have to do with "wholes",
that is, the so-called principle of holism. Popper describes it thus: "Historicism claims
that we must study the history of the group, its tradition and institutions, if we wish to
... understand and perhaps to foresee, its future development." 142 Popper discusses the
possibility that holism could never be subject to scientific enquiry: 143
It is a mistake to believe that there can be a history in a holistic sense, a
history of 'States' of society' which, represents the 'whole of the social
organism' or 'all the social and historical events of an epoch' ... [it] is
logically impossible ... to step up and direct the entire system of society
and to regulate the whole of sociallife...t44.
Proceeding from the above point Popper also suggests that any holistic planner must be
aware that it is impossible to centralize knowledge which is shared by so many
individual minds. 145 The only rational alternative is the piecemeal social method which
aims, as Popper expresses it, "for the elimination of concrete evils rather than the
realization of abstract goods" 146. With this method we take a problem, preferably a
small one, and attempt to solve it by various institutional changes. In this way we will
be able to look for the unforeseen results of the changes and attempt to right them. This
is obviously the rational method of problem-solving, of hypothesis and falsification, of
conjecture and refutation.
The alternative to piecemeal planning, closely allied to holism, is its practical end,
Utopianism. 147 The Utopianist wants to construct a society which is radically different
from, and better than, the one we have .now. He believes that a radically different
{
society will result in an improved human nature. 148 Popper condemns Utopianism as
not only misguided but unscientific:
It seems to escape the well-meaning Utopianist that this programme
implies an admission of failure, even before he launches it. For it
substitutes for his demands that we build a new society, fit for men and
women to live in, the demand that we 'mould' these men and women to
fit into his new society. This, clearly, removes any possibility of testing
the success or failure ()f the new society. For those who do not like
living in it only admit thereby that they are not fit to live in it; that their
'human impulses' need further 'organizing'. But without the possibility
of tests, any claim that a 'scientific approach' is being employed
evaporates. 149
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Thirdly, antinaturalist historicists agree that, even if naturalism in the physical sciences
were true, the sheer complexity of the subject matter of the social sciences makes the
naturalistic method inappropriate. Popper' expresses the position as follows: "The fact
that sociology comes last in this hierarchy of sciences plainly shows us the tremendous
complexity of the factors involved in social life" .150 Popper, however, sees sociological
method as "methodological individualism" 151: "... the task of social theory is to
construct and analyze our sociological models carefully in descriptive or nominalist
terms... in tenns of individuals, of their attitudes, expectations, relations etc ... " 152.
Attention will now turn to the pronaturalistic historicist doctrine. Two naturalist
principles are regarded as fundamental to historicism: firstly, that the social sciences are
empirical in that they test hypotheses by empirical methods; and secondly, that the social
sciences are theoretical. They find universal laws from which explanations and
predictions may be deduced.153 It is of course accepted by these historicists that the
social sciences use these principles in a different way. This empirical evidence is
historical in the sense that "sociology is theoretical history" 154. This means that, given
the initial conditions situated in history, we may deduce historical predictions from
them. Popper expresses the principle in this way: "If it is possible for astronomy to
predict eclipses, why should it not be possible for sociology to predict revolutions?" 155
The accuracy of forecasts is limited for there is uncertainty in both details and
timing. 156 As Popper comments, "... it follows from our exposition of the antinaturalist
doctrines of historicism that short-term predictions in the social sciences must suffer
from great disadvantages" 157. However, the naturalist historicist doctrine believes that
the social sciences should attempt large scale forecasts for, as mentioned above,
sociology is "theoretical history":
Sociology, then becomes, to the historicist an attempt to solve the old
problem of foretelling the future; not so much the future of the
individual as that of groups, and of the whole human race ... sociological
study should help to reveal the political future so that it could thereby
become the foremost instrument of far-sighted practical politics ... 158.
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There is a further historicist inference based on the principle of large scale forecast
which many historicists find more acceptable. This states that the only universally valid
laws of society are those which link up successive periods. 159 Popper rejects this
inference, as the development of human history is understood only in singular historical
statements: "Such a process ... proceeds in accordance with all kinds of causal laws ...
its description, however, is not a law, but only a singular historical statement" 160.
Some historicists would wish to replace the concept of law by trend. Even if history is
repetition, it has "a trend, or tendency or direction" 161 which links up successive
periods. However, according to Popper, trends are not laws. Rather, they are
existential, relating to singular historical statements and are not universal.l62 That a
trend has existed up to a certain time does not allow us to assume that it will
continue. 163
In his analysis of historicism, as presented in summary in the foregoing pages, Popper
seeks to show that historicism is "a method that does not bear any fruit" 164. Popper
regards it and its allies, Holism and Utopianism, as misguided "moral enthusiasm" 165.
He makes the sobering comment that goodness in itself can be dangerous if not
combined with rational criticism. 166 He comments as follows:
The main trouble of our time - and I do not deny that we live in troubled
times - are not due to moral wickedness, but, on the contrary, to our
misguided moral enthusiasm; to our anxiety to better the world we live
in. Our wars are fundamentally religious wars; they are wars between
competing theories of how to establish a better world. And our moral
enthusiasm is often misguided, because we fail to realize that our moral
principles, which are sure to be over-simple, are often difficult to apply
to the complex human and political solutions to which we feel bound to
apply them. 167
Popper believes that the counter to historicism and allied authoritarian movements lies in
a threefold response: respect for interpersonal objective truth, the ability to learn from
our mistakes, and an ability to listen to one another and to criticise one another. 168
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In the next section Popper's response to historicism, the Open Society, will be
addressed. This is a society based on ~volving truth, fallibilism, piecemeal social
engineering, individualism and protectionism.
5.5. POPPER'S ALTERNATIVE: THE OPEN SOCIETY
Popper's theory of historical development is based on the idea of two widely differing
and opposing forms of society - closed and open. It has been seen that the former is a
typical tribal society with fixed societal patterns, while the latter is based on evolving
and changing social patterns. The "static" and the "collective" are opposed by the
"evolving" and the "individualistic".
The truth about society is not something to be discovered, something outside our
control, as the historicist would have us believe. Rather, the individuals who make up
society are responsible for their own self-determination, for there are no ideas or
institutions other than those of human making. 169
The stress on the individual in Popper's thought is related to his nominalist and anti-
essentialist scientific and social stance: "essentialism not only believes in the existence
of universals (Le. of universal objects) it also stresses their importance in science
[whereas] ... the nOqlinalist holds that the task of science is only to describe how things
behave ... "170. Thus the activities of the social sciences should, according to Popper,
relate to the phenomenon under discussion, its origin, its behaviour and its relationship
to other phenomena. I?1
The importance of the individual relates directly to the quest for rationality. To be
rational is to have "an attitude of readiness to listen to critical argument and to learn
from experience" 172. Thus the root of reason lies in discussion and dialogue. This
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makes implicit in rationalism a recognition of common humanity. Criticism is the
source of the advance of knowledge and it can and must come from anybody.
Consequently there is a tendency for rationalism to be anti-authoritarian. Popper
denounces the authoritarian attitude in these words:
This authoritarian intellectualism, this belief in the possession of an
infallible instrument of discovery ... this failure to distinguish between a
man's intellectual powers and his htdebtedness to others for all he can
possibly know or understand ... 173.
His point is that: " ... we not only owe our reason to others, but we can never excel
others in our reasonableness in a way that would establish a claim to authority... ,,174.
Popper expresses the advantages of rational discussion for an open society: "But the
tradition of rational discussion creates, in the political field, the tradition of government
by discussion, and with it the habit of listening to another point of view; the growth of a
sense of justice; and the realism to compromise" 175. Society must be open and free for
"Truth is not manifest" 176. For Popper, the search for truth demands the following: (i)
imagina.tion, (ii) trial and error, (iii) the gradual discovery of our prejudices through (i)
and (ii), and (iv) critical discussion)77 Translated into the political field, government
would involve discussion, listening to other viewpoints, a sense of justice and a
preparedness to compromise. It is not that the method of critical discussion establishes
truth nor that it secures agreement; we are fallible men)78 However, through
discussion we can change our minds and become wiser men. 179
Even rulers are bound to make mistakes. Therefore rational government is only possible
if all are subject to criticism so that mistakes are noted and modifications made. The
fundamental principle is how to control leaders by devising institutional means to
balance power.180
There is a fundamental connection between science and democracy. Induction is
i~valid; truth emerges progressively through criticism and by attempts to refute theories,
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a process excluding no-one. This is why the growth of knowledge needs democracy -
the free flow of ideas and criticism. 181
The democratic or open society may not be the best system ever invented, but it is the
most practical scheme so far invented and one that is capable of constant improvement
and refinement. 182 It is the most effective means available to us to preserve freedom
and restrain tyranny.1 83
How does Popper view the state? He see.s it as a society with minimal functions: the
prevention of crime, the protection of the weak: (in both the physical and economic
sense) and the restraint of physical and economic bullying.184 The state in the open
society is a protective institution structured to fight against " ... concrete evils rather than
to establish some ideal good"185. Popper sees the state as "a necessary evil" 186.
Therefore it should not be expected to confer benefits on its citizens; rather, firstly, it
"provides no more than a framework within which the citizen may act in a more or less
organized and coherent way" 187. Secondly, because of what is known as the "paradox
of freedom" 188 the state must be empowered to intervene in certain limited areas of
political and economic life189 - a form of interventionism. Thirdly, the state's reform
programme should be one of "piecemeal reform". Immediate and specific problems
involving the economy should be tackled by a method of trial and error, achieving
improvements but never claiming perfection. 190 Popper comments: "But he [the
politician] will be aware that perfection, if at all attainable, is far distant, and that every
generation of men, and therefore also the living have a claim ... "191. The piecemeal
social engineer does not search for ultimate good for reasons linked to the growth of
knowledge as a major factor governing the course of history. We cannot anticipate
today what we shall only know tomorrow.192 Social and political developments are so
influenced by scientific developments that it is impossible to have a theoretical history
(or for that matter a theoretical social science) which will enable us to make historical
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and societal predictions. Popper does not deny that under suitable circumstances we
may make short-term predictions. 193 However, the essential point is that the growth of
knowledge is a major factor in determining historical and societal development.
At the same time, the open society has to oppose moral and intellectual relativism.
Moral relativism becomes a barrier to rational progress. Thus we cannot assume that
our present standards are the right ones and beyond criticism194 nor that differing
standards are merely relative. We have, rather, to keep up an endless quest for moral
improvement through self-examination and self-correction. A "dualism of facts and
decisions" 195 means that norms may not be derived from facts or actual historical
events.196 Man has to accept moral responsibility for the decisions that he makes.197
This means that our values determine the means by which we identify our actions and
. the means by which we judge them. Rationality plays an essential part in morality and
thus moral progress involves the opening of a new range of possible values.198 The
open society also values tradition. Piecemeal social reform has· the background of
social institutions as its basis for criticism and improvement. 199 What is necessary for
scientific progress200 also has its social counterpart. Popper expresses the social value
of tradition thus: "Traditions are needed for a link between institutions and the
intentions and valuation of individual men. "201. This means that existing institutions are
modified and changed rather than replaced. Therefore the open society is evolutionary
rather than revolutionary.202 A practical application of Popper's social and political
theories to the present is provided by Roger James in his book, Return to Reason. In
this work James proposes Popper's open society as a remedy for many contemporary
and social ills which are at root philosophical in nature. These are five in number.
Firstly, there is what he calls "solutioneering"203, that is, preparing a solution before
carefully formulating a problem and establishing a criterion by which Success or failure
is to be judged. Secondly, there is "tunnel vision"204 where possible snags in reform
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programmes are ignored rather than diligently sought for and corrected. Thirdly,
"trendism"205 confuses laws with trends. This means that one cannot expect that the
trends witnessed in one historical period will continue indefinitely in other periods.
Fourthly, there is the failure to realise that theories cannot be confirmed by finding any
number of facts that support them.206 Popper calls this error "white swanning", that
is, any number of white swans will not confirm that all swans are white, while only one
non-white swan will refute the theory.207 Theories cannot be verified, only
corroborated. Fifthly, there is the failure to distinguish between well corroborated
scientific theories and what James calls "unsubstantiated speculations" .208
It is obvious that James is highlighting some of the central issues in Popper's thought.
There is, moreover, a unity between his scientific and political thought. James' five
"philosophical errors" relate to the overall importance of rational criticism, the trial and
error method, historicism, the failure of induction as the scientific method and the
necessary demarcation between scientific and non-scientific theories.
The growth of all knowledge is evolutionary, the method of gaining knowledge is
hypothetico-deductive (not inductive) and the aim of knowledge is truth; likewise for
society.
The next chapter investigates the concept of "evolutionary openness" as Popper's overall
method. What does he mean by "openness"? What"are its roots? Is it his overall
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6.1. THE MEANING OF "OPENNESS"
Popper's autobiographical Unended Quest provides a starting-point in the search for the
meaning of "openness" in Popper's thought. The early Popper adopted what he called
"methodological nominalism" as opposed to "essentialism".l Popper defined
methodological nominalism as the belief that "the task of science is only to describe how..
things behave... they regard words merely as useful instruments of description. "2; while
essentialism believes that the scientific researcher's prerequisite is "revealing the real or
essential meaning of these terms [i.e., definition] and thereby the real or true nature of
the essences denoted by them. "3. A concern for meaning is therefore essentialist and,
for Popper, restrictive.
Popper denies that there is any real truth in the widely held theory that "the meaning of
a thing (provided it is grammatically and unambiguously formulated) is a function of the
meaning of the words in which the theory is formulated" 4. Rather, he states: "The
relationship between a theory (or a statement) and the words used in its formulation is in _
several ways analagous to that between written words and the letters used in writing
them down"5 or expressed somewhat differently, "The quest for precision is analagous
to the quest for certainty, and both should be abandoned. "6.
Popper expresses his position clearly: "In matters of the intellect, the only things worth
striving for are true theories, or theories which come to near to truth - at any rate,
nearer than some other (competing theory) ... ".7 The quest for truth, rather than
meaning or certainty, is the first clarification of the Popperian term "openness". A
prerequisite for this quest is intellectual and scientific humility. This humility is itself a
form of openness if dogmatism may be the characteristic form of "closedness"g (my
term). Popper expresses what this "humility" involves: "... I am deeply aware of my,
and more generally our, lack of knowledge... I have always held that all our alleged
knowledge consists, in reality, of guesswork, and that the best of it consists of
guesswork controlled by rational criticism. ,,9.
The meaning of openness as a concept is therefore closely related to critical rationalism.
Popperian rationalism accepts that knowledge never starts from firm foundations, but
progresses from an uncertain starting point, 10 It may be characterized as "an attitude of
readiness to listen to critical arguments and to learn from experience" .11 Indeed, as
Popper expresses it: "There is no better synonym for 'rational' than 'critical'''.l2 To be
rational is to be open to the viewpoints of others and to the growth of knowledge.
The growth of knowledge is a key concept in the always tentative struggle towards
rationality and truth. It involves the constant overthrow of scientific theories by severe
testing and their replacement by better theories. 13 It is, however, always an objective,
and never a relative, search for truth since truth is understood as correspondence to
facts.l4 In a real sense it is always an "open" truth, for the human subject can never
know whether he has reached it or not, 15 Therefore Popper sees truth as a "regulative
principle" .16 This means that it has no absolute form or limits - it is open-ended.
Popper's epistemological openness entails an openness in all areas of reality, that is,
physics, human psychology (perception), evolution (indeterminism), biology, social
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science and politics.
In the area of science, induction is rejected and replaced by falsification. This means
that no infinite number of single observation statements can ever logically justify a
general or universal statement. 17 On the other hand, it must be possible for one basic
statement (a so-called "potential falsifier") to falsify a theory. 18 This means that there is
no final, certain, demonstrative knowledge; rather, knowledge is hypothetical or
conjectural but nevertheless "real" or "objective" in that it can describe aspects of
reality.19 Here is the dichotomy that Popper calls "fallibilistic absolutism"20: we
cannot "know" in the traditional subjective sense (the quest for certainty), but objective
or absolute truth is, nevertheless, there as a regulative standard.21 Scientific knowledge
is thus never then "justified belief", but always conjectural:22 theories (conjectures) are
formulated in answer to problems, severely tested by the method of trial and error and
either "falsified" (refuted) or "tentatively accepted" .23 Some theories may therefore be
better than others, that is, they have stood up to tests better than previous theories.
They are then said to be better "corroborated" theories.24 This means that they are still
"open" in the sense that they have not yet been falsified. However, Popper's term
"verisimilitude" permits us to speak of one theory as being nearer to the truth than
another theory even if it is false. 25 Moreover, verisimilitude allows us to speak of
making progress towards the truth. The truth lies ahead: always striven for but never
attained with certainty. As Popper expresses it: "We must go on into the unknown, the
uncertain, and insecure... " .26 In the physical sciences thus, openness means a tentative,
uncertain growth in knowledge, a moving towards truth.
The same qualities apply to Popper's psychological theory of perception. Observation in
the traditional sense is certain only if the mind is a tabula rasa, a clean slate, capable of
pure observation. Popper calls this the "bucket theory of the mind,,27 (p.lOl). Popper
dismisses this theory for it fails to distinguish between subjective and objective
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knowledge.28 He proposes instead a "searchlight" theory of knowledge.29 He means
that observation is always "theory-impregnated" and takes place within a pre-existing
framework of previous theories. This makes perception only conjectural and subject to
criticism and correction. Popper proposes that observation does not produce theories;
theories are always there. Rather, observation invites us to modify and correct theories
by rigorous testing. With Kant, Popper believes that the intellect forms and shapes our
perception of nature 30:
...every description (and even every perception), and therefore every
true description is (a) selectivity omitting many aspects of the knowledge
described; and (b) argumentative in that it transcends its evidence by
adding a hypothetical dimension...31
Episteme or absolute knowledge is not logically, scientifically or psychologically
possible. Popper has demonstrated that the quest for certain or absolute knowledge
leads either to sceptism or dogmatism.32 Truth is, rather, an open-ended quest, a future
directed thrust into the unknown.
Popper's open-ended objectivist search for truth is clearly allied to the Darwinian theory
of evolution through natural selection.33 Animal organisms are concerned with the
problem of survival;34 human organisms usually formulate their problems linguistically
and consequently make them open to criticism and modification.35 Although human
knowledge is continuous with animal knowledge, it has the following distinctive
qualities: continual growth36, development outside the organism37 and the emergence
of human language38. The descriptive and especially the argumentative functions of
human language open the human organism to reasoning and rationality.39
The growth of knowledge progresses then to problems of increasing depth and
complexity. This depth and complexity means that the world is inventive and creative
and opens up to that which is new, that is, to that which has not been before. Popper
comments:
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I suggest that the universe and its evolution is creative, and that the
evolution of sentient animals with conscious experience has brought
about something new .... With the emergence of man, the creativity of
the universe has become obvious. 'For man has created a new bjective
World the World of the product of the human mind; a World of myths,
o ' d 0 °fi h 0 f d f 0 40of faIry tales an sClenh IC t eones; 0 poetry an 0 mUSIC...
The emergence of the human organism has created a new world - World 3 whose
products are the theories of the human mind. Human knowledge has transcended its
creator to become "autonomous,,41 by generating problems that are in fact uninspired
and unsolved by man42. In this sense World 3 has transcended man, opening up the
universe to that which cannot be foreseen.
Popper proposes that man's transition to openness was achieved by the growth of human
language43 (especially the descriptive and argumentative function44); in response to the
demands of language the brain became enlarged45 and man thus reached self-
consciousness46. The self-conscious mind is a product of the brain. It is something that
has transcended the brain and its activities direct the brain's processes.47 The self, as an
emergent property of the brain, cannot be "reduced" to the physical brain.48 With the
emergence of the self (anchored in World 2) and its products (World 3) there are now
three worlds49 (p.ll1-114) in constant interaction through World 2,50 the world of
mental processes. These worlds are not self-contained, but causally open to one
another. Openness, then, relates to evolution by Darwinian natural selection and the
consequent emergence of products of World 1 (the physical World): the self-conscious
mind (World 2) and the products of the self-conscious mind (World 3). This means that
the natural world is not closed or determined but open to creativity and novelty.
Indeed, Popper's universe is an open, indeterminate physical system with some form of
what he calls "plastic control"51 which allows for controlled freedom rather than sheer
chance.52 Propensities53 are dispositional properties. They are real forces which in
part "determine" undetermined events. Popper in effect proposes that freedom and
nature interact.54 Openness in the Popperian sense means indeterminism (albeit in a
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modified form), creativity, complexity and emergence.
We now turn to the social sciences. Methodologically, critical rationalism is the weapon
of all sciences - physical, biological and social. Through trial and error, that is, the
formulation of hypotheses, in principle falsifiable and subject to severe testing against
the background of earlier development, knowledge of society grows. In the social field,
openness is closely related to the rise of democracy and freedom; "closedness" to
authoritarianism, holism and various forms of Utopianism. Plato's political doctrine is
closed because it aims to arrest change and return to the static tribal society.55
Moreover, Plato's "Republic" is an ideal society for it is more perfect than that which
follows. 56 In addition the "Republic" is collectivist and exists independently of its
members.57 Popper's open society, on the other hand, exists for the good of the
individuals who comprise it.58
The root of the problem ,in the "closed" society of Plato (and, indeed, of Hegel and
Marx as well) is, according to Popper, "methodological essentialism,,59 the fundamental
concern of which is: "who should rule?" Popper's concern is, rather, how to control
possibly incompetent rulers. 60 Consequently, the perfect society and perfect rulers are
not legitimate concerns; rather, the evolution of a better society through piecemeal social
engineering is the rational approach.61 Consequently, the holistic approach which
begins with a "blueprint" of how society should be is irrational.62 Its concern is
meaning and definition, not criticism - it lacks openness.
Similarly, Historicism aims to determine the historical laws by which societies change
and develop.63 Popper rejects the possibility of discovering these laws: firstly, the
growth of knowledge cannot be predicted by rational means; secondly, the growth of
future knowledge must influence the course of history.64 Moreover, the growth of
society depends upon individuals who through their acceptance of responsibility
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determine its future course.65 Thus man, rather than history, is responsible. Society
cannot be rational or open (synonymous terms) without the individuals who, through
critical discussion and dialogue, open it to piecemeal improvement. Consequently, the
open or democratic society is capable of continual modification and improvement.
Openness in the societal sense thus entails democracy, individual responsibility and
piecemeal social engineering.
This section has been concerned to discover the meaning of openness in all the aspects
of Popperian concern. In the next section the roots of openness will be analyzed. They
are five fold: rationality, anti-inductionism, Darwinian natural selection, indeterminism
and individualism.
6.2. THE ROOTS OF OPENNESS
The most important of Popper's aphorisms is: "The central mistake... is the quest for
certainty".66 Popper relates in Unended Quest how Einstein's criticism of Newton's
theory of gravity convinced him of the very uncertainty of our knowledge of the external
world. 67 Popper later rejects all attempts at the justification of knowledge and sees
criticism as a viable alternative.68
The primary root of openness in Popper's thought is critical rationalism, which pervades
every aspect of his creed. Consequently, the quest for rationality will be the first root
discussed.
Popper's indebtedness to Socrates is well known. Rationalism begins with Socratic
doubt. For this reason Popper regards his encounter with Marxism as one of the main
events in his intellectual development. He comments:
It taught me a number of lessons which I have not forgotten. It taught
me the wisdom of the Socratic saying, "I know that I do not know." It
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made me a fallibilist and impressed on me the value of intellectual
modesty. And it made me conscious of the differences between dogmatic
and critical thinking.69
Fallibilism is the bedrock of rationalism. It implies that, although the search for truth
will never give the certainty of success, every detected mistake is an advance in
knowledge.70 Critical rationalism is not classical scepticism but rather a type of creative
doubt. This means that knowledge is possible but not certain knowledge. All
knowledge, then, is provisional and open to subsequent correction and refutation or
overthrow. The quest for certainty is indeed the enemy of truth. Truth and its
handmaid, rationality, are intrinsically open: "an attitude of readiness to listen to critical
arguments and learn from experience. ,,71. Critical rationalism, therefore, rejects any
dogmatic authority: the authority of the intellect or the senses72; the authority of
historicism 73 and the authority of an Utopian blueprint of society74.
J. BronowsIG. expresses his appreciation of Popper's concept of the growth of knowledge
in these words:
He (Popper) does not write of science as a finished enterprise, and he
does not think of it (even unconciously) as an enterprise that could ever
be finished. In his exposition science is systematic; yet it is a perfectly
open system; it is constantly changed and enlarged. Year by year it goes
to embrace more of nature, and yet there is no vision of an ideal society
that might embrace the whole of nature.75
Critical rationalism will never allow us to "justify" our theories; through criticism we
can, however, justify our preference °for one theory as opposed to another.
Consequently, knowledge is conjectural rather than either justified or absolute. In
replacing justification by criticism, Popper breaks the "closed" approach to rationality
and opens it to evolutionary growth. He states his position clearly when he says:
... the old philosophy linked the idea of rationality with final,
demonstrative knowledge...while I linked it with the growth of
conjectural knowledge. This itself I linked with the idea of a better and
better approximation to truth or of increasing truthlikeness or
verisimilitude. According to this view, fmding theories which are better
approximations to truth is what the scientist aims at; the aim of science is
knowing more and more. This evokes the growth of the content of our
theories, the growth of knowledge of the World.76
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In short, Popper is stating that rationality is the growth of conjectural knowledge rather
than the attainment of absolute knowledge. Rationality presupposes an attitude of
openness to permit growth at root. Firstly, it "presupposes a certain attitude of
intellectual humility"77 which is exemplified by Socrates78. Secondly, rationality
.. .is an attitude of readiness to listen to critical arguments and to learn
from experience. It is fundamentally an attitude of admitting that 'I may
be wrong and you may be right' , and by our effort, we may get nearer to
the truth.79
Thirdly, as Popper's account of rationality is fundamental both in the context of a theory
of knowledge and in his critique of totalitarianism, according to Popper rationality
- established "the unity of mankind"80. There is a link then between rationalism and
humanitarianism. Thus Popper's commitment to rationalism is based on respect for
persons, especially the individual. It is essentially democratic, for the other is seen as a
potential source of dialogue and information. 81
Critical rationalism is never merely theoretical. It has an empirical or experiental basis
whether it is related to the natural or social sciences.82 The trial and error method is
applicable to both disciplines: in neither does it lead to certain knowledge. The very
reality on which both are based is uncertain and tentative. 83
Scientific knowledge progresses then to deeper and more complex problems through
error-elimination and consequent adjustment.84 Societal knowledge progresses
similarly; by trial and error adaptation it uses piecemeal social engineering85 in order to
improve society gradually and open it to democracy and truth. It eschews an
essentialism which provides a static "bl!leprint"Jorsociety,86 embracing.rathera -
society that does not search for ultimate good but for the- bariishmentofevil and . ~ -
suffering. 87
Popperian critical rationalism insists that there is no final sanction or authority for
knowledge in either the natural or the social sciences. The only knowledge is that which
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is open and consequently free to change or to grow and become more truthlike. Critical
rationalism is guided by the insight that to be reasonable is to be open to what is other
than oneself. This rationalism leads mankind on the road to problems and insights of
increasing depth and complexity which sometimes attain, but never know, "truth". In
this sense truth is open.
Popper's arguments against induction will now provide a further logical and scientific
ground for openness. If we cannot logically "verify" but only "falsify") truth is always
beyond us.
The problem of induction is how we gam theoretical knowledge from expenence.
Popper's answer is a totally negative one, that is, experience never validates an
hypothesis. 88 This means that there is no logical justification for reasoning from
empirical phenomena of which we have experience to other similar phenomena of
which we have no experience. Popper derives this argument from Hume. Hume writes
that we have no reason to believe "that those instances of which we have no experience
[are likely to] resemble those of which we have had experience. "89 Popper calls this
. "Hume's [logical] problem of induction" .90 He also rejects Hume's psychological
theory of induction which led humans [irrationally as Hume believed] to believe in
natural regularities through the observation of repetition. 91
Popper proposes that the logical problem of induction arises from: (a) Hume's
discovery that no universal law, since it transcends experience, may be justified by
observation and experience, (b) the regularity in scientific Jaws and (c) the strong
empirical basis of science which asserts that scientific statements may be accepted or
rejected only on the basis of observation and experiment.92 Popper denies that (a) to (c)
clash:
We can see this the moment we realise that the acceptance by science of a
law or a theory is tentative only; which is to say that all laws and
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theories are conjectures, or tentative hypotheses... and that we reject a
law or theory on the basis of new evidence, without necessarily
discarding the old evidence which originally led us to accept it...
The principle of empiricism (c) can be fully preserved, since the fate of a
theory, its acceptance or rejection, is decided by observation and
experiment - by the result of tests. So long as a theory stands up to the
severest tests we can design, it is accepted; if it does not, it is rejected.93
Popper repudiates induction in the strongest terms94 for induction gets the stages of
knowledge acquisition in the wrong order. It proposes that observation comes first (the
mind is choosing al.l theories and expectations). Once _there are sufficient observed data
a generalisation is made. Therefore Popper replaces induction by deduction for the
above reason.
He proposes that scientific statements are logically differentiated. from statements
describing specific events.95 Two different kinds of statements are thus necessary for a
causal explanation. They are "universal statements" (hypotheses) and "singular
statements" (also called initial entities as they apply to a specific event). It is from the
universal statement used in conjection with the singular statement that a scientific theory
is deduced. 96
Popper's logico-deductive theory has exposed the basis of scientific openness. Induction
sought to justify knowledge while Popper's deductive system seeks only to eliminate
false theories by observational statements: " ... [there is a] purely -logical relationship of
deductibility which allows us to assert the falsity of universal statements if we accept the
truth of singular ones... ,,97.
Hume's second problem of induction was psychological.. Popper dismisses the problem ..
as primitive.98 He distinguishes between an irrational tendency imposed by habit and
repetition and a rational tendency to try out bold hypotheses and test them.99 He states:
"The first describes a typically Lamarckian procedure of instruction; the second, a
Darwinian procedure of selection. The first one is, as Hume observed, irrational, while
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the second seems to have nothing irrational in it." 100 Non-scientific sociological
. statements, although in principle not falsifiable (see problem concerning demarcation
p.98) can still be submitted to a method of critical examination by trial and error. lOl
Their hypotheses are related to a context or tradition against which they are critically
assessed. 102 Thus piecemeal social engineering is an accepted practical form of the
hypothetico-deductive trial and error method.
Popper sees that our whole intellectual development is an unending (hence open) process
of adjustment and modification of theories under the pressure of experience.103 The
growth of knowledge moves effectively when we proceed from problem to problem in
attempts to solve them. This non-inductive process gives our knowledge the permanent
nature of provisionality. All is open, nothing is permanently established and nothing is
unalterable. Our sole concern is to get closer to truth. No theory can ever give the final
truth. It is always open to subsequent modification.
It is evident that non-inductive problem solving can also be seen in terms of Darwinian
natural selection,104 that is, the survival of the fittest. Therefore the Darwinian theory
provides the third root of openness in Popper's thought.
By Popper's own admission the methodology of his theory of the growth of knowledge
by trial and error elimination (as contained in The Logic of Scientific Discovery) closely
resembles that of Darwinian selection. In The Poverty ofHistoricism 105 he attempts to
tackle some epistomological questions concerned with the theory of evolution. Chapter
.Seven of Objective Knowledge was regarded by Popper as an improvement on
Darwin.1°6 However, he regards the Darwinian theory as not "justifiable or testable "
scientific theory but rather as a 'metaphysical research programme' ...a possible
framework for testable scientific theories." 107
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Popper notes that the origin of life and the origin of problems are the same108: a
response to what he calls the "logic of situations" .109 This means that a theory or
action is a response to a problem being confronted. Therefore we start with problems
and not from observation. The growth of knowledge then proceeds "from old problems
to new problems by means of conjecture and refutation,,;110 moreover, this method is
the same from "the amoeba to Einstein" 111.
The first problems with which all animals are born are "inborn expectations" which,
when disappointed, begin the process of knowledge growth. 112 A response to a problem
is an hypothesis which is subjected to various pressures and tests: the fit su~ive and the
unfit are eliminated. l13 Popper distinguishes between humans, on the one hand, and
animals and pre-scientific knowledge on the other:
Thus, while animal knowledge and pre-scientific knowledge grow mainly
through the elimination of those holding unfit hypotheses, scientific
criticism often makes our theories perish in our stead, eliminating our
mistaken belief before such beliefs lead to our own elimination. 114
Animal evolution is concerned almost exclusively with the question of survival.
Humans obey the same laws of evolutionary change. In one sense they are continuous
with nature; in another sense they are discontinuous. This is evident when one considers
that animal evolution progresses in the form of either the modification of existing
behaviour-effecting organs or the emergence of new ones. Human evolution, on the
other hand, takes place largely outside the person or its behaviour. It is applied
knowledge involving the making of tools and weapons. Thus human evolution evolves
towards greater complexity, openness and emergence. Popper tabulates the following
levels of emergence in biological evolution: 115
World 3 (the products of
the human mind)
World 2 (the World of
subjective experience)
(6) Works of art and of Science
(including Technology)
(5) Human Language. Theories of Self
and of Death
(4) Consciousness of Self and of
Death.
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World 1 (the World of
physical objects)
(3) Sentience (Animal Consciousness)
(2) Living Organisms
(1) The heavier elements; liquids
and crystals.
(0) Hydrogen and Helium
He suggests two kinds of behavioural progress - "closed behavioural progress" and
"open behavioural progress", the former characteristic of animal behaviour and the
latter of human behaviour. 116 Open progress allows for alteration and choice and is
guided by natural selection as a result of varying environmental pressures.
Consciousness emerges in four stages from the open choices. The highest stage is the
evolution of language. It is at this stage that the self-conscious mind emerges and man
becomes capable of critical thought. 117 This self conscious mind is a product of the
human brain which it has transcended. It has become something completely different
from the brain which it now directs and with which it interacts. 118 The evolutionary
process cannot be understood "reductively" 119 for it is open: "new" unexpected things
emerge in what is essentially a creative universe. The new and the unexpected arise
partly from what Popper calls "downward causation" 120, that is, "higher evolutionary
development can and does control the behaviour levels from which it has evolved" 121.
At a higher and more open level still the self-conscious mind through critical and
conceptual thought, the so-called product of the human mind, transcends itself. These
products of the human mind "inhabit" an autonomous World 3 where the degree of
openness is so great that it creates certain problems that have not yet and may never be
solved. 122 Each of these three worlds, the physical, the mental, and the objective
product of the mind is irreducible to the others. Additionally, there are causal
relationships between all three123 for none is self-contained.
A picture emerges of a creative, expanding, evolving, indeterminate universe in which
higher organisms and systems are less predetermined and predictable than lower ones.
It is a universe that has produced creative man and his self; a universe that has been
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powerfully changed by the emergent products of man and is forever open to further
creative initiatives. It is a universe that has emerged through applying trial and error
natural selectivity to problems of ever greater depth and complexity.
The fourth root of openness is indeterminism. The approximate character of all
scientific knowledge, a central theme of Popper's philosophical method, produces the
most convincing argument in favour of indeterminism. 124 Moreover, this highly
complex scientific knowledge depends on human fallibility and creativity. Popper
comments: "we try to examine the world exhaustively by our nets; but its mesh will
always let some fish escape; there will always be enough play for indeterminism. ,,125
Popper's indeterminism is not classical indeterminism, that is, perfect chance. It is
rather "something indeterminate in character between perfect chance and perfect
determinism." 126 The determinists suffered a blow when atoms were no longer seen as
indivisible rigid bodies. 127 Popper continues:
But the introduction of composite atoms, and sub-atomic particles such
as electrons, suggested another possibility: the idea that atomic and
molecular collisions may not be of a determinate character...modem
physics assumes that there are objectively chance-like events, and
objective probabilities or propensities... it seems that the number and
complexity of both the different molecules and their properties are
unlimited and that they may far transcend the possibilities of deductive
explanation. 128
Chance-like indeterminate events are avoided by a system of "plastic controls" .129 This
means that World 3 objects, like theories and values, can effect physical changes in the
universe.130 Moreover, Popper introduces propensities in the realm of physics to
explain relational properties between things. These relational properties are really
existing forces which "influence" undetermined events. 131
Popper believes that indeterminism must make human freedom understandable and
therefore he elaborates his theory further. 132 He seeks to show that the emergence of
hierarchial levels or layers (three worlds) depends upon the indeterminism of the
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physical universe. 133 Each level is open to the causal influences that come from both
the lower and to the higher levels. 134 This means that there is an interaction between
the realm of freedom (World 2 and especially World 3) and the physical world (World
1). The physical world is indeterminate and incomplete 135 but causally open to the
world of mental processes and still further towards the transcendent world of the
products of the human mind. Human freedom is not random but "deliberate, purposive
activity" .136
It is World 3, the realm of the objects of human knowledge, that establishes for Popper
not only the indeterminate nature of the universe but its concomitant quality of openness
and incompleteness: "The introduction of objective human knowledge into our universe
- the introduction of World 3 - allows us to prove not only the indeterminate character
of the universe, but its essential qualities of openness and incompleteness." 137 The
autonomous realm that is World 3 - where there are, in Popper's words, " ... problem
situations in themselves which have never ,been produced or understood and may never
be produced or understood by men ... "138 - can and does act upon World 1 through
World 2. Thus the universe is intrinsically open and creative. It is open to both radical
novelty and emergence. 139 This means that higher level developments cannot be
reduced to a mere physical, chemical or biological level. Each successive layer of
emergence is unforeseen at the less developed or more primitive levels. 140
Furthermore, all life cannot be explained as properties of matter alone141 for even
matter is now understood as a process l42. Popper proposes, instead, that matter has.
transcended itself. 143 Thus his arguments for indeterminism are strong. They provide
perhaps the strongest arguments for openness and freedom. Popper proposes:
We live in a world of emergent evolution, of problems whose solution, if
they are solved, beget new and deeper problems. Thus we live in a
world of emergent novelty; of a novelty, which, as a rule is not
completely reducible to any of the preceeding stages. " 144
The fifth and final root of openness is individualism. The stress on individual
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phenomena is deeply embedded in Popper's thought; even in his scientific thought. It
has its origin in his early strong methodological opposition to what he calls
"essentialism" .145 Essentialism has its origin in a belief in the existence of
universals. 146 Popper's World 3 would share certain assumptions with various forms of
classical belief in universals. 147 However,. his problem concerned what he called "... a
deeper and more important problem: the problem of universal laws and their
truth... " .148 Popper's scientific difficulty lies not in the existence of universals but in
their logical relationship with singular statements: " ... there is no induction, because
universal theories are not deducible from singular statements. But they may be refuted
by singular statements, since they may clash with descriptions of observable facts" .149
While Popper regards Plato as "the discoverer of the third world", 150 his essential
problem is Plato's belief that the objects of World 3 are "essences" or "ultimate
explanations" rather than theories or problems)51 Popper describes himself as a
"methodological nominalist" 152 whose task is, rather, to describe how phenomena
behave153.
Popper's stress on the individual phenomenom can only be understood as part of his
attack on historicism)54 However, it is historicism's alliance with holism that has
particular relevance to the present argument, viz. the importance of individuals. Popper
states:
Historicism is interested in the development, not of aspects of social life,
but of 'society as a whole'; and Utopian engineering is similarly holistic.
Both overlook the important fact...the fact that 'whales' in this sense are
never the object of scientific inquiry.. .155
Historicism and Holism see society and its development as something outside and
beyond the control of individuals. Popper feels that the task of social theory " ... is to
construct and analyze our sociological models in descriptive or nominalistic terms, that
is to say, in terms of individuals (my emphasis), of their activities, expectations,
relations etc. - a postulate which may be called 'methodological individualism' ... " .156
As noted earlier Plato's closed society was static, tribal and collectivist. 157 Popper
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believes that the open society is one in which individuals are confronted with personal
decisions. 158
Further, the importance of the individual, too, is related to the struggle for rationality
which involves discussion and dialogue and ultimately" ... man's power to grow, to
transcend himself, not only by the imaginative invention of myths... but also by the
rational criticism of his imaginative inventions... "159. Creative rationalism needs
individual intuition and response together with a recognition of a common history.
Popper sees the rationalist as "a man who attempts to reach decisions by argument, and
perhaps in certain cases by compromise." 160 The rational attitude, moreover, "has an
attitude of give and take, and a readiness .not only to convince the other man but also
possibly to be convinced by him... " .161
Society needs the individual response and contribution for: "Truth is not manifest" .162
Popper has shown that the search for truth requires imagination, trial-arid-error, gradual
discovery of prejudices and critical discussion. 163 These qualities require responsible
individuals. Truth falteringly emerges by rational criticism, discussion and attempts to
refute them; in practice, it excludes no one. Truth is essentially democratic for it
arises from the free flow of ideas and their criticism. 164
However, the stress on the individual does not mean intellectual and moral relativism.
Relativism is irrational since individuals st~ve for objective truth. As Popper expresses
it:
... there is a kind of truth in this relativistic view of science: science is
man-made, and therefore fallible. But the idea of objective and absolute
truth is also a man-made idea; and fallibility means that though truth is
our supreme standard, we often fall short of it. Truth is therefore a
regulative idea: we try to live up to our standards, even though we have
no criteria by which we could decide whether we have reached them. 165
That the individual should be responsible is at the core of Popper's social doctrine. For
this reason our moral norms, though pointing to facts, cannot be derived from facts. 166
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This "dualism of facts and decisions" 167 means that norms may not be derived from
facts and actual historical events. Man is thus not determined by the "rhythm of
history" 168: he has, rather, to accept a moral responsibility for the decisions made169.
Popper's philosophy, and indeed, his philosophy of science, rest on the importance and
contribution of the free individual. At root it is a humanitarian creed. Bronowski aptly
expresses this insight:
For he insisted in his philosophy as much in his human life that there is
no final sanction and authority for knowledge, even in science; that only.
that is knowledge which is free to grow and change; and that a condition
for its growth is the challenge of independent minds. 170
Popper sees a power in the emancipated and free individual. It is a power that has led to .
growth and development and most of all to openness and consequent creativity. He
states:
The emancipation of the individual was indeed the great spiritual
revolution which led to the breakdown of tribalism and the rise of
democracy.... This individualism, united with altruism, has become the
basis of our western civilization. 171
In the next section openness will be proposed as Popper's overall methodological
approach in all areas of his concern. It is his unifying theme.
6.3. OPENNESS: POPPER'S OVERALL METHODOLOGY
In his article A Popperian Harvest172, Bartley outlined the main ,.themes that emerge
from Popper's seminar method. He relates:
.You must have a problem, not a topic.
.Do not try to be original. Find a problem that excites you. Work on it
and take what you want.
.You must wallt to communicate ~o your reader. You must be clear,
never use long words or anything endlessly complicated...
.It is immoral to be pretentious, or try to impress the reader or listener
with your knowledge. For you are ignorant. Although we may differ in
the little things we know, in our infinite ignorance we are all equal.
.Do not be .attached to your ideas. You must expose yourself, put
yourself to nsk. Do not be cautious in your ideas. Ideas are not scarce:
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there are more where they come from.... But once the idea is stated, you
must try nor to defend it, not to believe it, but to criticize it and to learn
from discovery its defects. Ideas are only conjectures. What is
important is not the defence of particular conjectures but the growth of
knowledge.
.So be scrupulous in admitting your mistakes: you cannot learn from
them if you never admit that you make them. 173
The above exposition captures the essence and essential unity of Popper's work. His
work has a wide scope ranging from physics through biology to sociology and political
theory. However, all these disciplines are seen as evolutionary products, subject to
critical examination. This examination includes a review of even their most
fundamental principles. Popper's critical methodology is fundamentally open in the
sense that no principles are beyond criticism and examination. 174 The method is
universally applied by Popper as there are no special methods relating exclusively to
philosophy, to science (both natural and social) or to logic.
In his later works, Popper directs himself to areas barely hinted at in his earlier years,
that is, biology and the evolutionary theory. These theories integrate all his previous
work and are thoroughly consistent with it. Popper began in The Logic of Scientific
Discovery with Physics, as an advanced form of knowledge. Later he turned to
prehuman forms of knowledge. Problem-solving, including animal problem-solving has
a Darwinian basis. Knowledge is the result of the process of natural selection. 175
This development leads eventually to the mental states of man. Though grounded in the
body, they began through consciousness to transcend themselves. A self-conscious mind
emerges as a product of the brain. It is totally different from the brain, but emerges
from and interacts with it. Moreover, this self-conscious mind directs the processes of
the physical brain. 176 The higher evolutionary development or the self-conscious mind
controls the lower levels, or the physical brain. 177
This "open" evolution, which is a product of blind variation or selective retention 178,
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gives rise to still higher levels - the products of the human mind which Popper calls
World 3.179 Unexpected and sometimes unavoidable consequences flow from them.
Thus a picture of an indeterminstic universe emerges.180 However, as noted earlier
(pp. 178-179) it is a universe of what Popper calls "plastic controls" .1 81 Controls (on
chance) are provided not only by propensities182 but by World 3 objects like theories
and values which influence changes in the physical universe. 183 The universe displays
causal openness in that each hierarchical level is able to interact with the other levels.
Expressed differently, this means that freedom (the higher levels) interacts with nature
(the lower levels) producing a universe that is evolutionary, creative, increasingly
complex and infinitely emergent.
Popper's varying and divergent disciplin~s are all integrated and closely connected.
Thus indeterminism in physics has its counterpart in history. Popper's epistemology has
been seen to be rooted in both physics and biology. These provide the basic
presuppositions of Popper's sociological doctrine, that is, the open society. The open
society is rooted in the open universe. The open society is evolutionary, striving
falteringly towards a rationality and truth, and its method is responsible individual
initiative. The quest for rationality arises from the ability "to listen to critical argument
and to learn from experience" .184
The criticism of theories and their scientific and logical counterpart, falsification, is
linked to political theory. Democracy provides the most efficient means for preserving
the freedom of critical rationalism. 185
In order to preserve this freedom and promote responsible and accountable individuality
political society needs only minimal functions.1 86 Popper says political structures
should "provide no more than a framework with which the citizens may act in a more or
less organized way" 187. Consequent!y, its method is one of piecemeal and open
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reform. Improvement, not perfection, is the aim.1 88 Indeed, perfection is impossible,
for the social and political order is influenced by continual scientific and sociological
development. 189 However, the open society is, not a realm of moral or ~ntellectual
relativism. We strive, as in the physical sciences, towards objective truth, towards
moral improvement by constant self-examination and self-correction.
This survey shows. that all Popper's varying scientific and social disciplines depend upon
an overall method that may be termed "evolutionary openness", whether the area be
physics, biology, sociology, logic or political theory, for "the truth is not manifest" 190
It lies always ahead and is reached by the arduous path of trial and error or knowledge
modification that leads to increasing complexity, novelty and openness.
In the next chapter a critical comparison will be made between Popper's "evolutionary
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7.1. TRUTH: THEOLOGICAL AND SCIENTIFIC
Moltmann's and Popper's evolutionary openness increases the possibility of dialogue
between theology and science. There are. areas of parallel research where a dynamic
exchange of ideas is possible. It is the contention of the writer that each scholar would
be open to the discoveries and insights of the other. Their methodologies, with much in
common, allow an overlap in the following areas of research: truth (future),
transcendence, open systems (indeterminacy) and a sociological commitment to an Open
Society. One is a theologian, the other a philosopher, primarily of science. However,
both are modest in their claims.
The Christian faith concerns God as an all-encompassing reality. For this reason what is
believed about reality by science, whether physical, chemical, biological or even
sociological, is not irrelevant to faith. Moreover science is the common possession of
humanity as a whole and therefore needs to be used in commentary on Christian
teaching.
Similarly, science needs to recognize that the spiritual and religious quest is one of the
major realities of human life even in a technological society. Langdon Gilkey makes the
point:
A scientific community ... that ignores the relation of its truth and its life
to law, to morals, and to fundamental religious symbols ... only makes
itself and its culture vulnerable to ideological capitulation. Ignorance of
the religious in both its demonic and its creative forms can be even more
fatal for a scientific culture than ignorance of new scientific and
technological development.!
I
Science and religion speak different languages; however, insight in one serves to
illuminate the other. Superficially it could be said that science asks "how" questions
about observables and religion asks "why" questions about personal goals and
alternative purposes.2 There is an obvious overlap of interest: scientists, too, will have
their ultimate concerns in partial realities. Theologies express interest and concern in
how the world God created actually works. However, the writer feels that there should
be no epistemological and methodological problem as long as theological language is not
used to answer strictly scientific questions and vice versa.
It is as open and not as closed systems that science and theology should confront each
other. Today many scientists have moved away from the ideology that has come to be
known as "scientism".3 They question whether science is really value-free, uninfluenced
by personal belief and subjectivity.4 In his 1962 study, The Structure of Scientific
Revolutions,5 Thomas Kuhn studies the periods when major changes have occurred in
the world-view of scientists. He calls these world-views paradigms, or the received
tradition of a given scientific community. These paradigms both define and limit the
questions asked and the solutions accepted. The point that Kuhn makes is that the
choice between any two paradigms is not dictated by objective rules. Moreover, new
paradigms explain dimensions of reality that old paradigms do not.
It is· the discussion of the relationship of scientific theories to the truth that has moved
the scientific community away from a simple mechanistic view of the world.
Consequently scientists are more modest in their claims for truth in the physical world.
In seeking the truth about nature they are aware that their selection is often made in
accordance with their own presuppositions and prejudices. David Ray Griffin observes:
Recognition that science has discovered a wide range of truth is
compatible with the conviction that a wide range of truth that is not
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discovered exists, and that its fonnulations of the truth it has discovered
are one-sided, presently only abstractions from the full truth.6
Thus it can be said that their goal is no longer certain knowledge but rather
verisimilitude, that is, a slow, faltering, understanding of reality but one which will in
its totality always elude them. Reality can only be known imperfectly, is always
influenced by personal judgement and remains subject to continual public scrutiny.
With Popper it can be said that only in criticizing competing theories can we steadily
approach open objective truth.7
Theologians, too, have come to realize that their own language is much less scientific,
more metaphorical and richer in religious models. 8. Theologians are able to speak: about
God only by analogy. All words used in religious statements fall far short of the
concepts they signify. Hans Kung9 has applied Kuhn's paradigm model of the evolution
of scientific knowledge to theology. He proposes that theological discourse must take
place within a broad set of metaphysical and theological assumptions. Kung lists five
major paradigm changes in the history of theology, the most recent being the
contemporary ecumenical paradigm. All paradigms are efforts by Christian theology to
think through what is believed to be the truth of the Christian faith. 10 There are many
cultural factors in the emerging modern paradigm: secularisation, religious pluralism,
racism, sexism, the Third World, ambiguity concerning science and technology and
environmental problems. 11 Thus, theology is more open than before in its articulation
of the Christian faith experience: it is increasingly seen as a time-bound effort to
translate the salvific event of the past to the world of the present. .Moltmann
understands an eschatologically open unfolding of the truth when he states: "The world
is not yet finished; but it is understood as engaged in history. It is therefore the world
of possibilities, the world in which we can serve the future, promised truth ... ".12
Open truth is complex truth. The new, emerging science challenges traditional science
because of the range of complexity within scientific reality. The physicist, Heinz
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Pagels, explains this development:
Science has explored the microcosmos and the macrocosmos; we have a
good sense of the lay of the land. The great unexplained factor is
complexity. Complex systems include the body and its organs,
especially the brain, the economy, population and evolutionary systems
... Scientists, in a new interdisciplinary effort, have begun to meet the
challenge of complex systems and,. remarkably, are understanding how
complexity can emerge from simplicity ... Some aspects of our moral
behaviour - behaviour that either reflects or constitutes our moral values
- seem extremely complex, but conceivably they arise from simple
elements that can be understood. While science cannot judge, it can help
us understand. 13
According to Pagels, complexity can lead to the resolution of the unresolvable conflict
between the reductionist and the transcendental views of reality. 14
Karl Rahner believes that Christians have to become used to the feeling of being lost in
the complex cosmos. In this way they will hold the scientific view of the world to
coexist in creative tension with the Christian view of their dignity and importance as
human persons. He expresses the tension in these words:
... their very recognition and acceptance of the fact of being lost in the
cosmos actually raises them above it and enables them to realize it as an
expression and mediation of that ultimate experience of contingency
which they, in virtue of their ancient faith, must perceive and accept
before the infinite God as finite creatures .... In this way the feeling of
cosmic dizziness can be understood as an element in the development of
people's theological consciousness.... If people have to give up their
feeling of being at home in the universe in exchange for the feeling of
not being at home, which reflects the character of their religious
experience, then this is at root a legitimate element of mankind's fate. IS
From the above analysis of the nature of religious and scientific truth the common,
mutually shared concept of complexity emerges: in the acceptance of the complexity of
their respective subject matter dialogue is possible between science and theology.
Overall, openness for Moltmann and Popper means the acceptance of complexity In
truth and truth in complexity.
Truth, for Moltmann, lies ahead. It is the anticipation, the sending ahead of God's
future contained proleptically in the death and resurrection of Jesus.16 This novum is
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qualitatively different from historical experiences. 17 This means the world is a system
" ... in which something new happens and can be realized" 18, an experiment, an open
creative process of indeterminate behaviour, of infinite possibilities in the realization of
which more open possibilities emerge. The eschatological end which completes the
historical process opens up all finite systems for the fullness of life. 19
For Popper, truth is no less evasive; it "is not manifest,,20; it is a "regulative
principle,,21; it is "correspondence to facts,,22; objective yet fallible23; evolutionary24
and transcendent (in World 3). Its origins are within the process of the universe, yet in
World 3 it transcends the world. World 3 is an autonomous man-made world that
evolves in emergent creativity and in which new things emerge. In a real sense, then,
the future of the truth, (that is, World 3) interacts with present reality (World 1 and
World 2). Popper states:
And I assert that even though this third-world is a human product, there
are many theories in themselves and arguments in themselves and
problem solutions in themselves which have never been produced or
understood and may never be produced or understood by men.25
From different perspectives Moltmann and Popper agree that truth (both theological and
scientific truth) is complex, non-reductionist, evolutionary and emergent. There is a
transcendence of the lower into the higher, of the less producing the unexpected and
unpredictable more; of an openness to growth in complexity. Moltmann expresses his
position as follows:
With every possibility that is realized, even more complex structures also
come into being, and these in turn open up new ranges of possibility ...
The richer wealth of forms is bound up with a growing indeterminacy of
behaviour, and this again involves increasingfitture possibilities.26
Popper's position is strikingly similar - truth is a product of emergent indeterminism. In
a strong reaction against determinism (clocks) and in favour of indeterminism plus
control (clouds) he states:
All physical systems, including clocks, are, in reality clouds... . This
suggests that the emergence of hierarchical levels or layers and of
interaction between them, depends upon a fundamental indeterminism of
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the physical universe. Each layer is open to causal influences coming
from lower and from higher levels.27
Truth is not easy to acquire: it evolves with an open system, leads to more complex
open systems, to a self-transcending system. Theology and science coexist within this
thesis of the nature of truth. Transcendence is a common language.
7.2. TRANSCENDENCE
Moltmann's contention has been that traditional theology has emphasized duality, that is,
creation and redemption, necessity and freedom, nature and grace. Accordingly, grace
prepares for and perfects nature.28 Moltmann, however, would prefer to say that grace,
rather than perfecting nature, prepares nature for eternal glory:
... we have to talk about nature and grace, and the relationship between
nature and grace, in a forward perspective, in the light of the coming
glory, which will complete both nature, and grace, and hence already
determines the relationship between the two here and now... [Similarly]
being a Christian is not yet in itself the completion, but represents only a
messianic path towards a possible future consummation of the condition
of being human.29
In a similar vein, as the Resurrection of Christ is the beginning of a new creation of the
world, so nature and grace are to be seen in a forward perspective. They should be seen
in the light of "the coming glory which will complete both nature and grace". 30
Moltmann will not define these dualities against one another, rather "they will be
determined in all their complex intercommunication in relation to a third, common to
them both" .31
This common process identifies God with his creation. However, Moltmann contends
that,
Without the difference between Creator and creature, creation cannot be
conceived at all; but this difference is embraced and comprehended by a
greater truth which is what the creation narrative really comes down to,
because it is the truth from which is springs: the truth that God is all in
all. This does not imply a pantheistic dissolution of creation in God; it
does mean that the final form which creation is to find is God. 32
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The kingdom of glory has its existence within history but is, nevertheless, a transcendent
reality, a novum which emerges within the world's processes out of the future of God.
Although he blurs the distinction between the immanent Trinity and the economic
Trinity, he rejects a simple identification of the world processes with God, urging that
"In order to understand the history of mankind as a history in God, the distinction
between the world process and the inner-trinitarian process must be maintained and
emphasized. "33 The immanent Trinity belongs, then, to the eschatological fulfilment of
God in glorified creation.34 Within the economic Trinity, God and creation co-exist in
the history of creative suffering. Unfulfilled or unglorified creation is a suffering
creation.35 Transcendence is linked to the panentheistic suffering of God in creation.
Moltmann's position is clear:
... the deliverance or redemption of the world is bound up with the self-
deliverance of God from his sufferings.... Not only does God suffer
with and for the world; liberated men and women suffer with God and
for him. The theology of God's passion leads to the idea of God's self-
subjection to suffering. It therefore also has to arrive at the idea of
God's eschatological self-deliverance. Between these two movements
lies in the history of the profound fellowship between God and man in
f&"' 36su lenng...
A God involved in the world processes, rather than God over creation, allows theology
to take matter seriously. Spirit-matter dualism was used in the past to articulate spiritual
transcendence. Moltmann, however, sees transcendence in the future spiritual destiny of
matter and all creation.
Popper understands transcendence in the objective, autonomous nature of problems or
theories which are independent of human thought. World 3, the world of the obj~tive
contents of human thoughts and values, is not just part of the natural history of man, but
an autonomous realm subject to an autonomous development. Although World 3 is a
totally human product, Popper asserts:
... the idea of autonomy is central to my theory of the third-world... .
There is also a most important feed-back effect from our creations upon
ourselves; from the third-world upon the second-world... . The
autonomy of the third-world, and the feed-back of the third-world upon
the second and even the first are among the most important functions of
198
the growth of knowledge. 37
Popper gives the third world an "ontological status"38 in that, although originating in
human activities, it transcends these activities since it contains both problems which no
one can solve and problems which are insoluble.
According to Popper, World 3 objects originate from the cognitive activities of the
human mind. As was noted earlier39, animal language could only serve the expressive
and communicative function of manifesting the condition of the organism and thereby
signalling to other organisms to respond. Only human language has both a fully
developed descriptive function and an argumentative one. These higher linguistic
functions of human beings are what Popper considers responsible for the creation of
World 3 objects.
Transcendence, then, originates within the human mind and self. Popper sees the self-
conscious mind as being an evolutionary product of the brain but transcending the brain
so that it actually directs the brain processes. He explains the interaction in these words:
...The active, psycho-physical self is the active programmer to the
brain... , it is the executant whose instrument is the brain. The mind is,
as Plato said, the pilot... the self... is incredibly richer.40
Popper opts for mental-physical interaction, dismissing problems connected with the
ghost in the machine as being based on outdated views of causation and physical
determinism.41 Moreover, he rejects reductionism and accepts upward causation along
with downward causation. In this he proposes that higher evolutionary developments
control the lower levels from which they have emerged.42 Thus the evolutionary
process is a self-transcending one in which phenomena emerge which are new and
different from what has previously existed in the world. Popper explains:
It (the self-conscious mind) is something utterly different from anything
which, to our knowledge, has previously existed in the world.... From
an evolutionary point of view, I regard the self-conscious mind as an
emergent product of the brain...43
Popper sees the self as anchored in World 344:
199
I have described World 3 as consisting of the products of the human
mind. But human minds react, in their turn, to these products: there is
feedback.... The influence is both conscious and unconscious It bears
upon expectations, upon preferences, upon programmes. Insofar as we
are products of other minds, and of our own minds, we ourselves may be
said to belong to World 3.45
Popper is far from proposing an immortal soul or psychic substance that· can exist
independently of the body. However, the self and World 3 are emergent products of an
evolutionary and self-transcending universe. Thus the acknowledgment of complex
systems leading to transcendence allows the· writer to propose that science and theology
are not two separate realms of discourse. Moltmann and Popper are far from achieving
a single integrated intellectual exercise, but their respective understandings of
transcendence have given them at least some common insights. In The Self and its
Brain, which Popper wrote in collaboration with Sir John Eccles, the world renowned
Nobel Prize winning scientist, Eccles comments:
...man is much more than is given by this purely materialistic
explanation. I think there is a mystery in man, and I am sure that at least
it is wonderful for me to get the feeling that he isn't just a hastily made-
over ape, and that there is something much more wonderful in his nature
and his destiny.46
Moltmann and Popper both speak of open systems in relation to evolutionary processes
in nature. In these systems, increasing complexity at higher levels leads to development
which could not have been foreseen at lower levels. In the next section of this chapter
the treatment of this subject will be discussed.
7.3. OPEN SYSTEMS
Moltmann moves towards a synthesis of scientific and theological thinking in his idea of
creation as an open system. He wants to affirm that God can create new things. Thus _
he states: "The future is not completely inherent in the present. The future also brings
randomness, because it can bring something new".47 What are the distinguishing marks
of the open system? According to Moltmann there are four: the future condition is not
totally determined by past behaviour; behaviour is indeterminate in that there are
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various possibilities of change; the final condition is different from the initial state; and
there is a predisposition to communicate and interact with other systems.48 Moltmann
understands that the evolution of complex open systems is partially undetermined.
Increasing complexity realizes a growing multiplicity of possibilities. This means that
The process of the evolution of systems of matter and life is not a
unilinear chain of causality. It more closely resembles a growing and
spreading web of elementary particles and structures. These structures
fan out, extending not merely in existing environments, but also in the
range of possibilities afforded by the future... • With every possibility
that is realized, even more complex situations also come into being, and
these in turn open up new ranges of possibility.49
Moltmann speaks of such an open universe as being both participatory and anticipatory.
By the former he means communication of a richly diverse nature between all the part-
systems and, by the latter, an accelerated growth in complexity leading towards ultimate
self-transcendence.50 The open universe evolves towards transcendence out of which it
subsists.
The evolution of these complex systems increases indeterminate behaviour. Moltmann
understands what he calls the " ... partial indeterminacy of nature ... ".51 He means by
this that the future does not completely inhere in the present for the future includes
elements of randomness and can bring something new. Furthermore, he understands
that, in the evolution of complex systems, the model of causality is inappropriate.52
Moltmann understands that the Holy Spirit is the principle of the evolution of the
universe.53 In this sense the Spirit is identical with the cosmic spirit of nature. He
writes: ". .. we give the name of Spirit to the form of organization and modes of
communication in open systems!\·54 In the kingdom of glory there is the full indwelling
of God in His creation. For this reason it is "... the openness of all finite life systems
for infinity" and "the unlimited fullness of divine potentiality ... in the new creation. ,,55
Popper's scientific and philosophical understanding of open systems has much In
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common with Moltmann's. Like Moltmann's, it is coterminus with a theory of
evolution; unlike Moltmann's, though, it is linked to his theory of knowledge. The
primary epistemological and evolutionary activity is always problem-solving. With
evolution it is linked to survival. As Popper notes:
All organisms are constantly, day by day, engaged in problem-solving;
and so are all those evolutionary sequences of organisms - the phyla
which begin with the most primitive forms and of which the now living
organisms are the latest members.56
--_ Popper offers no explanation of the genesis of life. His interest is only in the
development of life. (According to Popper nothing can be said about the origin of
theories. See p.ll0-113). Animal evolution relates to survival with an accompanying
modification of organs or even the emergence of new ones; human evolution involves
the emergence of language57 and subsequent developments outside the organism.
Popper proposes two kinds of behavioural programmes which he calls the closed
behavioural programme and the open behavioural programme. He defines them as
follows:
A closed behavioural programme is one that lays down the behaviour of
the animal in great detail. An open behavioural programme is one that
does not prescribe all the steps in the behaviour but leaves open certain
alternatives, certain choices... The open programme evolves, we may
assume, by natural selection, due to the selective tressure of complex
and irregularly changing environmental situations.5
The argumentative function of language with its concept of truth and falsity made the
development of reason possible and stimulated the human organism to a full
consciousness of self.59 Critical thought is the byproduct of the self-conscious mind.
Mental states emerge from the human body, but, with consciousness, transcend it.
Popper speaks of " ... those highly organized states which seem to be characteristic of
-the human mind,,60 as World --2~ the -h~man self. The self-conscious mind has so _
transcended the brain that it has emerged as something completely different from the
brain, yet interacting with and orchestrating it. 61 (p.112)
Popper's open evolutionary process cannot be understood reductively62; rather, upward
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and downward causation are the kingpins of openness: evolution both from lower to
higher forms and from higher evolutionary developments down to the lower levels from
which they have evolved.63
Emergence reaches a new level of complexity when the self-conscious mind, through its
products, transcends itself. These products of the human mind are created by humanity,
but they have consequences which are unexpected and unavoidable. They are thus
';;"", \.. / ' .~~
autonomous and therefore inhabit a roughly Platonic World 3. Their open autonomy is
proposed on three grounds: discovery of unknown and important truths about systems
created; autonomous problems that may never be grasped or known,64 and "exosomatic
systems of control"65 that are beyond our control. They control us. In summary,
Popper is proposing that the development of these World 3 entities is independent of the
hopes, intentions and predictions of their creators.
None of Popper's three worlds is reducible to the others, but there is an open causal
relationship between them. 66 The implications are described by Popper as follows:
... it shows that nature, or the universe to which we belong and which
contains as parts, the Worlds 1, 2, and 3, is itself open; it contains
World 3 and World 3 can be shown to be intrinsically open.67
Such a universe is creative and expanding with more highly developed organs and
systems displaying increasingly indeterminate and open behaviour than more primitive
organisms. Popper sees the asymmetry between the past and the future as providing a
strong argument for indeterminism. The past is closed; the future open. This means,
for Popper, that
In physical terms, this asymmetry is established by the fact that from any
place in the "past", a physical causal chain ... can reach any place in the
"future"; but from no place in the future can such an effect be exercised
on any place in the past.68
Is the future sheer chance? Is indeterminism free, haphazard and random? Popper's
indeterminism combines freedom and control (plastic controls) for, as he states:
203
... mere physical indeterminism is not enough ... we also must try to
establish how men, and perhaps animals, can be 'influenced' or
'controlled' by such things as aims or purposes, or rules, or
agreements.69
"Plastic controls,,70, by which Popper means World 3 objects like theories and values,
can influence World 1 changes in the universe.?l Moreover, even in the realm of
physics, "propensities,,72 (relational forces between phenomena) influence the
undetermined. For all these reasons Popper can state:
Indeterminism is not enough: to understand human freedom we need
more, we need the openness of World 1 towards World 2, of World 2
towards World 3 and the autonomous and intrinsic openness of World 3,
the world of the product of the human mind and, especially, of human
knowledge.73
This quotation demonstrates how nature and freedom interact. In World 2 and World 3,
matter has transcended itself, for" ... one sort of being, the physical, has given 'birth'
to another sort, the mental. ,,74 The mental (or the mind) evolves from nature (or the
physical); transcends nature, but nevertheless interacts with nature and controls its
operations. In this sense human freedom (the mental) is "purposive activity,,75, not
chance; teleological not "random".76
Popper sketches a universe that is emergent and novel, creative, complex, transcendent
and open.77 It is a universe whose destiny is beyond and ahead.
In the next section the open societies of Moltmann and Popper are seen as attempts to
supersede final political solutions in the spirit of open systems. Openness stands
intrinsically opposed to any closed worldly system.
7.4. OPEN SOCIETY-
Moltmann and Popper both assess the political domain from a teleological perspective.
No current or future society can ever be beyond critical scrutiny, for imperfect and
fallible men can seek only provisional solutions.
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Moltmann is more positive and activist than Popper. He believes that political theology
is intrinsically required for the liberation of the individual. The personal liberation from
sin must have a social dimension in order to re-establish the harmony of man with
himself, with humanity and with the rest of creation. The reason for this is that man is
not a one-dimensional being. His sufferings involve many levels of life; consequently,
liberation is a struggle against five "vicious circles of death".78 These are different
kinds of slavery, such as cultural, economic, social and political. However, as Christian
liberty flows from the justification of the sinner into the new life of grace, social change
also demands in addition a constant need for inner individual conversion.
However, political theology must resist the temptation to espouse a new sacral order. It
has to be critical of its own presuppositions in order to be a truly secularized theology.
This means that it has to become a force in society's liberation from political idols.79
Indeed, in Christianity's identification with the Crucified One who reveals the truth
about an unredeemed man80 the Christian faith is a power of liberation from any merely
secular political hope. Christian hope in the promise is so radical that it stands in
contrast not only to existing reality but also to any this-worldly reality. For Moltmann
the kingdom is only anticipated in creative acts that contradict and open up existing
reality to the future promise. 81 The Resurrection of Jesus is;the messianic anticipation
of the end-time. As the eschatological event, it transcends every merely partial political
solution. Thus the growth of the kingdom may not be confused or identified with any
specific stage of history or political ideology. 'Moltmann is opposed to final political
solutions. Therefore political theology must not link itself directly to politics as happens
when it sees itself in positiv~ ~d dogmatic terms. Only a future oriented, critical
political theology based on eschatology can provide a stimulus towards the creative
conversion of the world from the latency to the tendency of its possibilities. 82 This is
always an ongoing, unfinished process threatened by sin. Therefore until the parousia,
liberty will always be incomplete, for the creative acts that are the negation of the
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negative and open up closed systems to the future of a promise are not the kingdom, but
merely anticipations of the kingdom. Nevertheless, they open up society to the
liberating promise of Christ. 83
Popper's sociological ideas are closely integrated with his evolutionary epistemology.
All knowledge and, indeed, even the roots of knowledge in Darwinian natural selection,
is a process of problem-solving.84 Hence; living itself is a process of problem-solving.
Popper therefore calls for the creation of societies which are conducive to problem-
solving. Problem-solving calls for a bold propounding of trial solutions which can then
be subjected to criticism and error-elimination.85 This necessitates a form of society
which permits, firstly, the unrestricted assertion of different proposals; secondly,
criticism, and lastly a genuine possibility of change in the light of criticism. 86 Popper
believes that a society so organized will be more effective in solving its problems than a
centrally organized society planned and ordered as a whole. Rationality, logic and
science all point towards a society which is open and pluralistic. In Popper's words,
rational discussion has various advantages: " ... the the habit of listening to another point
of view; the growth of a sense of justice; and the readiness to compromise. ,,87 In an
open society, everyone is free to investigate problem situations and to propose solutions;
to criticize the proposed solutions of others, including especially the government.
Official policies are changed and organized in the light of such criticism. 88
An open society requires an individual response. Responsible individuals are needed in
a community where the growth of truth requires imagination, trial-and-error,
progressive discovery of preju.di£.~ and_critical discussion. 89 Stress on the individual is
bound to Popper's "methodological nominalism" ,90 a counter to what he calls -
"essentialism" .91 Essentialism (a form of classical belief in universals) aims to capture
the essence of reality in definitions. In this way it leads naturally to Utopianism and
consequent ideological conflict. Rather the approach should be to describe phenomena
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and ask questions like "How shall we behave in these circumstances?" Such an answer
could be fruitfully discussed, criticized and, then, should it withstand criticism, tried
out. There are no ideas, theories or institutions that are not of human making.
Popper i~ opposed to any deterministic politics of perfection starting from a blueprint.92
There are no rhythms or patterns to be discovered in the evolution of historical
processes.93 Changes can only be made in existing circumstances for social and
. -- ., . . ~.
political developments are strongly influenced by scientific developments. This means
that the growth of knowledge is a major influence on the course of human history. For
this reason Popper is adamant that all claims to knowledge can only be provisional, for
we "... cannot predict by rational or scientific methods the future growth of our
scientific knowledge,,94 and hence cannot predict the course of history. Change is
never going to stop. Therefore the very notion of a Utopian blueprint is nonsensical.
For this reason when critical rationalism, a philosophical concept, is applied to politics,
the result is "piecemeal social engineering,,95. Present social and political problems are
addressed by the method of trial-and-error. Improvements are achieved, but perfection
is not the goal.
The function of the state is a negative one. It minimizes evils without trying to realize
some positive good. Its function is to protect its citizens against various kinds of
exploitation, to maximize the freedom of all and to leave the promotion of happiness to
private initiative.96
The Open Society of Moltm.an.!l-and Eopper is the sociological counterpart of their
epistemology, anthropology and cosmology. Their society is a society of imperfection,
creatively overcoming limitation in an openness to the future. They are not in complete
accord. Moltmann is more collectivist and interventionist; Popper more individualistic
and less interventionist.
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In the next chapter, Moltmann's and Popper's contributions to a possible dialogue
between theology and science will be assessed. In complexity, transcendence and
openness they provide a model for a commonality of approach.
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One of the greatest adjustments that theology has had to make in our present century is
the acceptance of the idea that we live in a world where change is the norm. God did
not make a static, unchanging universe; rather, it can be said that he is making an
evolving, increasingly complex, transcendent and open universe.
Moltmann and Popper both accept that the matter or stuff of the universe organizes itself
into ever-increasingly complicated structures. With this increase in complexity there has
been a corresponding increase in the psychic quality of life until, with the advent of
man, we see some degree of conscious control of the material universe. Indeed, the
entire universe is in a continuous process of complex development with man in the
middle of it all.
In Moltmann's and Popper's thought there is a continuity in cosmic, biological and
human evolution. The whole of material reality out of which life - and eventually man -
has appeared, presents a vast process in the course of which the more complex has
arisen, from the less complex. It is an upward and open trend in which the higher
invariably emerges from the lower.!
-- -
In a strong stand against classicaIreductionism, both agree that when a higher degree of _
integration is reached the whole is greater than the sum of its parts. Thus the greater the
complexity of the brain and nervous system, the higher the form of consciousness.2
Indeed in man (the spearhead of evolution) evolution has led to two qualities intrinsic to
Moltmann's and Popper's thought, that is, self-consciousness and freedom (or
openness). For both, evolution prior to man's arrival was a gro.wth through increasing
complexity and openness towards freedom. Since man's arrival it is the growth of
freedom (and corresponding indeterminancy). Thus man is not a finished creation; he is
incomplete, his nature open-ended with possibilities for the future.
In chapter seven mention was made of Thomas Kuhn's influential study, The Structure
of Scientific Revolutions. Kuhn's influence has led some scientists to reconsider how
accurately we can know reality. Previously Popper had proposed that our observations
are theory-Iaden.3 The discussion of the relationship of scientific theories to truth and
reality has led many scientists today to be more modest in their claims about the physical
world.4 Indeed the physicist, Heinz Pagels, looks towards a resolution of the conflict
between the reductionist and the transcendental view of reality. He states:
The mind, it seems is transcendent to nature. Yet according to the
natural sciences that transcendent realm must be materially supported and
is said to be subject to natural laws. Resolving this conflict is, and will
remain, a primar~ intellectual challenge to our civilization for the next
several centuries.
The future openness of science must be matched by the openness of theology. This
means that they must both become more modest regarding the certainty of what they
know, as well as more open to outside influences. Theology, thus, cannot understand
the fullness of human history and the accompanying social and cultural changes without
knowledge and insight from physical nature and the cosmic processes which are already
more than 15 billion years old. The evolutionary theory outlined by Moltmann and
Popper recognizes, as mentioned earlier, a self-transcendence of the lower into the
higher, of the complex arising out of the simple. This makes it unnecessary to posit
body-soul dualism to safeguard ,the spirItual principle in man. Theologically, then,
potental spirituality is present even in the dynamics of matter.
A major challenge to faith, however, wilt"be to incorporate chance and accident into a
theory of evolution.
,-
In his work The Blind Watchmaker, Richard Dawkins a,
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contemporary neo-Darwinian, dismisses conscious design within a complex universe,
Natural selection, the blind, unconscious, automatic process which
Darwin described, and which we now know is the explanation for the
existence and apparent purposeful form of all life, has no purpose in
mind. It does not plan for the future. It has no vision, no foresight, no
sight at all. If it can be said to play the role of watchmaker in nature, it
is the blind watchmaker".6
It is our fear of purposelessness that makes us uneasy about giving chance all:d accident a
role in creation. There is no blind watchmaker in theology. For the theologian accident
must play a positive role in an evolutionary theology of creation. Perhaps with echoes
of Moltmann's Theology ofPlay in our minds, we could use the analogy of a game. A
game has rules and constraints, but it also contains an element of chance. Perhaps in
keeping with the openness of creation, God's very creative act is a continuous thing like
the playing of a game. This means that all the various moves cannot be calculated and
premeditated from the beginning. The universe, for Moltmann and Popper, is not a
closed mechanical system running in predestined tracks. Rather, it is an open-ended
universe governed by both law and chance and follows a route leading towards
complexity, openness and self-transcendence.
f
The German theologian, biophysicist and Nobel prize-winner, Manfred Eigen, qptures
the aforesaid sentiments in these words: "Certainly God does play dice, but he also
follows the rules of the game.,,7 Express~ differently, for the theologian it could be
said that God is the Field in which the game is played, intimately close to every detail of
the process, a Lord of scientific law and a Lord of chance.
The theologian has always been more concerned about the fact that God creates the,- -
universe. The what and the how of creation have previously been of little concern. In -
dialogue with science, it becomes possible for theology to learn more of God's creative
power and the implication of these results for human beings and their relationship to
God. Efforts must certainly be made to re-formulate certain traditional Christian
doctrines in the context of widely accepted scientific findings, especially those regarding
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the evolution of matter which reaches its acme in the human person.
The degree of convergence in Moltmann's and Popper's treatment of the evolutionary
process, that is, complexity, openness, and transcendence, provides a modest basis for a
collaborative sharing of the fallible insights of two differing areas of reality. Science
and theology are no longer two totally separate areas of discourse; for, in Alfred North
Whitehead's words,
"When we consider what religion is for mankind, and what science is, it
is no exaggeration to say that the future course of history depends upon
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